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I. INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace is the realm of digital data.' Its shores and rivers are
the computer memories and telephone networks that connect comput-
ers all over the world. Cyberspace is a hidden universe behind the
automatic teller machines, telephones, and Lexis terminals which many
of us take for granted. It is also a way for computer users all over the
world to interact with each other instantaneously. It is also the fastest
growing communications medium ever invented. However, the growth
of electronic communication and data manipulation has not been
matched by an equal growth in understanding on the part of legisla-
tures, the judiciary, or the bar. Many decisions involving computers
and computer networks are fundamentally flawed by a lack of
understanding of the technology and how the intricacies of a particular
1. "Computer information systems," as the term is used in this Article, refers to a variety
of computer services that, together, make up "Cyberspace."
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legal field apply to the particular technology. In some cases decisions
are made and legislation is passed with no regard or understanding of
what impact there will be on the technology being affected by the
legislation or court decision. Only with a proper understanding of
both the law and the technology will electronic communications grow
unimpeded by the archaic residue of the legal system.
This Article gives a summary of the current regulatory structure
in the United States governing a few of the "Empires of Cyberspace,"
such as bulletin board systems, electronic databases, file servers,
networks (such as the Internet) and the like. Different legal analogies
that may apply will be illustrated, and some of their strengths,
weaknesses, and alternatives will be analyzed. I will begin by looking
at different types of computer information systems, and then the major
legal issues surrounding computer information systems will be
surveyed in brief.2 Next, the different legal analogies which could be
applied to computer information systems will be examined. These
different analogies provide an understanding of how courts have seen
various communication technologies, and how more traditional
technologies are similar to computer information systems. Liability for
improper activities-both defining what is improper and who can be
held responsible-has been determined by the analogy the courts
decide to apply. In the course of this analysis, it will be shown where
some judges and legislators have gone wrong. Hopefully, as more
attorneys, judges and legislators become familiar with computers and
network communication, there will be fewer errors to point out.
II. COMPUTER INFORMATION SYSTEMS DEFINED3
As computer communication advances and becomes more
commonplace, many services that were once distinct have merged and
are harder to distinguish. While once we could talk about bulletin
board systems, files servers, chat rooms or channels, etc., systems may
now act as all of these services rolled into one entity and accessible at
a World Wide Web site. Some of the different technologies are worth
distinct examination, however.
A network is a series of computers, connected often by special
types of telephone wires. Many networks are conduits used to call up
2. Each of the legal issues could be discussed in articles at least this long, so only the most
important aspects will be covered.
3. For more information on specific technologies and terms, a good resource is Requests for
Comments (RFCs) and the like put out by the Internet Engineering Task Force. See
<http://www.internic.net/ds/dspgOintdoc.html>.
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a remote computer in order to make use of that computer's resources
from a remote personal computer.4 Many networks allow a much
broader range of uses such as sending e-mail and more interactive
forms of communication between machines,' transferring computer
files, using information distribution protocols such as usenet news and
the phenomenally popular World Wide Web (the Web), and also
providing the same remote access and use that the simpler networks
allow.6 Networks can be used not only for personal e-mail, but also
for a number of special kinds of electronic publishing.
A Bulletin Board System, often referred to simply as a BBS, is the
computerized equivalent to the bulletin boards commonly found in the
workplace, schools, and the like. Instead of hanging on a wall covered
with notes pinned up with thumbtacks, computer bulletin boards exist
inside the memory of a computer system. Rather than walking up to
a bulletin board and reading notes other people have left, or sticking
up notes of his or her own, the BBS user connects his or her personal
computer to the "host" computer,8 sometimes directly via a telephone
4. Some of the major examples of networks are the Internet-a global network of networks,
Sprintnet, and specifically for WESTLAW users there is Westnet.
5. An example of such interactive communication is the UNIX "Talk" command which
allows a person to correspond instantaneously with a remote user. Both users can type
simultaneously; one user's text appears on the top of his or her computer screen while the other
user's text appears on the bottom. While such uses predated even electronic mail, such services
are being replaced by audio and video conferencing technologies which allow users with
microphones or video cameras attached to their computers to communicate with other similarly
equipped computer users or, in some cases, the computer communications may be interfaced with
more traditional telephone networks.
6. An example of these more full-service type networks include the Internet, Bitnet, and
ARPANET.
7. One such special use is the electronic mailing list. A message is sent to a "listserver"
(sometimes just called a "Listserv") where it is then automatically distributed to other people on
its electronic mailing list. A listserver is an automated computer mailing program running out
of a computer account. Mail is sent to the account; the listserver then redistributes the message.
The people on the list then receive the message as e-mail. They can respond by sending a reply
back to the listserver which then distributes that message to its list, which includes the first
message sender. This works, in effect, like a group of people standing around discussing a topic,
though some people are left behind in the discussion if they do not log on to read their mail
regularly. A similar type of electronic publication is the electronic digest; a message is sent to the
listserver, but, instead of being automatically sent out, it is held. A "moderator" then sorts
through and edits the material for distribution to the people on the digest's mailing list. The
most formal type of electronic publishing is the Electronic magazine or journal, often called the
E-journal. These are "real" magazines, just like print magazines, but they are distributed
electronically, rather than in hard copy.
8. A host computer is the computer that runs the bulletin board software and stores the
messages left by users of the BBS.
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line,9 more often via a computer network such as the global Internet.
By connecting to the BBS, a user can read the notes (also referred to
as messages or posts) of other users or type in his or her own messages
to be read by other users. These computer bulletin boards are
sometimes referred to as "systems" because they often provide
additional services or separate "areas" for posting messages related to
different topics.1" Others may be simple message areas, yet others
may be "web-boards" which run on a World Wide Web page and
allow the additional hyperlinking or features that the Web protocol"
allows.
There are a number of different things bulletin board systems
allow one to do. As their name implies, their primary function is as
a place to post messages and read messages posted by others.
Whatever the user's interests, there is probably a BBS or Internet
usenet newsgroup12 to cater to it. Like any communications forum,
these discussion forums can raise some serious First Amendment and
liability concerns over some of the potential uses, such as availability
of pornographic material, defamation, etc.
Another use for networked computers (or bulletin board systems
and other services which allow multiple users to connect to the system)
is the sending of electronic mail, or e-mail, as it is often called.
Electronic mail is a message that is sent from one computer user to
another, transmitting either between users on the same computer, or
between users on different computers connected together by a network.
9. Connection via a telephone line may be accomplished by a modem (a device which
converts computer data to an audio signal which can then be transferred over a standard telephone
wire where it is received by another computer, also equipped with a modem) which then converts
the signal back into a form comprehensible to the receiving computer.
10. These "areas" may be referred to by a variety of names, such as boards, forums, special
interest groups (SIGs), conferences, rooms, newsgroups, etc.
11. The World Wide Web works based on the hypertext transfer protocol (http). Thus
any Internet address that begins "http://" indicates that it is a web address. Web pages are
written in a special language, Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), which describes how the
web page should be displayed by web browsing software. (It is important to note, however, that
HTML only roughly describes the look of a web page, some aspects of a web page's appearance
are affected by the settings of a specific user's web browser for instance, the coding of a web
page may indicate that some text is emphasized, but the user can determine how text that is
emphasized is displayed by his or her web browser).
12. Usenet news is similar to a BBS in practice, but it is a worldwide conferencing system
with no central host computer. A user "posts" a message to a particular newsgroup via a service
provider's "news server." The news server then passes the message to other news servers from
which the first news server receives or gives a "news feed." These receiving news servers then
pass the message on to other news servers to which they are connected. The process continues
until the posted message achieves worldwide distribution. Local Internet providers who make
available usenet news often receive thousands of individual topic-segregated discussion forums.
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E-mail and regular mail are different in three important ways. First,
because e-mail is provided by private parties, it is not subject to
government control under the postal laws as is regular mail."
However, it is under the control of the system operator (often called
the SYSOP) of the computer system on which it resides at any
particular time. This gives rise to the second issue-privacy. Unlike
the U.S. mail, electronic mail is almost always examinable by someone
other than the sender and the receiver of the message. By necessity,
the communications provider may not only have access to all mail sent
through the computer system, but may also have to keep copies (or
"backups") in case of system failure. Third, e-mail is interactive in
nature and can involve almost instantaneous communication, more like
a telephone than regular mail, so much so that regular users of e-mail
often refer to the U.S. mail as "snail mail."
Multiple user bulletin board systems are also frequently used for
their "chat" features, allowing a user to talk to other users who are on-
line (connected to the host computer or network) at the same time.
Some of these bulletin boards take the form of slow discussions where
messages may be few and may be stored on the system for a long time;
others may take the form of a "chat room" or "channel" or "instant
messages" where discussions move in near real time, 14 and the
messages may not be accessible for long after they are entered by users.
Another service available over computer networks (or many
bulletin board systems) is the ability to upload and download files.1"
A computer system providing a file archive, or "file server, 16 may
allow its users to download almost any type of computer file. This
may consist of text, software, pictures, sounds, and more. These
servers may be seamlessly integrated with other technologies and
distribution mechanisms-for instance, a web page may have "links"
to software packages which are distributed via a "web server." 7
13. Robert W. Kasteneier et al., Communications Privacy: A Legislative Perspective, 1989
Wis. L. REV. 715, 727 n.75 (1989).
14. In real time conversations, the messages are received at about the same time that they
are sent, as opposed to messages which are sent but not received until some time later, such as
when the recipient does not actively check to see if any new messages have been posted to a
bulletin board.
15. Downloading entails transferring files from the computer on which the files are stored
to the user's computer, and uploading is the reverse.
16. A file server (or just "server") is a storage device, such as a disk drive or CD ROM,
hooked up to a computer network that lets any computer connected to it access the files contained
on the server.
17. Discussed infra Part IX.E.
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Another common type of information distribution system is the
database.'" These services allow the user to enter a variety of "search
terms" to look through the information the service has collected.
Other network based information distribution services include the
menu driven "gopher" server (basically, a type of file server), Wide
Area Information Server (WAIS),"9 and the Web.
The Web, the fastest growing Internet service, is another method
of accessing material on a computer network. Technically, the Web
is a protocol-a format for transmitting information over a network,
just as e-mail or usenet news are also protocols that distribute
information over a network such as the Internet. The Web features
the ability to display graphics, sounds, movies, and more. Most
importantly though, it allows for hypertext links. Hypertext links are,
for example, terms in a document that when selected, call up other
documents, (or sounds, pictures, or other materials) which are related
to the selected term. From these related documents, links can be
followed to yet more related documents, and so on.
III. ISSUES INVOLVED
Computer information systems present a whole slew of legal
issues. Whenever a new form of communication emerges, there is a
concern that along with legitimate users will come some abusers.2°
Just as networked computer systems can be used for political debate,
they can also be used as an outlet for defamation. How should they
be treated? Who is liable? Is it the user who originally posted the
defamation or the system operator who controls and provides the
forum?
Whenever a new communications medium develops, there is a risk
that it will be used to deliver material which society frowns upon, such
as obscene or indecent data. Computer information systems allow the
distribution of this material in the forms of text, picture, and sound.
One major use for computer information systems is transferring
files. Legal issues arise when these transfers contain copyrighted
material. A harder question is who should be liable when data
transfers constitute copyright infringement-the transmitter? The
18. Examples include WESTLAW, LEXIS, DIALOG, ERIC, and the local library's card
catalog.
19. This is a natural language search system for searching through diverse forms of informa-
tion stored in a large database or across computer networks-in essence, a large database.
20. For example, defamatory content can be sent via e-mail, cable, traditional broadcasting,
or it can even be chiseled into stone tablets. Just as someone can break into a computer system,
there has been unauthorized reception of cable and satellite TV signals and cellular phone fraud.
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system operator of the machine through which the material passes?
The recipient who may have initiated the transfer?
A continual threat to computer users is the computer virus.21
Viruses can be distributed via computer information systems, both
consciously and unconsciously. They can be put into a system by
someone intending to cause harm, or they can be innocently transferred
by a user who has an infected disk.
Information privacy is another issue for users and operators of
computer information systems. With society becoming increasingly
computerized, people need to be made aware of the extent to which
their stored data and electronic software are secure. The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.22
Yet, how does this Amendment apply to Cyberspace? Cyberspace is
a vague, ethereal place with no readily identifiable boundaries, where
a "seizure" may not result in the loss of anything tangible and may not
even be noticed.
Furthermore, when activities do occur that violate the law, where
does one seek redress? When a network such as the Internet is
accessible worldwide, and thus difficult to identify from where
objectionable material is originating, jurisdiction becomes a complex
question.
In all of these cases, questions arise as to who is liable. If
SYSOPs are not made aware of the legal issues they may face in
running a computer system, they may either fail to reduce or eliminate
harm when it is within their power to do so, or they may unnecessarily
restrict the services they provide out of fear of liability.
IV. LEGAL ANALOGIES
Some services allow one entity to deliver its message to a large
number of receivers. In this regard, the entity acts like a publisher.
Many publishers use web pages to supplement their printed editions
21. A virus is a program which replicates itself and moves from computer to computer
system by incorporating itself into other programs that are then shared among computer systems.
Not all viruses cause damage, though many do. For more information on viruses and related
programs, see <http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/hypertext/bngusenet/comp/virus/top.html>.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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either by providing additional stories or by providing information
services on-line. Some services are nearly indistinguishable from
broadcasting. Perhaps an information system operator may literally be
a broadcaster because computer services can be provided by sending
data over the airwaves. However, other computer services function
more like common carriers than publishers. Networks just pass data
from one computer to another-they do not gather and edit data. In
most cases though, the analogy is that information dissemination may
be in the one-to-many form that broadcasters traditionally use.
Computer services can also be used to allow many entities to deliver
their messages simultaneously to many other entities in a public
debate-style setting. In this way, computer information systems are
likened to traditional public fora, such as street corners or community
bulletin boards.
None of these analogies is especially useful taken individually.
Each is accurate in describing some situations, but is lacking in
describing others. There is a tendency to look at a service and give it
a label, and then regulate it based on its label. This labeling works
well in some instances, but when a service has a number of communi-
cation options, such as a bulletin boards, e-mail, a chat feature, and a
file server, one analogy is insufficient. Even the terminology used to
discuss a situation can color how it is viewed-e.g., "I visited your web
site" versus "you distributed your material into my jurisdiction via
your web site." To regulate networked computer systems properly,
lawyers, judges, and juries need to understand computer information
systems and how they work and when some of these analogies do not
cleanly apply.
Liability for illegal activities on-line is affected by how the
particular computer information service is viewed. As cases arise
around computer communication services, the law applying to old
models of communication is looked to for guidance. Therefore, until
a distinct body of law evolves to define the limits of liability in a
computer network context, it is important to understand how the law
affecting other media may apply.
A. Information System as Press
Often the only practical difference between print media and
electronic media is paper. In fact, with electronic word processing and
page layout programs used by most print publishers, printed periodi-
cals in essence exist as electronic journals prior to printing.
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Even bulletin board operators sometimes see themselves as being
analogous to print publishers.23 Prodigy, a large on-line service
provider, is an example of a service that initially saw itself as a
publisher. In fact, Prodigy at one point referred to the people who
screen messages posted in their conferences as "editors" and not
censors, and Prodigy claimed all of them had journalism back-
grounds.24 Both Prodigy and the local newspaper took "articles" by"authors" and "publish[ed]" them in their respective media for the
consumption of their "subscribers."
Generally, there are two types of publishers-primary and
secondary. A primary publisher is presumed to play a part in the
creative process of crafting the message which is then disseminated.2"
Primary publishers are what one generally thinks of when thinking of
publishers. Prodigy has claimed to be such a publisher.26 While the
Constitution provides some protection to the editor's judgment as to
what to print,27 the protection is not complete. The publisher is
generally held to know what is being published because he or she has
editorial control over the material that is published.
The question then becomes: Is knowledge enough to result in
liability? Defamation 21 generally requires the publisher to have
published the defamation with knowing or reckless disregard for the
truth.29 For a SYSOP, at least a "know or have reason to know"
standard would be necessary. A SYSOP for a large computer system
with a lot of users may not be able to keep track of all of the electronic
journals and messages on bulletin boards which are being run on his
or her system. Add in gigabytes of usenet news traffic that typically
passes through the average Internet service provider's system, and the
amount of content for which there may be liability becomes tremen-
23. However, a Wisconsin court has held that a traditional BBS is not, for the purposes of
a state defamation-retraction law, a "periodical." It's In the Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, No. 94-
3162 (Wis. Ct. App., Apr. 11), rev'd, 535 N.W.2d 11 (1995). Compare, Stern v. Delphi Internet
Services Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (N.Y. Supp. 1995) which found that for the purposes of
a New York invasion of privacy law, an on-line service is analogous to a news disseminator/distri-
butor such as a television network, news vendor, bookstore, or library.
24. Mitchell Kapor, A Day in the Life of Prodigy, EFFECTOR ONLINE, available over
INTERNET, by anonymous FTP, at FTP.EFF.ORG (Electronic Frontier Foundation) (Vol. 1, No.
5).
25. Robert Charles, Note, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation: Who Should be Liable?
Under What Standard?, 2 J.L. & TECH 121, 131 (1987).
26. See generally, Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28. Discussed infra Part V.A.
29. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
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dous. While a SYSOP may have the same editorial control that a print
publisher has, the sheer volume may effectively prohibit actual editorial
control over what is being published over the computer system.
An argument for a "know or reason to know" standard is
supported by some cases-for example, those that do not allow the
publisher to be held liable for everything in his or her periodical, such
as the safety of products sold by their advertisers.3" As the court in
Yuhas v. Mudge held,
[t]o impose the [duty to check the truth of the claims of all of their
advertisers] upon publishers of nationally circulated magazines,
newspapers, and other publications would not only be impractical
and unrealistic, but would have a staggering, adverse effect on the
commercial world and our economic system. For the law to permit
such exposure to those in the publishing business . .. would open
the doors to 'liability in an indeterminate amount for an indetermi-
nate time, to an indeterminate class.' 3'
The converse of the position taken in Yuhas v. Mudge also
supports this "know or reason to know" standard. In Braun v. Soldier
of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,32 a magazine was held liable for the results
of running a personal services advertisement for, what turned out to
be, an assassin.33 The court found the publisher knew of the likeli-
hood that criminal activity would result from an ad such as the one at
issue, as many newspaper and magazine articles had linked past Soldier
of Fortune personal services ads with criminal convictions. 4 The test
the court used was "whether the burden on the defendant of adopting
adequate precautions is less than the probability of harm from the
defendant's unmodified conduct multiplied by the gravity of the injury
that might result from the defendant's unmodified conduct."35
Employing this test, the court held that the proper balance was to hold
the publisher liable when "the advertisement on its face would have
alerted a reasonably prudent publisher of the clearly identifiable
unreasonable risk of harm to the public that the advertisements
posed."36  The court, in accord with Yuhas v. Mudge, held that the
30. See, e.g., Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
31. Id.
32. 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071 (1993).
33. The advertisement read: "GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary
desires jobs. Vietnam Veteran. Discrete [sic] and very private. Body guard, courier, and other
special skills. All jobs considered. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.
34. Id. 1112-13.
35. Id. at 1115 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d. 169 (2d Cir. 1947)).
36. Id. at 1115.
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publisher's First Amendment concerns should be protected by not
requiring the publisher to actually investigate the advertisements, and
only to impose liability where a reasonably prudent publisher would
determine that an ad "on its face" posed "a clearly identifiable
unreasonable risk that the offer in the ad is one to commit a serious
violent crime. ' 37
If a "know or have reason to know" standard were applied to
computer information systems, offending material reported to a SYSOP
would have to be dealt with under threat of liability. Also, any
offending material discovered by the SYSOP would need to be
removed. A SYSOP could not avoid monitoring for improper content,
knowing such content is present, and then later claim ignorance.
This test was put to use, to some extent, in the Stratton Oakmont
v. Prodigy case.3" In this case, Prodigy lost a motion for summary
judgment when the court held that Prodigy could be held liable as a
primary publisher for defamatory statements made on one of its
bulletin boards.39 The court held that, because Prodigy had a staff
of people who monitored its bulletin boards for messages that do not
fit Prodigy's content guidelines, because it has software that automati-
cally screens all bulletin board postings, and because it advertised itself
as a service that provides an atmosphere free from certain types of
content, Prodigy could be held to be exerting the same content control
as a publisher, and thus be subject to the same liability as a publish-
er. 40
A secondary publisher is someone who is involved in the
publication process, such as a press operator, mail carrier, or radio and
television engineer, who usually does not know when a statement he or
she transmits is defamatory and is usually not in a position to prevent
the harm-a secondary publisher generally has no control over the
content of the message, unlike a primary publisher.41 Unless the
secondary publishers know or have reason to know of the defamatory
nature of the material they are transmitting, they are free from liability
37. Id. at 1118 (quoting district court's jury instruction). To point out the difficulty with
this test, one of the three Justices dissented because although he agreed with the court's test, he
found the particular ad ambiguous. Id. at 1122 (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
38. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995). The result in this case
has been superceded by statute. See, e.g., Zehran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th
Cir. 1997).
39. Statton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 at *1.
40. Id. at *4.
41. Joseph P. Thornton, et al., Symposium: Legal Issues in Electronic Publishing: 5. Libel,
36 FED. COM. L.J. 178, 179 (1984).
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for defamation.42 Secondary publishers are often treated synonymous-
ly with republishers which are discussed in the next section.
B. Information System as Republisher/Disseminator
A republisher, or disseminator, is defined as someone who
"circulates, sells, or otherwise deals in the physical embodiment of the
published material."4  Some computer information systems are like
republishers because all that they do is make files or messages
available, just like a book seller or library makes texts available. A
librarian cannot be expected to read every book in the library, just as
the system operator of a service may not be able to read every file
stored on the computer system. One of the characteristics of secondary
publishers is that they are "presumed, by definition, to be ignorant of
the defamatory nature of the matter published or to be unable to
modify the defamatory message in order to prevent the harm."44
The case that first established the immunity from liability for
distributors, breaking the common law tradition, was Smith v.
California.45 The Smith case involved a bookseller who was convicted
of violating a statute that made it illegal to deal in obscene materials.
The lower court held violators of the statute strictly liable. However,
the court held that a law which holds a bookseller strictly liable for the
contents of the books he or she sells is unconstitutional. Justice
Brennan stated his reasons as follows:
For if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the
contents ... he will tend to restrict the books he sells to the ones he
has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction
upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene
literature. It has been well observed of a statute construed as
dispensing with any requirement of scienter that: 'Every bookseller
would be placed under an obligation to make himself aware of the
contents of every book in his shop. It would be unreasonable to
demand so near an approach to omniscience.' And the bookseller's
burden would become the public's burden . . . . The bookseller's
limitation in the amount of reading material with which he could
familiarize himself, and his timidity in the face of absolute criminal
liability, thus would tend to restrict the public's access to forms of
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1989).
43. Eric C. Jensen, An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin Boards and the First Amend-
ment, 39 FED. COM. L.J. 217, 247 (1987).
44. Charles, supra note 25, at 131.
45. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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the printed word which the State could not constitutionally suppress
directly.46
While this case did not determine the degree of liability appropri-
ate for a bookseller, it did find that strict liability was too restrictive.47
Later courts, however, were willing to set a minimum standard of
liability, and that standard was set to a "know or have reason to know"
standard.48 In addition, secondary publishers are not required to
investigate the contents of the messages they are delivering in order to
avoid liability.49 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. is a major decision
supporting the analogy of the computer information system as a
republisher or disseminator of media.S" CompuServe, another large
on-line service provider, contracts out its editorial control of various
discussion groups to other companies, who maintain the fora in
accordance with CompuServe's general guidelines."1  The groups
maintaining these fora are similar to print publishers-they take articles
submitted by users and then publish them, exerting editorial control
over the material where necessary. CompuServe functions, in essence,
like an electronic book store. CompuServe sells to its users the
materials that the discussion groups publish. In Cubby, one of the
forums uploaded and made available an on-line publication which
defamed the plaintiff.52 CompuServe had no opportunity to review
the periodical's contents before it was made available to CompuServe's
subscribers. District Judge Leisure found that, because CompuServe
had no editorial control over the periodical, and CompuServe did not
know or have reason to know of the defamation contained in the
periodical, CompuServe was, in essence, "an electronic, for-profit
library." 3
Like a bookstore or library, CompuServe had the option to carry
or not to carry the periodical, but once the decision was made,
CompuServe had no editorial control over the periodical. The court
recognized the function of technology and admitted that a computer
database is the functional equivalent to a news distributor or a public
46. Id. at 153-54 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 155.
48. See Seton v. American News Co., 133 F. Supp. 591, 593 (N.D. Fla. 1955). Cf. Manual
Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
49. Id.
50. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
51. Id. at 137.
52. Id. at 138.
53. Id. at 140.
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library, and therefore the same "know or have reason to know"
standard should apply.
This view is supported by the Stratton Oakmont decision,
discussed earlier, which held that when a system operator does take
substantial steps to monitor system content, it can be held responsible
for not doing an adequate job. 4 Thus Stratton Oakmont and Cubby
seem to establish the two ends of the liability spectrum.
With respect to some types of material, Congress has decided to
change the balance of these two cases. As part of the "Communica-
tions Decency Act""5 a "safe-harbor" provision was added to provide
some immunity for entities which merely carry content provided by
others.5 6 As one of the first courts to rely on the provision described
the situation,
Whether wisely or not, [Congress] made the legislative judgment to
effectively immunize providers of interactive computer services from
civil liability in tort with respect to material disseminated by them
but created by others. In recognition of the speed with which
information may be disseminated and the near impossibility of
regulating information content, Congress decided not to treat
providers of interactive computer services like other information
providers such as newspapers, magazines or television and radio
stations, all of which may be held liable for publishing or distribut-
ing obscene or defamatory material written or prepared, by others
while Congress could have made a different policy choice, it opted
not to hold interactive computer services liable for their failure to
edit, withhold or restrict access to offensive material disseminated
through their medium."
With this safe-harbor provision, Congress is stating that whatever
service providers are, they are not to be treated as republishers of other
people's content. In fact, this section would seem to provide immunity
even when a system operator sees questionable content on a system and
actively decides to leave the content publicly accessible." Further-
54. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
55. Passed as section 502 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-1-, 110
Stat. 133 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 609 (1997)).
56. Section (c) (1) reads "(1) TREATMENT OF PUBLISHER OR SPEAKER-No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1994).
57. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
58. This interpretation was pointedly noted by Judge Friendly in the Drudge opinion:
Because it has the right to exercise editorial control over those with whom it contracts
and whose words it disseminates, it would seem only fair to hold AOL to the liability
standards applied to a distributor. But Congress has made a different policy choice by
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more, in order to specifically address the unpopular Stratton-Oakmont
decision, subsection (2) provides:
(2) CIVIL LIABILITY - No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of-
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitu-
tionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to
material described in paragraph (1).9
Specifically excluded from this safe harbor provision are violations of
any criminal law, intellectual property laws, communications privacy
law, or any state law that is consistent with this section.6' So far, this
safe harbor provision has been used to provide immunity for service
providers from claims of negligence in allowing the allegedly careless
dissemination of defamatory statements, 61 and for use of a service
provider's chat rooms to market child pornography.6 2
C. Information System as Common Carrier
Network transmissions, e-mail, and some other features of a
computer information systems such as "chat" features all work to
support a common carrier model. A common carrier is a service that:
is [ofi a quasi-public character, which arises out of the undertaking,to carry for all people indifferently . . . .' This does not mean that
the particular services offered must practically be available to the
entire public; a specialized carrier whose service is of possible use to
providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even
aggressive role in making available content prepared by others. In some sort of tacit
quid pro quo arrangement with the service provider community, Congress has conferred
immunity from tort liability as an incentive to self-police the Internet for obscenity and
other offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even
attempted.
Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
59. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 230(d) (West Supp. 1998).
61. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). The Zeran court held
that although not all state claims are preempted, the particular claim at issue is based on attaching
liability for distributing others comments, and thus is explicitly preempted by the safe harbor
provision. Id. at 334. See also Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 44.
62. Doe v. America Online, Inc., No. CL 97-631 AE, 1997 WL 374223, at *2 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. June 26, 1997).
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only a fraction of the population may nonetheless be a common
carrier if he [or she] holds himself [or herself] out to serve indiffer-
ently all potential users.63
Importantly, a computer information system need not be classified
according to only one communications analogy-a system can act at
times like a publisher, and at times like a common carrier.
Common carriers have generally been considered secondary
publishers,64 and as such, have traditionally functioned under a
reduced standard of liability.6" That standard is, once again, a "know
or have reason to know" standard of liability.66 This standard has
been widely adopted and applied to the electronic communications
media from telegraphs67 to telephones,68 and even to businesses such
as telephone answering services.69 There are a number of reasons for
applying a knowing standard to a common carrier.
One reason is efficiency; service providers would not be able to do
their job transmitting data as well if they also had to monitor
content.7" Another reason is fairness; common carrier operators are
not trained in what is libelous and what is not. And, even if they
were, they would have to make many decisions at a quick rate-not a
fair burden to place on the common carrier.7 A third reason is
privacy; by removing a need for common carriers to monitor content
of transmissions, the likelihood is increased that transmissions will be
held private. Thus, a "know or have reason to know" standard makes
a lot of sense for computer networks, as all of the above interests
would be served by applying the same liability standard to a network
as is applied to a common carrier.
Like a common carrier, computer networks carry data from one
computer to another with no regard for the information being
transferred. Data that is transferred over a computer network often
consists of electronic mail, web traffic, or other data passively being
forwarded from an account on a sending machine to an account on a
63. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Commr's v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
64. E.g., Von Meysenburg v. Western Union Tel. Co., 54 F. Supp 100, 101 (S.D. Fla.
1944); Mason v. Western Union Tel. Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 53, 56 (1975).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 612 (1989).
66. Id. § 581.
67. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lesesne, 182 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1950); O'Brien v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 542 (1st Cir. 1940); Von Meysenburg, 54 F. Supp at 101.
68. Anderson v. New York Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1974).
69. People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1967).
70. Charles, supra note 25, at 143.
71. Id. at 123.
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receiving machine. The volume may be tremendous, and some of the
data, such as private e-mail, may be sensitive information. Support for
a "knowing" standard is gained from the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 which statutorily applies this standard to the
interception and use of intercepted e-mail and network communica-
tions.12  For a SYSOP to be liable for a user's illegal use of the
system, the SYSOP would have to know or guess that the illegal use
was occurring, and he or she would then be under an obligation to
prevent such a use.
D. Information System as Traditional Mail
Since a major use for networked computer systems is sending e-
mail, it is only sensible to compare such a use to the U.S. mail. The
U.S. mail is a type of common carrier mandated expressly by the
Constitution.73 U.S. mail, or "snail mail" as it is often called by
frequent e-mail users, is governed by a statute which gives "regular"
mail the same kind of privacy that the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act gives e-mail.74 The Postal Service Act punishes:
[w]hoever takes any letter ... out of any post office or any
authorized depository for mail matter, or from any mail carrier, or
which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the
custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to
the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the
correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or
opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same . . .
This statute has the same effect as the statutes specifically geared
towards electronic communications-it protects both mail in transmis-
sion,7 6 as well as mail being stored for the recipient.77  Just as the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act protects stored communica-
tions in the form of an e-mail recipient's "mail box,"78 so does the
postal service protect a "snail mail" recipient's mail box.79 U.S. mail
recipients have certain protections which e-mail recipients may also
create for themselves.
72. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994).
73. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(b)(iii) (1994).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1994).
76. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1702 with e-mail, 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
77. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1702 with 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1702; see also United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
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U.S. mail recipients can ask the post office to block mail from
particular senders who are distributing what the receiver sees as
sexually offensive mail.8  The reason for this protection from
unpleasant U.S. mail-based on notions of trespass 8 -has been
applied to e-mail and network communications as well." In the case
of electronic mail, a computer program could be set up to automatically
reject incoming mail from certain senders. A program could also be
used to search through the text of an incoming message and reject any
message which contained certain terms which would indicate that the
message's contents were something which the receiver did not want to
see. This method is frequently used to screen out unsolicited
commercial e-mail.
The same similarity analysis between e-mail and the U.S. mail
would work to preserve an advertiser's right to send out e-mail for
commercial purposes, just as commercial U.S. mail enjoys some
Constitutional protection." This protection is something that many
wish to circumvent in the e-mail context. Unsolicited commercial e-
mail, sometimes referred to as "UCE," "UBE" (unsolicited bulk e-
mail), or as "spam, '"84 has been the source of much recent debate due
to its growing prevalence. The argument is that "junk e-mail" is more
like a "junk-fax" than regular "junk (paper) mail." Receiving
communication via fax machines usually entails consuming the
recipients fax paper and ink, as well as tying up the recipient's fax
machine and telephone line. Thus, junk-faxes amount to sending
advertising to a recipient who must pay to receive the advertisement,
regardless of whether or not it is wanted. The practice of sending
junk-faxes became enough of a problem that they were prohibited by
Congress.8s
E-mail presents an analogous situation to faxes for many people.
Unsolicited e-mail must be stored on a service provider's computer.
It takes system resources to process this unsolicited e-mail. Further-
more, many recipients must pay for the time they spend connected to
80. Rowan v. United States Postal Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
81. Id. at 737.
82. Cf., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
83. See Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
84. Spam was originally the term applied to certain types of excessive usenet news posting,
where one message is posted to a number of news groups as an individual message sent to each
group, rather than as one message sent with a pointer to it in each news group (known as cross-
posting). Often these "spammed" messages dealt with commercial transactions. When these
advertisements were later delivered by e-mail the term was carried over and applied to unsolicited
commercial e-mail as well.
85. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (1986).
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a computer service in order to receive this mail. Even time spent
deleting the messages unread may cost a user for the connect time
necessary to process the e-mail. Even more than commercial faxes,
commercial e-mail is paid for almost entirely by the recipient and the
recipient's service provider, rather than the commercial entity sending
the message. Because of this unbalancing of costs, various efforts are
under way to ban unsolicited commercial e-mail.86
E. Information System as Traditional Public Forum
For centuries, when people had ideas to communicate, they did so
in public fora, such as parks, streets and sidewalks, and local town
squares. These areas are usually "owned" by the government. In
many ways, computer information systems, such as bulletin board
systems, mailing lists, and chat rooms, are becoming the new public
fora. These are mostly operated by individual citizens and corpora-
tions.
The First Amendment 7 (and the Fourteenth Amendment"8 ) to
the U.S. Constitution prohibits the government from restricting
content-based speech, or even expressive conduct because of the ideas
expressed. 9 Governments can proscribe speech based on some of its
aspects, such as potential for harm caused by obscenity and fighting
words, but not on the basis of viewpoint.9" The government may also
impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, as
long as they are "justified" and the restrictions do not refer to the
content of the regulated speech.9 The law governing speech restric-
tions pertaining to state owned fora, or fora with sufficient government
entanglement to constitute state action, should follow the principles
established by the First Amendment. Three cases have specifically
examined this issue in the Internet context. The Supreme Court in
Reno v. A. C.L. U. gave expansive protection to speech on the Internet
as a public forum.92 The court stated,
As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, we presume that government regulation of the content
of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas
86. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.705 teffective July 1, 19981; 1998 Wash. Laws ch. 149
(H.B. 2752, 55th Legis. effective July 11, 1998).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
89. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
90. See id. at 385-86.
91. Id. at 386 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
92. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
[Vol. 21:10751094
Computer Systems Law
than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but
unproven benefit of censorship.93
The Supreme Court also struck down portions of the Communications
Decency Act94 as a grossly unconstitutional attempt to impose a
content-based restriction on Internet communication. The Court
started with the premises that material may originate from any
jurisdiction, and may enter any jurisdiction without the ability to limit
distribution.95 Additionally, there is no way to determine the identity
or age of people accessing Internet content in most circumstances. 96
That said, even if one could define what material is "indecent," and
thus restricted to adults, one has no idea how to restrict minors from
accessing the material. Because the Act imposes a blanket restriction
on speech based on its viewpoint, the Court held that a "time, place,
and manner" argument for regulation is inappropriate.97 Further, the
pervasiveness and scarcity arguments traditionally applied to broadcast-
ing do not fit with the reality of the Internet and thus are not a basis
for regulation.98 In essence, the Court found no reason to allow for
a looser standard when regulating speech on the Internet than in any
other traditional public forum. Because the Communications Decency
Act was "wholly unprecedented" '99 (as well as being vague and
ineffectual), the statute was not allowed to stand as a valid government
restriction on speech in a public forum.
Similarly, Urofsky v. Allen struck down as unconstitutional a
Virginia statute intended to provide "[r]estrictions on State Employees
Access to [the] Information Infrastructure."' 0  The statute stated
that "[e]xcept to the extent required in conjunction with a bonafide,
agency approved undertaking, no agency employee shall utilize agency-
owned or agency-leased computer equipment to access, download, print
or store any information infrastructure files or services having sexually
explicit content."'01  The court found that such a statute would
burden over 101,000 state employees by restricting them from
93. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351.
94. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. 1997).
95. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335-36.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2342-43.
98. Id. at 2343-44.
99. Id. at 2347.
100. No. 97-701-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2139 (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 1998) at *34 (citing
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1.804).
101. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-80 (Michie 1998).
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researching and discussing sexually explicit topics which may be
necessary in their areas of expertise; including such areas as a wide
range of academics fields, and employees in the state's Department of
Corrections, Social Services, Juvenile Justice, Mental Health, and in the
Office of the Attorney General. 1 2 Additionally, the public would be
deprived of the benefit of these employee's expertise.0 3 In exchange
for such substantial restrictions on First Amendment protected speech,
the statute would meet its stated goals of improving workplace
efficiency and avoiding hostile work environment claims. However,
even with the statute in place, workplaces could still be inefficient
thanks to networked computers and nonsexually explicit content and
other means of creating hostile work environments would still be
available to those so inclined." 4  Because content-natural, less
burdensome, and more effective methods of addressing the state's
interests are available, the ocurt held that the statute was not an
acceptable restriction on the right of state employees.1l s
The third case, Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the
Loudoun County Library, addressed the use of content-filtering software
in public libraries along with an accompanying "Policy on Internet
Sexual Harassment."'0 6 This case also held that the state could not
restrict adult access to speech appropriate only for minors. 107
Furthermore, the court held that the filtering software did not work to
satisfy the goals of the policy because it did not block objectionable
material. However, the software did block acceptable (and constitu-
tionally protected) material that the policy did not intend to prohib-
it.1"8 Interestingly, the court rejected a resources-based argument
stating that once a library makes internet access available to patrons,
all Internet content becomes instantly accessible. Blocking access to
material with filtering software actually increases costs and thus a "we
must block inappropriate content to preserve scarce resources for more
worthy content" argument fails. 9
While government-owned, publicly-accessible locations are
traditionally places where individuals engage in free speech activity, the
same rights generally are not enjoyed on private property. Of
102. Urofsky, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2139, at *13.
103. Id. at*14.
104. Id. at *15.
105. Id.
106. No. 97-2049-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725 (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 1998).
107. Id. at *37-*38.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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particular concern to the system operators of privately run computer
systems are the limits imposed on control of speech occurring on
private property held open for public use. As was held in Marsh v.
Alabama, "[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion. The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."11' In Marsh,
the Court held that a woman could not be prevented from passing out
leaflets in a town shopping district which was freely open to the
public."' What made this situation unusual was that the town in
which the woman wanted to pass out her leaflets (Chickasaw,
Alabama) was then owned by the Gulf Shipping Corporation. The
court reasoned that, because the privately owned town provided all of
the services and facilities that would normally be provided by a
publicly owned town-such as streets and sewers and the like, and
because the company-owned town was otherwise indistinguishable
from any other town, the company must also provide for the First
Amendment right of the people who wanted to use the "public" areas
in their normal fashion.'
Marsh has been interpreted expansively, and has been extended to
shopping centers."' In the Logan Valley case, the Supreme Court
held that a shopping mall is just like the business district of a company
town-both are open to the community and to those passing through,
and both serve the same purpose." 4 The Court held that:
the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its trespass
laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to
exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner
and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which this
property is actually put."'
These cases were not all the Supreme Court had to say on the
issue, however. In Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner,1 6 another shopping
center case, the Supreme Court held that, when there is another outlet
for speech to be heard, not on private property, a landowner does not
110. 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
111. Id. at 508.
112. Id. at 506-08.
113. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 319 (1968).
114. Id. at 317-18.
115. Id. at 319-20.
116. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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need to provide his own private property for the speaker's use. 117
The Court noted that Marsh held only that where "private interests
were substituting for and performing the customary functions of
government, First Amendment freedoms could not be denied where
exercised in the customary manner. "118 This decision was
refined yet further in Hudgens v. N.L.R.B.,"19 which held that Marsh
applies only to cases in which privately owned property "has taken on
all of the attributes of a town, i.e., such as 'residential buildings,
streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant, and a 'business
block on which business places are situated."" 2  The Court held
that the only way a speaker's First Amendment rights may trump the
property rights of the owner of, say, a shopping center, is if that
shopping center is the functional equivalent of an entire town, complete
with the above listed services.' 2 ' The Hudgens holding reflects the
current state of private forum law. However, using a traditional
private forum model, with this "functional equivalent of the entire
town" standard in place, regardless of the extent to which a communi-
cations system takes on the aspects of a "community," and no matter
how open the system is, until the Supreme Court fundamentally
changes its analysis, a user only has speech rights at the sufferance of
the system operator.'22 If a computer information system is the
functional equivalent to a town, the user may have greater First
Amendment rights, but since private computer information systems do
not provide a system of sewers and streets, the system operator retains
control over how speech is exercised on his or her system. This is
especially likely to be true when the system operator requires a service
contract before access to the system is given. In this case, not only is
the SYSOP not providing the required sewage treatment plants and
residential buildings, but the system is also arguably not even open to
the public.
117. See id. at 566-68
118. Id. at 562.
119. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
120. Id. at 516 (quoting Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. at 330-31 (Black, J., dissent-
ing)).
121. Id. at 520-21.
122. It is worth pointing out that individual states can provide greater speech protection
than is provided for by the U.S. Constitution. For example, California has a constitutional
provision which has been held to permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on
the property of privately owned shopping centers to which the public is invited. See Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 75, 85 (1980); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
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This analysis was put to the test in Cyber Promotions, Inc. v.
America Online, Inc.'23 In this case, Cyber Promotions argued that
it had a First Amendment right to send unsolicited commercial e-mail
to America Online subscribers, and that America Online should not be
allowed to block the e-mail. The court, using a variety of tests, 124
rejected a Marsh-like analysis and held that America Online's system
is private property, and America Online could rightfully exclude Cyber
Promotions' unwanted e-mail. 2 ' Furthermore, a court addressing
the same issue with the same defendant held that not only can an on-
line service exclude communications from a certain party, but when
that party forces its message into the e-mailboxes of the service
provider's customers, such actions may constitute a trespass. 26
F Information System as Traditional Bulletin Board
For centuries courts have been looking at liability for notices
posted on bulletin boards, bathroom walls, sides of buildings, and
wherever else defamatory material can be posted. In the past few
hundred years there has been little debate about proprietor liability for
the content of the "bulletin boards" under its control. The law of
Great Britain, as parent to the U.S. legal system, is illustrative. The
English Star Chamber in Halliwood's Case (1601) held that "if one
finds a libel, and would keep himself out of danger, if it be composed
against a private man, the finder may either burn it or deliver it to a
magistrate."' 27
A fairly modern case (1937), which is cited more frequently in this
country, is Byrne v. Deane."8 This case involved a poem, placed on
the wall of a private golf club, that was alleged to be defamatory of one
123. 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
124. The court looked at three possible tests to support Cyber Promotions' argument, and
found that none of them were met. First, the court did not find America Online exercised
"powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state." Cyber Promotions, Inc., 948
F. Supp. at 441 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-1005 (1982)). Second, the court
did not find that America Online "has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials,"
as required by the test in McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ.,
24 F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1994). Cyber Promotions, Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 444-45. Finally, the
court found that the State had not so insinuated itself into such a position of interdependence with
America Online that the two must be recognized as joint participants in excluding Cyber
Promotions' messages, as would be required by the test the Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
enunciated in Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 1984). Id. at 444-45.
125. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 447. See also CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
126. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1024.
127. Quoted in Byrne v. Deane, 1 K.B. 818, 824 (Eng. C.A. 1937).
128. 1 K.B. 818 (Eng. C.A. 1937).
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of the club's members. 29 Judge Hilbery held that the owners of the
club could be held liable as republishers of the defamation. 130  He
based this conclusion on the fact that the club owners had complete
control of the walls of the club;13' they had seen the poem; 132 they
could have removed it; and yet they did not. In the words of Judge
Greer, "by allowing the defamatory statement ... to rest upon their
wall and not to remove it, with the knowledge that they must have had
that by not removing it would be read by people to whom it would
convey such meaning as it had, were taking part in the publication of
it.,133
Courts in the U.S. have made rulings on the posting of defamato-
ry material since at least 1883. Woodling v. Knickerbocker 34 involved
two placards left on a table at a furniture dealer, one which read,
"[t]his was taken from Dr. Woodling as he would not pay for it; for
sale at a bargain,' 35 and the other that read, "Moral: Beware of
dead-beats."'1 36  The court found for the plaintiff, holding that
regardless of who left the sign, anyone who allowed or encouraged its
placement, or who had authority to remove the sign after it was placed,
could be held liable for its publication. 37 Importantly, the court also
discussed the liability of one of the furniture store owners who had not
seen the defamation. The court said that she could not be held liable
for her partner's nonfeasance in removing the sign because there was
no way to imply that she had given him authority to act as a publisher
of defamatory material, and this was beyond the scope of their
business. 38  This situation was contrasted with that of a business
involved in publishing or selling books or magazines. In the case of a
publisher or seller, all of the partners are to be regarded as having
given authority to the other partners in deciding what to publish or
sell, and therefore all of the partners are to be held liable for defama-
tion. 139  Fogg v. Boston & L. R. Co. supports this theory. 40  In
129. Id. at 818. The case finally held against the plaintiff on the grounds that the message
was not defamatory. Id.
130. Id. at 820.
131. Id. at 821.
132. Id. at 838.
133. Id.
134. 17 N.W. 387 (Minn. 1883).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 20 N.E. 109 (Mass. 1889).
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that case, a newspaper article defaming a ticket broker was posted in
the defendant's railway office. The court held that a jury could
properly have found that the defendant, by way of its agents, had
knowledge of what was posted in its office. 4 ' Also, by not having
it removed in a timely manner the company could be construed as
having endorsed or ratified the posting of the defamatory article, even
if it had not been responsible for its posting in the first place. 42
In Hellar v. Bianco, the proprietor of an establishment was
originally unaware of the defamation, which then raised the issue as to
what constituted a reasonable time to remove defamatory posts once a
proprietor is made aware of their existence."4  Hellar involved
"libelous matter" that was scrawled on the men's room of a tavern,
"indicating that appellant was an unchaste woman who indulged in
illicit amatory ventures,' 1 44 which was scrawled on a men's room
wall of a tavern. After the woman who was the subject of the note
began getting calls about the graffiti, the bartender was asked to have
the message removed.'45 Later that evening, when it was not re-
moved, the tavern owner was charged with republication of the libel.
The court held that republication occurred when the bartender knew
of the libel, and had an opportunity to remove it, but did not do
so. 146  In this set of circumstances, a short period of time was
sufficient to constitute republication.
A longer period of time was found not to constitute republication
in Tacket v. General Motors Corp.147 Tacket involved a defamatory
sign posted in a GM factory.'48 The court held that it was conceiv-
able that it could take three days to remove a sign because of the speed
at which large bureaucracies work." 9 The court also said, however,
that a second sign, which had been posted for seven or eight months,
was different and that a lengthy time of posting without removal could
be found by a jury to be republication by implied ratification. 150
A more recent case, Scott v. Hull,'5' appears, at first glance, to
hold in a manner contrary to these earlier cases. In Scott, graffiti
141. Id. at 110.
142. Id.
143. 244 P.2d 757 (Cal. App. 1952).
144. Id. at 758.
145. Id. at 759.
146. Id.
147. 836 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987).
148. Id. at 1043-44.
149. Id. at 1047.
150. Id.
151. 259 N.E.2d 160 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970).
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defaming the plaintiff was written on the side of a building.'52 The
plaintiff told the defendant about the graffiti and asked that it be
removed; the defendant refused. 3' The court held that the building
owners were not liable as republishers, and that they were under no
duty to remove the graffiti 5 4 The reasoning behind this decision is
that the viewing of the graffiti was not at the invitation of the owners -
as it was in the earlier cases. In Scott, the graffiti was on the outside
of the defendant's building.' It was placed there by strangers and
read by strangers. The defamation was not put there by an act of the
defendant, and the court refused to find liability for nonfeasance in this
instance.' In Hellar, the defamation was "published" in the
restroom on the defendant's premises; the graffiti was placed there by
invitees of the defendant and was read by other invitees.'57 Of
course, as discussed earlier, in the digital context, a bulletin board
operator's liability for defamatory material posted by others has been
legislatively reduced, if not removed altogether. 15 8
G. Information System as Broadcaster
Authority to govern broadcasting is given to the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (F.C.C.) under the Communications Act of
1934.' The justification for content regulation over the airwaves is"spectrum scarcity." There are only so many radio and television
stations that can be on the air at once. "Without government control,
the medium would be of little use because of the cacophony of
competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably
heard."' 6 °  In order to preserve the "market place of ideas" from
monopolization, the F.C.C. governs the use of the airwaves to preserve
the rights of viewers and listeners to be informed.' An equal
concern is to protect children from inappropriate material; this is
especially true because of radio and television's special reach-they can
even bring indecent messages to those children too young to read.'62
152. Id. at 160.
153. Id. at 161.
154. Id. at 162.
155. Id. at 160.
156. Id. at 162.
157. 244 P.2d at 757. See also Tacket, 836 F.2d at 1042; Woodling, 17 N.W. at 387; Byrne,
1 K.B. at 818.
158. See discussion supra, Part IV.B, Information System as Republisher/Disseminator.
159. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1934).
160. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
161. Id. at 390.
162. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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Radio and television are given special treatment, including the"channeling" of constitutionally protected speech, because:
1. children have access to radios and in many cases are unsuper-
vised by parents;
2. radio receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy
interest is entitled to extra deference;
3. unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any warning
that offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and
4. there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the
government must therefore license in the public interest.163
These facts allow the F.C.C. to promulgate rules to channel
constitutionally protected "indecent" speech to times of the day when
children are not as likely to be in the listening audience; however, the
F.C.C. may not altogether prohibit indecent speech.164
The four factors justifying channeling of speech do not work very
well when applied to wired computer communication, such as
computer information systems. No spectrum scarcity issue is involved
when accessing a networked computer system. 6 5  For example,
indecent material available via computer generally must be actively
sought. There is little risk of having the telephone ring and being
spontaneously assaulted by a computer spewing lewd data. While
computers, like radio receivers, are in the home, it generally takes an
active effort to obtain indecent material via computer; the risks of
accidental exposure to such material at issue in the broadcasting
context are just not present.'66 Finally, although children do have
unsupervised access to computers, they also may have some potentially
unsupervised access to "dial-a-porn '167 and cable television. Neither
dial-a-porn nor cable are restricted as severely as broadcasting. As far
as the four factors justifying channeling of indecent speech applying to
wireless data transmission (packet radio, radio-WAN), the element of
spectrum scarcity comes back into play, giving the F.C.C. more of a
reason to regulate computer communications sent via the airwaves.
As well as channeling indecent speech, the other exceptions and
guarantees of free speech that apply to publishers also apply to
broadcasters. For instance, a broadcaster does not have the right to
163. Id. at 731.
164. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d. 1504 (D.C. Cir 1991).
165. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that the broadcasting analogy is the wrong analogy
to apply to the Internet, particularly because these factors are not applicable to the Internet. Reno
v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997).
166. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
167. "Dial-a-porn" refers to sexually suggestive material provided by telephone.
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make defamatory statements with knowing or reckless disregard for the
truth.16 One court applied this "know or have reason to know"
standard in the context of defamation transmitted over television
network's affiliated stations.'69 The court held that even where the
stations had the technical ability to check for material that should be
censored before broadcast, imposing potential liability for everything
transmitted without requiring an intent or knowledge requirement"would force the creation of full time editorial boards at local stations
throughout the country which possess sufficient knowledge, legal
acumen and access to experts to continually monitor incoming
transmissions and exercise on-the-spot discretionary calls or face ...
lawsuits at every turn. That is not realistic.' 170
Cable television and cable audio signals are governed in a similar
fashion to regular broadcasting. These services are seen as "ancillary"
services to broadcasting, and therefore fall under the F.C.C.'s
authority.'7 ' Like computer information systems, but unlike
broadcasting, cable television must be actively brought into the home.
Because of this, cable television traditionally was not seen as being as"pervasive" as broadcasting, and therefore, for instance, the Pacifica
obscenity standard, outlined in FC.C. v. Pacifica Foundation,'
traditionally was not extended to cable.'
Cable television regulation, however, acknowledges the growth of
cable, which now reaches a majority of all television households. 74
The Communications Act of 1934 allowed a cable franchising authority
to prohibit or restrict any service that "in the judgment of the
franchising authority is obscene, or is in conflict with community
standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent or is
otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States."'7
The 1992 amendments to the Communications Act allow a cable
operator to establish a policy of excluding "programming that the cable
operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory
168. See Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976).
169. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995), affg 800 F. Supp. 928, 936
(E.D. Wash. 1992).
170. Id. at 931.
171. See 47 U.S.C. § 152 (1994); see also United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S.
649, 664 (1972).
172. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
173. Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 1167 (D. Utah 1982);
Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1419 (11th Cir. 1985).
174. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(3), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 609) [hereinafter Cable Act].
175. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1994).
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activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by
contemporary community standards."' 76  Cable operators can also
refuse to carry programming containing obscenity, indecency, or nudity
on public-access stations 77 and on leased"' channels.
Thus, this standard taken from Pacifica now can be applied to
cable television. Furthermore, the 1996 changes to the Communica-
tions Act now require that a cable operator fully scramble the audio
and video to any "sexually explicit adult programming or other
programming that is indecent on any channel of its service primarily
dedicated to sexually-oriented programming.' 7 9  The Act also
requires a cable operator to block on request the audio and video of
any channel to which a customer does not subscribe.' °
V. SPEECH WHICH CAUSES INJURY
Let us start with a hypothetical situation. The Data Playground
is a large, full service Internet-accessible bulletin board system. In the
BBS's message system, one of the forums, called the Sewer, is set aside
for the users as a place to blow off some steam, and express their anger
at whatever bothers them. Samantha Sysop, the bulletin board
operator, feels such a forum is necessary. She feels that without it,
frustrated users will leave unpleasant messages in the other forums
which are meant for rational discussions of serious topics. By
providing the Sewer, users who get upset with other users or with life
in general can "take their problem to the Sewer." Because she is
unsure of any liability for posts in the Sewer which get too heated, she
posts a disclaimer, which can be seen the first time a user posts in or
reads the Sewer, which states that the SYSOP disclaims all liability for
anything that is said in the Sewer. Samantha Sysop reads the posts left
in the Sewer, and once in a while posts a message there herself. One
day a user, Sam Slammer, leaves the following message in the Sewer:
From: Sam Slammer
I am sick and tired of logging onto this damned bulletin board and
seeing that damn user Dora Defamed here. She is always here.
However, at least if she is here it means that she is not still at home
beating her young daughter. In fact, her daughter is too good
looking to be stuck with a mother like Dora. She should be stuck
176. Cable Act, § 10(a)(2).
177. 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (1994).
178. 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2) (1994).
179. 47 U.S.C. § 641(a) (West Supp. 1998).
180. 47 U.S.C. § 640(a) (West Supp. 1998).
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with someone like me, after all, I really like young girls, and having
sex with her would be a real catch. (If anyone would like to see the
films of the last little girl I had sex with, leave me mail.) Anyway,
Dora: it is a wonder that kid isn't brain damaged, seeing as you are
so badly warped. I would really like to do society a favor and kill
you before you get the chance to beat any more children. In fact,
if anyone is near the computer from which Dora is connected to this
BBS, I urge you to go over to her and kill her. Do us all a favor.
This hypothetical post clearly raises a number of issues. In one
post there is potentially defamatory speech, speech advocating lawless
action, fighting words, and perhaps an admission and solicitation of
child pornography.
A. Defamation
Defamation can occur on a computer information system in a
number of forms: posts on a bulletin board system, like the one in the
Sam Slammer hypothetical, can be defamatory, as can other electronic
publications; file servers and databases can distribute defamatory
material; and e-mail and usenet news messages can contain defamatory
statements. Defamation can even be distributed in the form of a
scanned photograph.18 But what is defamation, and what risks and
obligations does it present to the person posting the message and to a
system operator?
Defamation occurs in two forms: libel and slander. The
difference between these two forms of defamation is often not apparent,
based on a common sense approach. Rather, it is solely a matter of
form and "no respectable authority has ever attempted to justify the
distinction on principle."' 82 With the rise of new forms of technolo-
gy which confuse the distinction between libel and slander, many
courts have advocated the elimination of the distinction. "Speech" on
a computer information system has more of the characteristics of libel
than slander. Most courts have argued, based on libel cases, that
messages appearing on computer information systems are libel and not
slander; often, judges used the generic term "defamation."' 83
Slander is publication in a transitory form-speech, for example,
is slander.8 8 Libel, on the other hand, is embodied in a physical,
longer lasting form, or "by any other form of communication that has
181. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Libel and Slander: Defamation by Photograph, 52
A.L.R. 4th 488, 495 (1987).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1989).
183. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(2) (1989).
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the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed
words." '  Written or printed words are considered more harmful
than spoken words because they are deemed more premeditated and
deliberate. For example, Sam Slammer had to sit down at a keyboard
and compose his post; it is not a matter of a comment carelessly made
in a fit of anger. Though on the other hand, as frequent users of e-
mail often notice, e-mail messages and the like can be composed and
sent very quickly and with little thought-much like a hastily spoken
comment. Printed words last longer than spoken words because they
are put in a form in which they can serve to remind auditors of the
defamation, while the spoken word is gone once uttered. 18 6
Had Sam Slammer accused Dora Defamed of child abuse in
person, the statement would be fleeting; on the BBS it is stored for
viewing by any user who decides to read what posts have been left in
the Sewer. For days, weeks, or months, people can read Sam's
statement unless Samantha Sysop removes it. Any user can save a
copy of the post on his or her own computer, and can distribute it,
verbatim, to anyone else, with Sam's name right at the top. Even
forms of electronic communication such as "chat rooms," which seem
to be more fleeting, may be logged. In essence, a transcript may be
recorded and stored for an indefinite time period.
Text on a computer screen shares more traits with libel than with
slander. Computer text appears as printed words, and it is often more
premeditated than spoken words. Computer text can be called from
a disk as many times as is needed. The message can even be printed,
and the text can be more widely circulated than the same words when
they are spoken.
In its barest form, libel is the publication of a false, defamatory,
and unprivileged statement to a third person.1"7 In other words,
there must be a statement that is communicated to another, produces
reputational harm to a third party, is untrue, and is made by someone
who did not have a socially-accepted reason for making the statement.
"Defamatory" communication is defined as communication that
tends to harm the reputation of another so "as to lower him [or her] in
the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him [or her]."'88 Actual harm to reputa-
tion is not necessary for a statement to be defamatory, and the
185. Id. § 568(1).
186. See Tidmore v. Mills, 32 So. 2d 769, 774 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 32 So. 2d 782
(Ala. 1947).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1989).
188. Id. § 559.
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statement need not actually result in a third person's refusal to deal
with the object of the statement; rather, the words used must merely
be likely to have such an effect." 9 For this reason, if the person
defamed already looks so bad in the eyes of the community that his or
her reputation could not be made worse, or if the statements are made
by someone who has no credibility, there will not be a strong case for
defamation.
"Community" does not refer to the entire community, but rather
to a "substantial and respectable minority" of the community.190
Even more specifically, the community is not necessarily seen as the
community at large, but rather as the "relevant" community. 9' This
means, for example, that one could post a defamatory message on a
bulletin board system defaming another user and be subject to a libel
suit, even though only other BBS users see the post.
In the hypothetical, we don't know whether Sam's accusations of
child beating are true. If they are, Sam would have a defense against
a charge of libel. The comment is arguably being "published" to any
other BBS user who reads the message Sam has left publicly, and as
already discussed, the computer message has the same harmful
qualities as a message written and distributed on paper. In fact, Sam's
comments potentially reach a larger audience than Sam could have
reached by simply posting a notice on a bulletin board affixed to the
wall in the local computer center. The remark about child abuse has
the potential for lowering people's estimation of Dora, and could easily
encourage people to avoid associating with her. Even if people do not
avoid Dora because of the remark, in a defamation suit it is sufficient
that the statements have the potential to have that effect. Here they
clearly do.
The community at issue here is not the world at large, but rather
a substantial and respectable minority of the "relevant" community.
Bulletin board systems can give rise to a close knit group of users.
Here, she is being attacked in a public forum in front of the whole
community of users.
This raises another issue: can a person sue for defamation that
occurred to a fictitious name or a persona that appears on a computer?
If "Dora Defamed" was not the BBS user's real name, could the real
189. Id. § 559 cmt. d.
190. Id. § 569 cmt. e.
191. See, e.g., Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 167 N.E. 432 (N.Y. 1929). This case
involved a newspaper article on Palestinian art and custom which was mistakenly credited to the
plaintiff, an expert in the field. The article contained a number of inaccuracies that, while still
impressive to the lay reader, would embarrass the plaintiff among other experts. Id. at 433.
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user sue Sam Slammer for defaming the user's "Dora" persona on the
BBS? In a bulletin board community, unless users know each other in
real life away from the computer, the only impression one user gets of
another is from how he or she appears on the computer screen. The
user in real life may not even be the same sex as the person he or she
portrays on the bulletin board system."'
On the BBS, people only know and associate with Dora, not the
real person behind the name. When Dora is defamed, in essence, so
is the person behind the computer representation of Dora. The user
is defamed in the eyes of the users behind all of the other BBS
personalities that read Sam's post. It should not matter if Dora
Defamed is not the user's real identity. A defamation action should
still be allowed.
The last issue is whether Dora is being defamed in front of at
least a "substantial and respectable" minority of the relevant communi-
ty. This hinges on who reads the Sewer forum. If the Sewer is widely
read, a defamation suit will be more likely to succeed than if the Sewer
is largely ignored.
There is one Australian case which held that speech over a
computer "bulletin board" was actionable in a libel suit.193 This case
was a default judgment resulting from messages sent over the DIALx
science anthropology computer bulletin board, a discussion group
available worldwide and at the time subscribed to by some 23,000
anthropology students and academics. The court found that a number
of the statements made were capable of a defamatory meaning; the
statements were published throughout academic circles around the
world; the statements were likely to be further repeated, gaining in
impact in the process; and the statements would have a detrimental
impact on the plaintiffs standing in the international academic circles
in which his reputation was based.'94 Due to his reputational and
psychological injury, the court found that he was deserving of an award
of AU$40,000.' 95 In our hypothetical case, while the defendant's
192. A person may also be of a different sexual orientation. See McVeigh v. Cohen, 983
F. Supp. 215 (D.C. 1998). This case was litigated over the U.S. Navy's attempts to discharge a
sailor for homosexual acts in violation of the Navy's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue"
policy as a result of comments posted on-line in an America On-Line user profile. In his
decision, Judge Spoorkin comments that "in the context of cyberspace, a medium of 'virtual
reality' that invites fantasy and affords anonymity" comments made on-line may not carry the
same weight as comments or observations made in the real world. Id. at 219.
193. Rindos v. Hardwick, Supreme Court of Western Australia, unreported, March 31,
1994, 1994/1993, SCLN #940164. See <www.law.aukland.ac.nz/cases/rindos.html>.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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note may not have received broad circulation, it is likely that it was
read by a substantial and respectable minority of the relevant commu-
nity.
Because defamation involves speech, serious First Amendment
concerns are raised. Just because speech is defamatory does not mean
that it is left unprotected. Analysis is based on the party or parties
privy to the defamation. In our hypothetical, the relevant parties are
Sam and Dora. Constitutional protection was first found for some
types of defamation in New York Times v. Sullivan,196 which involved
an advertisement taken out in a newspaper expressing grievances with
the treatment of blacks in Alabama.197 An elected city commissioner
sued, claiming that the statements made in the advertisement defamed
him and that the advertisement contained some inaccuracies. Justice
Brennan argued that the case should be considered "against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."' 98
Because one of the main purposes of the First Amendment was to
preserve debate and critical analysis of the affairs of elected officials,
the Court held that any censorship of that speech would be detrimental
to society. 199 Because of this, the Court said libel laws should be
relaxed where the speech pertains to the affairs of elected officials.
Likewise, due to the importance of being able to examine the worthi-
ness of public officials, the Court argued that speech critical of officials
should also be less open to attack on grounds of falsity. False speech
that is made known can be investigated; but true speech that the critic
worries may be false, which may result in a libel suit, will remain
undisseminated. Because of the importance of monitoring elected
officials, the Court held that allowing speech that would aid in the
monitoring of elected officials' conduct was more important than
protecting officials from potential harm resulting from defamatory
speech.
A balance between open debate and freedom from defamation was
struck by establishing an "actual malice" standard of liability for the
publisher.00 "Actual malice" is a term of art with a specific meaning
in the publishing context. As the Court stated:
196. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
197. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
198. Id. at 270.
199. Id. at 279.
200. Id. at 279-80.
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The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his [or her] official conduct unless he [or she]
proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.201
This standard applies to electronic publishing as clearly as it
applies to print or speech. Dora, as far as we know, is not a public
official. If Dora was merely a persona on the bulletin board system
and not the user's actual name, and if there is no way for the average
user to associate the persona with the real person, then, even if "Dora"
was defamed and the real user was a public official, it would be
questionable as to whether the public official privilege would apply.
In this situation, the rationale behind the privilege would not be
relevant to the actual facts. Statements about Dora do not reflect on
the actual user's abilities to perform his or her official job. If,
however, the public official can be linked to the Dora persona, then the
basis for privileging statements about public officials does apply to the
situation, and Sam Slammer's statement may be privileged, presuming
no actual malice was intended.
The New York Times standard was expanded in two important
cases, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,20 2 and its companion case,
Associated Press v. Walker.20 3  Both cases involved defamation of
people who did not fit under the "public official" heading, but who
were "public figures." As discussed in the concurrence, some people,
even though they are not part of the government, are nonetheless
sufficiently influential to affect matters of important public con-
cern. 20 4  The Court subsequently has defined public figures as
"[t]hose who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the
vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, are
properly classed as public figures."2 5  Because these people have
influence in our governance, just as public officials do, the same
"actual malice" standard should apply to such public figures.20 6
Here, as in the case of public officials, we don't really know who Dora
201. Id.
202. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), affg 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir.
1965).
203. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), rev'g 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965).
204. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
205. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
206. Id. at 343.
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Defamed is. If she is a public figure, Sam's child abuse claim may be
privileged; if she is not, he may be liable.
Another major case defining the constitutional protection of
defamation is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2 °7 In Gertz, a magazine
published an article accusing a lawyer of being a "Communist-fronter"
and a "Marxist. '20  The article accused the plaintiff of plotting
against the police. 2°9 The plaintiff was a lawyer who played a role
in the trial of a police officer who was charged with shooting a boy.
The lawyer sued for defamation. The publisher's defense was based
on another exception to defamation law that the Court had carved out
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.21' Rosenbloom extended the New
York Times standard to include not just public officials and public
figures, but also private figures who were actively involved in matters
of public concern.' The Gertz Court held that this expansion went
too far,212 and the Court overruled Rosenbloom.
The Court in Gertz acknowledged that the press should not be
held strictly liable for false factual assertions where matters of public
interest were concerned.214 Strict liability would serve to chill the
publisher's speech by leading to self censorship where facts are in
doubt. This First Amendment interest was balanced against the
individual's interest in being compensated for defamatory false-
hood. 21  The Court reasoned that private individuals were deserving
of more protection than public officials and public figures because
private persons do not have the same access to channels of communica-
tion and have not voluntarily exposed themselves to the public
spotlight. 21 '6  The Court held that "so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. 217
207. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
208. Id. at 326.
209. Id.
210. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
211. Id. at 31-32. Matters of public concern have been held to include crackers' "ability
... to breach the security and threaten the integrity of large computer systems." Wilson v.
Slatalla, 970 F. Supp. 405, 413 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
212. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
213. Id. at 346.
214. Id. at 340.
215. Id. at 341.
216. Id. at 344.
217. Id. at 347.
[Vol. 21:10751112
Computer Systems Law
Courts have not made it very difficult for private people to sue for
defamation where no matter of public concern is at issue; in one of the
more famous defamation cases, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.,21 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. was held liable for a credit
report made from inaccurate records contained in a database. 219 The
Court argued that statements on matters of no public concern,
especially when solely motivated by profit, did not deserve sufficient
First Amendment protection to outweigh the individual's interest in
suing for defamation.2 °
An interesting issue presents itself in the context of electronic
communications when an "access to channels of communication"
argument is raised. With access to the Internet readily available even
at public libraries, some have argued that everyone has access to the
same channels of communication, and thus there should be no
difference between public figures and private individuals; everyoneshould be treated as a public figure. 221 This argument is accurate to
the extent that in the Internet age almost anyone in a country with a
modern telecommunications infrastructure can have access to an
electronic "printing press" capable of reaching millions of people
worldwide. However, this does not mean that an individual with an
America Online web page can effectively rebut charges made on the
New York Times web page. Even though an individual's ability to
rebut defamatory statements has increased, so too has the ability to
widely distribute the defamatory statements in the first place. The
balance of media power may not be realistically any different.
Returning to our hypothetical, we must look to the subject of Sam
Slammer's defamatory comment to see if it is a matter of public
concern. Sam is accusing Dora of "beating her kid." While child
abuse may be a matter of public concern, whether Dora is such an
abuser is not likely a matter of public concern. Just as people's
inabilities to pay their debts can be a matter of public concern, as was
found in the Dun & Bradstreet case, the ability of one particular
company to pay its debts is not necessarily a matter of public concern.
Child abuse (which is not an issue in this hypothetical) thus raising the
question of "how access to channels of communication" is defined in
the on-line context.
218. 472 U.S. 749 (1989) (involving a suit for defamation because of a false credit report).
219. Id.; cf. Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass'n, 682 F.2d. 509 (5th Cir.
1982).
220. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761-62.
221. Mike Godwin, Libel Law: Let It Die, WIRED, 4.03, Mar. 1996, at 116.
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The press has been found to have other privileges as a result of
the kind of news the press is reporting. One such privilege is for fair
report, or "neutral reportage,"' 222 which is not an issue in our hypo-
thetical. This isolates a reporter from defamatory statements that he
or she is reporting. 223 The press is given greater freedom in this area
because merely reporting that a certain individual made a certain
statement may be a matter of public interest. Therefore, the public
interest is best served by allowing the press to inform people that such
statements were made, without the imposition of liability upon the
reporter. 224  Neutral reporting is privileged, but if the reporter is
found not to have lived up to the "actual malice" standard (knowing
or careless disregard for the truth), his or her report will not be consid-
ered neutral and therefore the fair report privilege will not apply.
Statements of opinion are also privileged.225  Protection of
opinion is, of necessity, not absolute; otherwise "a writer could escape
liability ... simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I
think.' ' 226  Sam Slammer cannot defend himself by saying, "Well,
I think Dora beats her daughter." The court in Cianci v. New Times
Publishing Co. succinctly laid out the limits of the opinion privilege:
(1) that a pejorative statement of opinion concerning a public figure
generally is constitutionally protected ... no matter how vigorously
expressed;
(2) that this principle applies even when the statement includes a
term which could refer to criminal conduct if the term could not
reasonably be so understood in context; but (3) that the principle
does not cover a charge which could reasonably be understood as
imputing specific criminal or other wrongful acts.227
In the hypothetical, Sam made an outright accusation that Dora
Defamed committed a criminal act. Even if he had stated that he
222. See Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d. Cir. 1977). See
also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) (holding that a newspaper's coverage of a
government report which, due to inaccuracies, defamed a public official, could not result in
liability unless the newspaper published the story with actual malice); Beary v. West Publishing
Co., 763 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding a publisher that reprinted a court opinion verbatim was
absolutely privileged for any defamatory comments in the court opinion).
223. Beary, 763 F.2d at 68.
224. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 119.
225. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
226. Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).
227. Id. (holding that Cianci held the privilege inapplicable to a situation in which the
plaintiff was clearly accused of committing a criminal act and distinguishing Greenbelt Coop.
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)); Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974);
Gertz v. Robert Welsh 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976);
Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 386 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
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believes that she beats her daughter, unless the statement is clearly one
interpretable as an opinion, he still is likely to be held liable for his
remark.
What is Samantha Sysop's liability for the defamatory statements
stored on her computer system? As was discussed earlier, as an
operator of an "interactive computer service" the "safe-harbor"
provision, 228 passed as part of the Communications Decency Act,
provides that she is not to be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
of Sam's comments. Furthermore, she is not to be held liable for
trying to keep her system clear of such objectionable comments, even
if she fails in the attempt.229 Arguably, even if she sees and inten-
tionally leaves the defamatory content publicly available she would not
be liable.23° An individual who posts a defamatory message, on the
other hand, would receive no such protection, and would be liable for
his or her actions. Unless some sort of privilege exists, or unless it can
successfully be argued that the subject of the defamation should have
to prove a higher standard to rebut the comments-because of the
subject's position in the on-line community or because of the subject's
access to the channels of communication-liability should attach to one
who posts defamatory comments on-line just as it would in the off-line
world.
B. Speech Advocating Lawless Action
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." '231 The First
Amendment is one of the most important guarantees in the Bill of
Rights, because speech is essential for securing other rights.2"2 While
the right of free speech has been challenged by the emergence of each
new medium of communication, the right of free speech still applies to
the new forms of communication, although it is, at times, more
restrictive. No matter which standard for examining content is
employed, some forms of speech are currently not allowed on the local
street corner or on the local computer screen. In our Sam Slammer
hypothetical, questions arise as to whether his message contains some
of this speech which is inappropriate for public consumption.
228. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (West Supp. 1998).
229. Id. at (c) (2).
230. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); cf. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
231. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
232. Legal Overview: The Electronic Frontier and the Bill of Rights, available over
INTERNET, by anonymous FTP, at FTP.EFF.ORG (Electronic Frontier Foundation).
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One type of speech not permitted is advocacy of lawless action as
laid out in Brandenburg v. Ohio.233 The Brandenburg Court held that
a state may prosecute a person for advocating the use of force or the
violation of the law despite the guarantees of free speech and free press"where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." '234 Sam
threatened to kill Dora, and he urged others to kill her as well.
An important distinction is made between mere advocacy and
incitement to imminent lawless action. The first is protected speech,
while the second is not. This distinction is quite important, yet can be
blurry in a computer context. On a bulletin board system or in a
usenet news group, for instance, messages may be read by a user weeks
after they have been posted. It is hard to imagine such "stale"
messages as advocating imminent lawless action. In our hypothetical,
Sam encourages anyone near the computer Dora is using to go kill her.
A user who reads the post hours later may no longer have the
opportunity to take the requested action, even if so inclined. Dora
may be, for example, at home (beating her daughter?) and no longer at
that computer. The action was advocated, but other users will not be
incited to carry out the action because the act would not be possible at
the time.
An information system with a chat feature, which allows users to
talk nearly instantaneously to one another, is, however, altogether
different. With such a "chat" feature, it would be possible to make a
Brandenburg incitement threat because the incitement may come at a
time when action is possible.23 A chat feature provides nearly
instantaneous communication, whereas e-mail or bulletin board
postings are not necessarily so. While a bulletin board posting may be
seen weeks after it was written, and may thus be "stale," a chat feature
implies an immediacy which may allow for an imminent incitement in
the right factual setting.
One case that created a lot of media attention to the issue of such
"lawless" speech on-line is the Jake Baker case.236 The case involved
a college student who posted a story to an Internet news group
describing the torture, rape, and murder of a person bearing the name
of a fellow student. Further investigation turned up e-mail exchanges
233. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
234. Id. at 447.
235. Regardless of the immediacy of the comments, the "safe-harbor" provision of the
Communications Decency Act would seem to isolate Symantha Sysop from liability for the
objectionable content. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
236. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
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with a Canadian man in which they discussed their sexual fantasies
involving the kidnapping, torturing, and murdering of women.
Furthermore, these e-mail messages discussed specific plans to live out
these fantasies. Baker was charged with five counts of violating 18
U.S.C. § 875(c), a sort of statutory offshoot of the imminent lawless
action doctrine, which states:
Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communi-
cation containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to
injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.237
Relying on the decision in United States v. Kelner,238 the Baker court
argued that the statute could only be constitutionally applied if "the
threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person
threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect
of execution ... "239 Furthermore, the court must construe the
statements as the receiver (who need not be the object of the threat) is
likely to interpret the statements. The court found that the Kelner test
was not met; the e-mail at issue in the indictment did not sufficiently
identify a class of potential victims, and in other cases the actions to be
taken were not adequately defined. 4°
While Baker was not convicted under section 875(c), the section
was used to convict a college freshman who sent an e-mail message to
President Clinton threatening that "One of these days, I'm going to
come to Washington and blow your little head off. I have a bunch of
guns, I can do it."24'
In such a case, it is possible that a more adventuresome prosecutor
could employ another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 871, which specifically
prohibits threats against the President, Vice-President, and certain
other officers of the United States:
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the
mail or for delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any
letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document containing any
threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon
237. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1986).
238. 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
239. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1382.
240. Id. at 1387.
241. In Jail for E-Mail, WIRED, 2.10, Oct. 1994, at 33.
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the President of the United States ... shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.242
If a computer network can be considered "any letter carrier" and an e-
mail message "any letter, writing, print, missive, or document," then
this statute may be applicable to e-maited threats as well.
While the Baker case involved college students, younger students
may have less First Amendment protection for objectional speech. In
Boucher v. School Board of School District of Greenfield, the court held
that a student could be expelled from school for publishing an article
providing details for breaking into his school's computer system.4
The court further held that the student could be punished if the school
has "reason to believe" that the student's expression will be disrup-
tive.244
C. Fighting Words
Another kind of speech not given First Amendment protection is
"fighting words." Fighting words are "those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. '245  In Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, the Court held
that fighting words (as well as lewd, obscene, profane, and libelous
language) "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality. ' 246 The Court further defined fighting words as words
that have a direct tendency to provoke acts of violence from the
individual to whom the remarks are addressed, as judged not by what
the addressee believes, but rather by whether a common person of
average intelligence would be provoked into fighting.247 A message
posted on a bulletin board or sent by e-mail could contain fighting
words.
Dora is being accused of being a child abuser, and in the message
someone offers to sexually abuse her young daughter. There is no
imminence requirement in Chaplinsky as there is in Brandenburg.248
Fighting words can be considered delivered to the addressee when the
message is read. Dora will become enraged when she reads Sam's
242. 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (West Supp. 1998).
243. 134 F.3d 821, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1998).
244. Id. at 827.
245. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
246. Id. at 572.
247. Id. at 573.
248. Compare Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 with Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446.
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message. When Sam left the message has little bearing on when Dora
will be ready to fight. While it is hard to fight with the message
sender when he or she is not nearby or even in the same country, that
does not preclude some forms of "fighting." Of course, if the sender
of the fighting words is nearby, actual fighting could occur. If the
sender of the message is on a computer network, an angered recipient
could "fight" by trying to tamper with or otherwise damage the
sender's computer account. If Sam had written his post about
Samantha Sysop instead of Dora, he could find himself unable to access
the bulletin board system, or he might find that his copy of his
master's thesis, which he was word processing, is suddenly missing
from his computer account.
As with the other types of speech we have discussed, the "safe
harbor" provision of the Communications Decency Act would appear
to isolate a system operator from liability for threatening speech
originating from a user of the system.249
D. "Terrorist" Materials and Hate Speech
In light of recent terrorist bombings, many people have drawn
attention to the availability of hate speech, bomb-making materials,
and the like on computer information systems. 250  What these
observers do not explain, however, is why it poses less of a threat to
have a copy of The Anarchist Cookbook,25 The Poor Man's James
Bond,25 2 or other "mayhem manuals" available in the public library
than it does to have the same book available on a computer informa-
tion system. "Terrorist" materials and hate speech are similar to
materials advocating lawless action and fighting words which are both
described in the preceding sections.
As mentioned, Brandenburg requires that in order to suppress hate
speech, the speech must be intended to produce "imminent lawless
action" and must be "likely to produce such action."' 23  Both ele-
ments are necessary. Speech consisting of the "mere advocacy of the
use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of
249. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (West Supp. 1998).
250. See, e.g., Dennis Romero, Terrorist Threat Lurking on Info Highway, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1995, at 21.
251. WILLIAM POWELL, THE ANARCHIST COOKBOOK (1971) (book devoted to drug
abuse, explosives, and firearms).
252. KURT SAXON, THE POOR MAN'S JAME BOND (1991) (book devoted to explosives,
bombs, and poisons).
253. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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the First Amendment. 25 4  As was pointed out in our "Sam Slam-
mer" hypothetical, in the case of a computer bulletin board, messages
may not be seen until some time after they are posted. The messages
are likely to be read by people who are at home sitting in front of their
computers, instead of being heard while rallying outside of the
monster's castle, pitchforks and torches in hand. In such a situation
the Brandenburg test requiring that listeners be incited to immediate
lawless action is not as likely to be met.
Hate speech that is sent to inflame the victim of the speech may
not be protected under the First Amendment if the speech can be
classified as being "fighting words." As discussed above, fighting
words are defined by Chaplinsky as words that have a direct tendency
to provoke acts of violence from the individual to whom the remarks
are addressed and that would provoke a person of average intelligence
into fighting.55
Specific acts of terrorism, conducted across a computer informa-
tion system, may be outlawed without interference from the First
Amendment. One example: if terrorists threaten to kidnap or injure
others in a message conveyed over a computer information system, and
if the message is sent in interstate or foreign commerce, the note may
result in a jail sentence of up to five years and/or a fine of up to
$1,000.216 If the threat is made in an attempt to extort money or
anything else of value, the penalty increases to a maximum of twenty
years in jail and up to a $5,000 fine.2"7 If a kidnapping has already
taken place, and the electronic communication is in the form of a
ransom note, the party transmitting the note may also be subject to up
to twenty years in prison and up to $5,000 in fines.255 If the com-
munication threatens to injure the property or reputation of the
addressee, or threatens to accuse the addressee of a crime, and the
communication is transmitted with an intent to extort any money or
thing of value, the transmitter of the communication could face up to
a $500 fine and could be imprisoned for up to two years, or both.25 9
More generally, while some types of dangerous reference materials
may be outlawed in the United States, most materials are protected by
the Constitution, even if they have the potential to cause harm. One
instance when publication of reference materials likely to cause harm
254. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982).
255. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
256. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (West Supp. 1998).
257. 18 U.S.C. § 875(b) (West Supp. 1998).
258. 18 U.S.C. § 875(a) (West Supp. 1998).
259. 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) (West Supp. 1998).
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was prevented was the case of an article describing how to make a
bomb.26 ° This holding, however, concerned the publication of details
on how to make a hydrogen bomb, in violation of the Atomic Energy
Act.261 The judge in that case distinguished the particular situation
from other Supreme Court precedent that even protected the publica-
tion of classified information.262 The distinction the judge drew was
based on the immense destructive potential of furthering the develop-
ment of nuclear weaponry in other countries. The court noted that "a
mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for
thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life
is extinguished and the right to publish becomes moot. 263
In cases of distributing information that has the potential to cause
damage, except at the level of global destruction, many courts have
ruled in favor of allowing the speech to be made without restriction.
Such cases have involved everything from stunts performed on the
"Johnny Carson Show" '264 to demonstrations on the "Mickey Mouse
Club. ' 265  One of the better illustrations of such cases involved a
fourteen-year-old boy, who, after reading a Hustler Magazine article
entitled "Orgasm of Death," decided to try the described practice of
"auto-erotic asphyxia" at home and hung himself in the process. 66
The court held that the publication of the description of techniques
likely to cause harm was protected by the First Amendment. The
court stated that, even though protecting children is an important social
goal, that concern is to be weighed against "the danger that unclear or
diminished standards of [F]irst [A]mendment protections may both
inhibit the expression of protected ideas by other speakers and constrict
the right of the public to receive those ideas. ' 267  Therefore, mere
negligence in publishing material that may cause harm if used for an
improper purpose may not result in liability under an incitement
theory.268
It is important, however, to distinguish advocacy of lawless action
from actual aiding and abetting the commission of a crime. Recently,
260. United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
261. Id. at 996. See Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2274(b).
262. Id. at 994 (distinguishing New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
263. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 996.
264. DePhillipo v. National Broad. Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982) (boy hanged himself
imitating stunt seen on television).
265. Walt Disney Productions v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981) (child's eye put out
by a BB while trying to reproduce a sound effect demonstrated on the Mickey Mouse Club).
266. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
267. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1020.
268. Id. at 1024.
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the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court
opinion 269 that held that even "how-to" books on committing murder
have been held to be constitutionally protected by applying the
Brandenburg standard.27 ° In its decision, the court held:
in order to prevent the punishment or even the chilling of entirely
innocent, lawfully useful speech, the First Amendment may in some
contexts stand as a bar to the imposition of liability on the basis of
mere foreseeability or knowledge that the information one imparts
could be misused for an impermissible purpose. Where it is
necessary, such a limitation would meet the quite legitimate, if not
compelling, concern of those who publish, broadcast, or distribute
to large, undifferentiated audiences, that the exposure to suit under
lesser standards would be intolerable. .. . At the same time, it
would not relieve from liability those who would, for profit or other
motive, intentionally assist and encourage crime and then shameless-
ly seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First Amendment .... [A]t
the very least where a speaker-individual or media-acts with the
purpose of assisting in the commission of crime, we do not believe
that the First Amendment insulates that speaker from responsibility
for his actions simply because he may have disseminated his
message to a wide audience. 71
Of course, holdings such as this leave open the question as to
when someone is exercising his or her First Amendment right to
publish potentially harmful material, and when such actions constitute"shamelessly seek[ing] refuge in the sanctuary of the First Amend-
ment." '272 As attempts at legislation such as the Communications
Decency Act (and further attempts at control arising after the Act's
rejection by the Supreme Court) show, legislators are likely to continue
to push for regulation of "objectionable" content, including the areas
of hate speech and the advocacy of violence. Some of these efforts are
likely to be challenged in the Supreme Court, and some of these
efforts, in essence, will be challenged by national borders. Any
country with an Internet connection may be faced with receiving illegal
speech originating in another country over which the objecting country
has no control.
269. Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996).
270. Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
271. Id. at 247.
272. Id.
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VI. OBSCENE AND INDECENT MATERIAL
Computer information systems can contain obscene or indecent
material in the form of text files, pictures, or sounds (such as the
sampled recording of an indecent or obscene text). The degree of
liability that attaches depends on which legal analogy is applied to
computer information systems. Differences in regulation based on
medium are a result of differing First Amendment concerns.273
A. Obscenity
The constitutional definition of "obscenity," as a term of art, was
solidified in Roth v. United States.274 The Roth definition asks if the
material deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests.
This standard was further explained in Miller v. California, a case that
explored the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting the mailing
of unsolicited sexually explicit material. 276  The Court expressed the
test for obscenity as:
whether
(a) the average person, applying community standards would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. 277
The first two prongs of this test have been held to be issues left to
local juries, while the last prong is to be determined by the court.278
Each of the Miller prongs critically limits the definition of obsceni-
ty.279 Courts generally have been unwilling to find a national
standard for obscenity,280 and have held that a carrier of obscenity
273. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2239 (1997); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978).
274. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
275. Id. at 487.
276. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
277. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
278. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987) (citing Smith v. U.S., 431 U.S. 291 (1977)).
279. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2332.
280. One exception is a 1995 case from the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals, which allowed the use of an Air Force-wide military community standard for obscenity
in a court martial trial. United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 45
M.J. 406 (1996). The court recognized the jury instruction allowing a nationwide community
standard rather than a standard gauged by members of the airforce community was erroneous, but
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must be wary of differences in definition between the states. 281' This
has profound implications for computer information systems that have
a national reach. It means electronic publishers must not only be
aware of one obscenity standard; they must know the obscenity
standards of every jurisdiction in which they distribute content.
Publishers must be aware of the different standards because the
Constitution's protection of free speech does not extend to obscenity,
and states are free to make laws severely restricting its availability,
especially to children.282
The dilemma caused by the patchwork of local standards applied
to computer information systems carrying pornographic information
that is accessible from anywhere in the world was clearly illustrated in
United States v. Thomas.283  This case involved a couple who ran a
bulletin board system out of their home in California. They were
convicted in a Tennessee court that applied the obscenity test from
Miller v. California, and thus applied local Memphis community
standards. 284  The conviction resulted from a Tennessee postal
inspector calling up the California bulletin board system from
Tennessee, applying for an account, and then accessing and down-
loading a variety of "adult" files. He also requested computer files and
videotapes that were sent to him by the Thomases via the United
Parcel Service (UPS).2s' After receiving the pornographic materials
by modem and UPS, the postal worker had the Thomases charged with
transporting obscene materials via common carrier (UPS and the
telephone company) and with transporting obscene material in
interstate commerce. 8 6
Although the BBS was located in California, and served predomi-
nantly California users, and even though the postal inspector called
long-distance to connect, requested an account, and requested the
transmission of the computer files, the Thomases were still found
guilty of violating federal statutes by delivering materials that were
considered obscene on the other side of the continent. The appellate
court explicitly refused to create a community standard based on a
community of BBS users. 287 The court said that the Thomases knew
found no prejudice as the standard used was more lenient. Id. at 425.
281. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974).
282. See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 36, n.17.
283. 74 F.3d 701, (6th Cir. 1996).
284. Id. at 110.
285. Thomas, 734 F.3d at 705.
286. Id. They were charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1465 among others.
287. Id. at 711.
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that they had a user in Tennessee and the Thomases allowed that user
to access pornographic materials.2 8   Therefore, they were subject to
the community standards where that user was located.289
On the other hand, individual states may be limited in the extent
to which they can "export" their state on-line content laws.29°
Because there is no way to control in which states on-line content is
either accessed or routed, state restrictions on on-line speech may run
afoul of the "Dormant" Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.291 A local restriction on network content runs the risk of being
struck down if it affects activities that occur wholly outside of the
regulating state, and if the burdens on commerce unduly exceed any
292benefits provided by the regulation. Furthermore, it is possible
that if other courts follow the analysis used to strike down a New York
network obscenity law, then only national regulation will be found
capable of surviving a Commerce Clause analysis. 293
Also, although states can regulate the availability of obscene
material, they cannot forbid the mere possession of it in the home.294
The justification for this is based on privacy.295  In the now famous
words of Justice Marshall in Stanley v. Georgia:
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regarding
obscenity, we do not think they reach the privacy of one's home.
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read, or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men's minds. 296
Stanley has been interpreted as establishing a "zone of privacy"
about one's home.297 Many networked computer system users are
connected to the system by modem from their homes. Because of this,
any pornographic material they have stored on their home computers
288. Id. at 712.
289. Id.
290. American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See also Dan
L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1095, 1123-34 (1996) for an excellent analysis
of the Dormant Commerce Clause issues.
291. See Burke, supra note 290, at 1126-27.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 1134.
294. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
295. Id. at 565.
296. Id.
297. See Jensen, supra note 43, at 235.
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is protected from government regulation.29 However, connecting to
a remote computer information system entails moving obscene material
in and out of this zone of privacy, and therefore may not be insulated
from state legislation. 299 Support for this argument comes from U.S.
v. Orito,3 0 which held that Congress has the authority to prevent
obscene material from entering the stream of commerce, either by
public or private carrier.30 ' While a person's disk drive on his or her
computer is analogous to his or her home library, connecting to a
computer information system can be seen as analogous to going out to
a bookstore.30 2
Stanley may protect a person's private library,3"3 but "[c]ommer-
cial exploitation of depictions, descriptions, or exhibitions of obscene
conduct on commercial premises open to the adult public falls within
a State's broad power to regulate commerce and protect the public
environment."3°4
B. Indecent Speech
Speech that is not considered obscene may qualify as indecent. In
F C. C. v. Pacifica Foundation, Inc., the Court held that unlike obscene
material, indecent speech is protected by the First Amendment, though
it can still be regulated where there is a sufficient governmental
interest.30 ' Indecent language is that which "describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by community standards ... sexual or
excretory activities and organs .. "306 Furthermore, the restrictions
the government may place on indecent speech are very limited,
especially when indecent material is transmitted via a medium that
requires affirmative steps to access the indecent material.30 7 This
limitation on the ability to restrict access to indecent material has been
explicitly applied to distribution of indecent material via the Inter-
298. Note that an exception would be made for child pornography. See discussion infra
Part VI.C.
299. See Davis v. Oklahoma, 916 P.2d 251 (Okla. 1996); cf, United States v. Thomas, 74
F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
300. U.S. v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
301. Id. at 143.
302. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
303. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
304. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68-69 (1973).
305. 438 U.S. at 726.
306. Id. at 732.
307. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989).
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net."° The Supreme Court has held that unlike in the broadcast
context, the Internet bandwidth is not a scarce "expressive commodi-
ty," and that previous Supreme Court cases "provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to this medium. 30 9
While there may be a strong interest in keeping indecent material
away from children, restrictions cannot be placed on this material so
as to unduly burden adult access to this material .3 " Because the
Internet does not (yet) provide any mechanism for establishing the age
of users who may gain access to indecent material, any legislation that
limits access to indecent material to adults may provide too great a
restriction on the right of adults to access this material via computer
network.311
As was found in the case of a New York law designed to restrict
indecent or obscene material, regulation by individual states of indecent
material may be especially problematic. 12 Because of the inability
to regulate which jurisdictions Internet traffic passes through, and
because of the inability to ascertain from which jurisdictions material
published on the Internet may be accessed, state regulation of indecent
content may violate principles of federalism in violation of the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 13
C. Child Pornography
Another area of content regulated on computer information
systems is child pornography. New York v. Ferber held that states can
prohibit the depiction of minors engaged in sexual conduct.314 The
Ferber Court gave five reasons for its holding. First, the legislative
judgment that using children as subjects of pornography could be
harmful to their physical and psychological well-being, easily passes
muster under the First Amendment.315 Second, application of the
Miller standard for obscenity is not a satisfactory solution to the
308. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343; Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun
County Library, No. 97-2049-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725 (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 1998); Urofsky
v. Allen, No. 97-701-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2139 (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 1998).
309. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
310. See id. at 2345.
311. Id.
312. See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169.
313. Id. at 173-74.
314. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
315. Id. at 756-57 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
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problem of child pornography.3 16 Third, the financial gain involved
in selling and advertising child pornography provides incentive to
produce such material, and such activity is prohibited throughout the
United States.317 Fourth, the value of permitting minors to per-
form/appear in lewd exhibitions is negligible at best.31 Finally,
classifying child pornography as a form of expression outside the
protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with earlier
Court decisions. 19 The Court said, "[T]he distribution of photo-
graphs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of children ... 320 and is therefore within
the state's interest and power to prohibit.
The federal government has explicitly addressed child pornogra-
phy as it pertains to computer communication. 21 Section 2252 of
title 18 of the United States Code forbids knowing foreign or interstate
transportation or reception by any means including, for example, visual
depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, that has been
converted into a computer-readable form.3 22  The act of sending
child-pornographic pictures via computer network to solicit sex has also
been held sufficient justification for increasing a pedophile's sen-
tence.3 23 Investigations into illegal child-pornography distribution via
computer network have resulted in a number of convictions32 4 due to
child pornography trafficking on America OnLine.2S
Pictures are easily converted into a computer-readable form. Once
in such a form, they can be distributed interstate or internationally
over a computer information system. Pictures are put into a computer
by a process called "scanning" or "digitizing. 3 26 Scanning is accom-
plished by dividing a picture up into little tiny elements called pixels.
The equivalent can be seen by looking very closely at a television
screen or at a photograph printed in a newspaper. The computer
316. Farber, 158 U.S. at 759 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
317. Id. at 761.
318. Id. at 762.
319. Id. at 763.
320. Id. at 759.
321. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1978).
322. Id. § 2252(a)(1).
323. United States v. Delmarle, 99 F.3d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1996).
324. See U.S. Customs Closes Network Transmitting Pornography, GLOBAL TELECOM
REPORT, Mar. 22, 1993.
325. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997); United States v. Reinhart 975 F. Supp. 834
(W.D. La. 1997).
326. See Lois F. Lunin, An Overview of Electronic Image Information, OPTICAL INFO. SYSS.,
May 1990.
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examines each of these dots, or pixels, and measures its brightness; the
computer does this with every pixel. The picture is then represented
by a series of numbers that correspond to the brightness and location
of each pixel. These numbers can be stored as a file for access on a
bulletin board system or file server or can be transferred over a
network.327
Computers do not differentiate between "innocuous" pictures and
pictures that are pornographic. A piece of child pornography can be
scanned and distributed by file server, bulletin board, on a web page
or through e-mail just like any other computer file.328 If Sam
Slammer had received a response from someone interested in seeing the
pictures of the last time he had sex with a child, the pictures could
easily be scanned into a computer-readable form and distributed over
a BBS or computer network.
While a computer may not differentiate among subject matter of
pictures, the law does. Persons responsible for distributing child
pornography could be prosecuted, and such a suit could result in
$50,000 or more in fines and damages.329 It has specifically been
held that distributing images stored in digital form constitutes "visual
depictions" that may form the basis of a child pornography convic-
tion.33 If Sam Slammer did try to distribute the pictures he made
of the last time he had sex with a minor, his distribution of those
pictures over a computer information system could result in a
prosecution for child pornography trafficking.
Another issue raised by Title 18, section 2252, of the United
States Code is possession of pornographic material. Anyone who
"knowingly possesses 3 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films,
video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction [of
child pornography] that has been mailed, or has been shipped or
327. Id.
328. An interesting issue which may eventually find its way to the Supreme Court is the
issue of synthetic child pornography--child pornography that is created on a computer without
involving children. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 § U.S.C. 2252A, outlaws
images that even appear to be of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, ignoring the
comment made by the Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber that simulated child pornography
that did not actually use children may have some constitutional protection. See New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753 (1982).
Two distinct court cases have examined the constitutionality of the Child Pornography
Protection Act of 1996 and have reached opposite conclusions. In the Free Speech Coalition v.
Reno, No. C-97-0281, 1997 WL 487758 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1997) Judge Samuel Conti upheld
the Act as constitutional. However, in United States v. Hilton, No. 97-78-P-C, 1998 WL 167255
(W.D. Me. Mar. 30, 1998) Judge Gene Carter ruled that the Act is unconstitutionally vague.
329. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (1986).
330. United States v. Hockings, 129 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1997).
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transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced
using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported,
by means including computer" '331 can be fined and imprisoned for up
to five years.332 While the requirement of knowledge may insulate
some computer information systems such as networks, it clearly does
not protect computer users who knowingly traffic in pornographic
material stored in computer files.333
Thus, if Sam were distributing pornographic pictures in and out
of his computer account, he could be charged under section 2252 with
transporting material used in child pornography. He would probably
need to be caught with three pictures in his account at the time, but it
is likely that a prosecutor could ask a system operator to look through
any backups of the computer data that was in Sam's account at an
earlier time.
Typically, a system operator will make a backup copy of all of the
data stored on a computer system. This is done so that, if the
computer should malfunction, the information can be restored by use
of this backup. Backups are often kept for a while before being erased,
in essence freezing all of the users' accounts as they were at a time in
the past. If pictures were also found in the backups, a claim could be
made that Sam was in possession of these pictures as well. This would
be an easy claim to make if Sam had the ability to ask the SYSOP to
recover any of the files that are on these back-ups, but that are no
longer in his actual account.334
Based on U.S. public policy against child pornography, it is likely
that an attempt would be made to hold Sam responsible for the
knowing possession of any files that were formerly in his account and
that could still be recovered from the system operator's backups of
Sam's data. However, if such a claim were to be attempted, it would
also need to be shown that Sam knew of the accessibility of these
331. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
332. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1978).
333. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1994) (holding that the
"knowing" requirement of the statute applies to each of the statutory elements that criminalizes
conduct that would otherwise be innocent conduct, even if reading the statute to produce this
interpretation is not the most grammatical reading of the statute).
334. Cf. U.S. v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1997). This case held that a defendant must
know that images were present on his computer's hard drive to be liable for possession of the
images. Id. at 748. However, the court also held that it was harmless error to improperly instruct
the jury as to the knowledge requirement when the defendant, a computer analyst, claimed to
have deleted the pornographic computer files, yet copies were still found on his computer's disks
along with other strong evidence that the defendant had knowledge and possession of the illegal
pictures. Id. at 749.
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backups, because the statute requires the knowing possession of the
pictures.35  As to Samantha Sysop's liability, unless she knew what
was stored in Sam's account, it is unlikely that she would be held liable
for having child pornography stored on her computer system. Section
2252, as quoted above, contains a knowledge requirement. If
Samantha Sysop did not know what was in Sam's account, she would
not meet that knowledge requirement. If she had reason to know that
Sam had pictures of child pornography in his account, but intentionally
turned her back, she may be considered to have constructive knowledge
of the presence of the pornographic material on her system, and
therefore, she could be charged with the knowing possession of the
material. It is not likely to make a difference that the material is in
Sam's account; Sam's account is still on Samantha's computer system,
which she is responsible for maintaining in a legal manner.
VII. COMPUTER CRIME
Computer crime is an ever-present area of concern for operators
of networked computer systems. Operators continuously find
themselves needing to devote substantial resources to avoid falling
victim to system-crackers and the like. The term "computer crime"
covers a variety of offenses, including: unauthorized access to and use
of computer resources, data theft, damaging stored data, engaging in
service attacks, trafficking in stolen passwords, spreading computer
viruses, and a number of other related offenses. 36  All of these
activities are often referred to as "hacking. '
335. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (1978). The knowing transportation in interstate commerce
element is not difficult to meet--one court has stated that "transmission of photographs by
means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes
transportation in interstate commerce." United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir.
1997).
336. There are various definitions of "computer crime." See, e.g., Note, Addressing the New
Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1898 (1991), where the author
notes that the Office of Technology Assessment defines a "computer crime" as one "in which
computerized data or software play a major role," and notes that the Department of Justice defines
a "computer crime" as one when "any illegal act for which knowledge of computer technology is
essential for successful prosecution." Id. at 1898, citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: MANAGEMENT, SECURITY AND
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 85, 86 (1986).
337. Purists argue that the term "cracking" should be used where a destructive intent is
present, while "hacking" should be used in the exploratory sense. For the sake of convenience
only, the more familiar term "hacking" will be used here to refer to both types of activities.
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A. Computer Fraud
The first federal computer crime law, entitled the Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, was
passed in October of 1984.338
[T]he Act made it a felony knowingly to access a computer without
authorization, or in excess of authorization, in order to obtain
classified United States defense or foreign relations information with
the intent or reason to believe that such information would be used
to harm the United States or to advantage a foreign nation. 39
Obtaining information via unauthorized access from the financial
records of a financial institution or from a credit reporting agency's
consumer file was also outlawed by the act.34° Accessing a computer
to use, destroy, modify, or disclose information found in a computer
system, as well as to prevent authorized use of any computer used for
government business (if such a use would interfere with the govern-
ment's use of the computer) were also made illegal.34'
The 1984 Act was revised by The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986.342 The 1986 Act added three new crimes: a computer
fraud offense,343 modeled after federal mail and wire fraud statutes;
an offense for the alteration, damage, or destruction of information
contained in a "federal interest computer" ;344 and an offense for
trafficking in computer passwords under some circumstances.3 41
Even the knowing and intentional possession of a specified amount of
counterfeit or unauthorized "access devices" was made illegal.346 The
1986 statute has been interpreted to cover computer passwords "which
may be used to access computers to wrongfully obtain things of value,
such as telephone and credit card services. ' 347
338. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, ch. 21, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994); Dodd S. Griffith,
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured Response to a Growing Problem, 43
VAND. L. REV. 453, 455 (1990).
339. Griffith, supra note 338, at 460.
340. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (1994); see also Griffith, supra note 338, at 460.
341. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (1994); see also Griffith, supra note 338, at 460-61.
342. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
343. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (1994).
344. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (1994).
345. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6) (1994).
346. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6) (1994).
347. United States v. Fernandez, No. 92 CR. 563, 1993 WL 88197, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
25, 1993).
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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act presents a powerful weapon
for SYSOPs whose computers have been violated by hackers. The first
person charged with violating the Act,348 Robert T. Morris Jr., was
charged with releasing a "worm" onto a section of the Internet
computer network,349 causing numerous government and university
computers either to "crash" or to become "catatonic.""35  Morris
claims that the purpose of his worm program was to demonstrate
security defects and the inadequacies of network security, and not to
cause harm.351 However, due to a small error, the worm program got
out of control and caused numerous computers to require maintenance
to eliminate the worm at costs ranging from $200 to $53,000 each.35 2
District Judge Munson read the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, as
it appeared at the time, largely as defining a strict liability crime. The
relevant language applied to someone who:
(5) intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without
authorization, and by means of one or more instances of such
conduct alters, damages, or destroys information in any such Federal
interest computer, or prevents authorized use of any such computer
or information, and thereby (A) causes loss.., of a value aggregat-
ing $1,000 or more .... 313
The District Court's interpretation that this language only required the
intent to access the computer, not an intent to cause actual damage,
was affirmed on appeal.3 4
Morris' lawyer, Thomas Guidoboni, described the Computer
Fraud Act of 1986 as "perilously vague" because it treats intruders
who do not cause any harm just as severely as computer terrorists. 55
The jury in the Morris case indicated that the most difficult
question was whether Morris' access to the Internet was unauthorized
because, as defense counsel pointed out, two million subscribers had
the same access.35 6
348. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
349. Id. at 506; Nicholas Martin, Revenge of the Nerds: The Real Problem with Computer
Viruses Isn't Genius Programmers, It's Careless Ones, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1989, at 21.
350. Morris, 928 F.2d at 506.
351. Id. at 504.
352. Id. at 506.
353. Id. at 506, citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1994).
354. Morris, 928 F.2d at 507-09.
355. Thomas A. Guidoboni, What's Wrong with the Computer Crime Statute? Defense and
Prosecution Agree the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is Flawed but Differ on How to Fix It,
COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 17, 1992, at 33.
356. David F. Geneson, Recent Developments in the Investigation and Prosecution of Computer
Crime, 301 PLI/PAT 45, at 2. The difficulty arises from the fact that Morris had authorized
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This section was clarified in the Computer Abuse Amendments
of 1994."' 7 The section was amended to broaden the scope of the
protection offered in section 1030(a)(5)(A) and to close a loophole
contained in the earlier version. "[I]ntentionally accesses a Federal
interest computer" is no longer used, and instead, the section applies
to anyone who "through means of a computer used in interstate
commerce or communications, knowingly causes the transmission of a
program, information, code, or command to a computer or computer
system ... "3"8 As amended, the section now protects not only
federal-interest computers, but also covers privately owned computer
systems used in interstate commerce or communication, but that may
be affected by someone acting through means of a computer located
within the same state as the affected computer.359 The amendments
also remove the "access" requirement from the statute. Instead, a
specific intent to perform certain acts which may constitute direct or
indirect access has been added.36 Significantly, the revised statute
also adds a requirement that there be either a specific intent or reckless
disregard as to whether the transmission will cause damage or will
withhold or deny the use of a "computer, computer system, network,
information, data, or program" in excess of the user's authorization
before liability will be found.361
Two other changes to the Computer Abuse Amendments Act of
1994 were made. First, a section providing for civil remedies was
added 362 and second, there is now specific protection for actions that
modify or impair information or computers used in medical examina-
tion or treatment.363
The civil provisions were first used in North Texas Preventative
Imaging v. Eisenberg, which held that a "time bomb" inserted into a
software update to ensure payment could constitute a violation of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.364
access to some computers but not others, presenting the question of whether Morris' actions
amounted to unauthorized access or whether his actions exceeded authorized access. Morris, 928
F.2d at 510.
357. Computer Abuse Amendments of 1994, H.R. 3353, 103rd Cong. (1994) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1001, 1030 (West Supp. 1998).
358. Id.
359. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (1994).
360. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (1994).
361. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
362. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (1994).
363. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8)(B) (1994) (defining term "damages" to include situations in
which medical diagnosis of treatment is impaired).
364. No. CV 96-71, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19990, at *22-*23. (C.D. CA. Aug. 1996).
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Additional changes have been made to the statute since the 1994
amendments, most noticeably in 1996.361 In addition to renumbering
various sections, the 1996 amendments removed the term "federal
interest computer" altogether, replacing it with the term "protected
computer." '366 The amendments also added an additional offense:
the intentional accessing of a protected computer that recklessly causes
damage. 67  Additional modifications were also made to the damage
causing provisions to account for actions that cause a denial of
service, 368 a growing area of computer crime. Thus, someone like
Robert Morris, who intentionally lets a worm loose, but is only
reckless in causing damage, would likely be found to violate the
statute.
B. Traditional Fraud Committed Via Computer Network
More traditional types of fraud may also be carried out via
computer network. State and federal regulators have recently started
taking an active role in cracking down on fraudulent schemes commit-
ted via the Internet and on on-line services. The Federal Trade
Commission, for instance, has the authority to prevent unfair or
deceptive trade practices through the Federal Trade Commission
Act.69 and other statutes the agency is charged with enforcing.
Under the authority of these statutes, the Agency has taken action
against everything from "run of the mill" pyramid scheme opera-
tors37 to bizarre scams involving software that, when downloaded
and run, surreptitiously disconnects the user's computer from his or
her Internet service provider, and reconnects the user's computer to a
Moldovan telephone exchange (that, in actuality, is really reaching a
server in Canada, but the call incurs charges as if the user were calling
a number in Moldova).37' In case anyone had much of a doubt,
365. Computer Abuse Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-294, § 201 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, 1030 (West Supp. 1998).
366. Defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2).
367. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B) (1994).
368. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) defines "damage" to include impairing the availability of data,
a program, a system, or information.
369. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
370. See Federal Trade Commission v. The Mentor Network, Inc., Civ. No. SACV 96-
1104 LHM (EEx), (C.D. Cal. 1997) (stipulated final judgment and order, available on the
Internet at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/9703/mentor.htm> (visited March 29, 1998).
371. Federal Trade Commission v. Audiotex Connection, Inc., No. CV-97 0726 (DRH),
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (available on the Internet at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/9711/
AdtxamdFCMPord.htm> (visited March 29, 1998); In re Byelen Telecom, Ltd.; File No. 972-
3128 (available on the Internet at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/9802/beylene.d&0.htm> (visited
March 29, 1998).
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service providers who surreptitiously reroute telephone calls to foreign
countries in order to receive kickbacks from long distance companies
can be held liable for the accompanying deception.372
Similarly, if someone offers a product on-line, and then does not
deliver, that "merchant" may be held liable under state equivalents to
the Federal Trade Commission Act.373 At least one court has held,
that existing state antifraud laws are "an excellent weapon in the soon-
to-be-expected war on Internet fraud." '374
Unfortunately, due to the international reach of computer
networks not all fraud is easily prevented. International cooperation
will be of growing importance. For instance, when an Australian
company masqueraded as a U.S. company that handled domain name
registrations, the Federal Trade Commission provided an opinion letter
about the legality of the Australian company's actions,375 which could
then be used to influence Australian authorities to investigate the issue.
C. Unauthorized Use of Communications Services.
One of the favorite targets of computer hackers is the telephone
company.376 Telephone systems are susceptible to computer hackers'
illegal use. By breaking into the telephone company's computer,
hackers can place free long distance calls to other computers, and can
get lists of telephone credit card numbers. Trafficking of stolen credit
card numbers and other kinds of telecommunications fraud costs long
distance carriers over $1 billion annually.377 Distribution of fraudu-
lently procured long distance codes is often accomplished over bulletin
board systems or by publication in electronic journals put out by
hackers over computer networks. 7s
In addition to a variety of other statutes which may clearly
provide a remedy against such unauthorized use, 379 it is possible that
372. Id.
373. See, e.g., People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1997) (finding a magazine vendor who
did not deliver promised magazine subscriptions liable for violating various provisions of New
York business law).
374. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
375. See letter from David Medine to David M. Graves, Aug. 21, 1997, available on the
Internet at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/9708/internic.let.htm> (visited March 29, 1998).
376. Cindy Skrzycki, Thieves Tap Phone Access Codes to Ring Up Illegal Calls, WASH. POST,
Sept. 2, 1991, at Al.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. People v. Casey, 587 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that unauthorized use
of telephone access codes violates state statutes prohibiting theft and unauthorized use of
computers).
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some protection from hackers is to be found in section 1343 of the
Wire Fraud Chapter of the U.S. Code.38° This section prohibits the
use of wires, radio or television in order to fraudulently deprive a party
of money or property. 81 This statute has been held to include the
fraudulent use of telephone services,3 82 and has also been applied to
the use of computers to alter account information so as to "steal"
airline frequent-flyer miles. 383 However, one case that tried to apply
the wire fraud statute to free distribution of pirated software found that
while such free distribution may be reprehensible, it was not punish-
able as wire fraud.3 84  Also, it has been held that the mere unautho-
rized "browsing" of information without any further use or disclosure
does not amount to wire fraud or computer fraud.3 85 More often, the
statute relating to fraud in connection with computer access devices386
is used to address the theft of communications services. This statute
has been interpreted to include computer passwords.387 This statute
has been applied even when no customer account is com-
promised-theft from the service provider is sufficient.38 8 Regardless
of whether or not a customer's account is accessed, unauthorized
service use creates a potential drag on the efficiency of the entire
communications system and results in lost opportunity costs to the
service provider. 89 Interestingly though, a few cases have found that
"theft of service" in the form of unauthorized use of computer time
and disk storage do not constitute larceny and the cases hold that the
unauthorized use of such services does not constitute the deprivation
of a thing of value as required under the larceny statutes.390
380. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994).
381. Id.
382. See, e.g., Brandon v. United States, 382 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1967).
383. United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1993).
384. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 545 (D. Mass. 1994).
385. United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that IRS employee
did not commit wire fraud or computer fraud by reading tax payer records for personal reasons
when there was no evidence of any further use or intent to use the confidential information).
386. 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (1994).
387. United States v. Fernandez, No. 92 CR. 563, 1993 WL 88197 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,
1993).
388. United States v. Ashe, 47 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 1995); cf., United States v. Taylor, 945
F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1991).
389. See United States v. Bailey, 41 F.3d 413, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S.
1134 (1995) when the court discussed the costs of cloning even when a customer account was not
compromised. In addition to the Federal statutes, some state laws also exist to punish theft of
local telephone service or publication of telephone access codes. See, e.g., State v. Northwest
Passage, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 741, 585 P.2d 794 (Wash. 1978) (en banc).
390. United States v. Collins, 56 F.3d 1416, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1995); State v. McGraw, 480
N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind. 1985).
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D. Viruses
As pointed out in the introduction, computer viruses are
increasingly of concern-both for operators of computer information
systems, and for users of the systems. But what is a virus? A virus
refers to any sort of destructive computer program, though the term is
usually reserved for the most dangerous ones.3 9' Computer virus
crime involves an intent to cause damage, "akin to vandalism on a
small scale, or terrorism on a grand scale." '392 Viruses can be spread
through networked computers or by sharing disks between comput-
ers.393 Viruses cause damage by attacking another file or by simply
filling up the computer's memory or by using up the computer's
processor power. 94 There are a number of different types of viruses,
but one of the factors common to most of them is that they all copy
themselves (or parts of themselves). Viruses are, in essence, self-
replicating.395
Also discussed earlier was a "pseudo-virus," called a worm.39 6
People in the computer industry do not agree on the distinctions
between worms and viruses. 397  Regardless of the exact definition,
however, a worm is a program specifically designed to move through
networks.398 A worm may have constructive purposes, such as to
find machines with free resources that could be more efficiently used,
but usually a worm is used to disable or slow down computers. More
specifically, worms are defined as, "computer virus programs... [that]
propagate on a computer network without the aid of an unwitting
human accomplice. These programs move of their own volition based
upon stored knowledge of the network structure. 399
Another type of virus is the "Trojan Horse."4 °  These are
viruses that hide inside another seemingly harmless program. Once
391. See, e.g., Daniel J. Kluth, The Computer Virus Threat: A Survey of Current Criminal
Statutes, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 297, 297-98 (1990).
392. Id. at 298.
393. David R. Johnson, Computer Viruses: Legal and Policy Issues Facing Colleges and
Universities., 54 EDUC. L. REP. 761 (1989).
394. Id. at 762.
395. Id.
396. See Morris, 928 F.2d 504 and discussion, infra at § VII2A.
397. Eric Allman, Worming My Way; November 1988 Internet Worm, UNIX REV., Jan.
1989, at 74.
398. Kluth, supra note 391, at 300.
399. Id. at n.14.
400. Id. at 298.
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the Trojan Horse program is used on the computer system, however,
the virus spreads.
The virus type that has gained the most fame recently has been
the "Time Bomb," which is a delayed action virus of some type.4"'
This type of virus has gained notoriety as a result of the Michelangelo
virus-a virus designed to erase the hard drives of people using IBM
compatible computers on the artist's birthday.4"2 Michelangelo was
so prevalent, it was even distributed accidentally by some software
publishers when the software developers' computers became infect-
ed. 403
One concern many have about the statutes dealing with computer
viruses is the problem of an intent requirement.4 4 Without some
sort of intent requirement, virus statutes may be so overbroad so as to
cover defective computer programs.4 5
What legal remedies are available for virus attacks? Distributing
a virus affecting computers used substantially by the government or
financial institutions is a federal crime under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act.406 If a virus also involves unauthorized access to an
electronic communications system involving interstate commerce, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act may come into play.40 7
Most states have statutes that make it a crime to intentionally interfere
with a computer system. 408  These statutes will often cover viruses
as well as other forms of computer crime.40 9
SYSOPs must also worry about being liable to their users as a
result of viruses that cause a disruption in service.410 Service outages
401. Dawn Stover, Viruses, Worms, Trojans and Bombs: Computer Infections, POPULAR
SCIENCE, Sept. 1989 at 59.
402. Steve Alexander, Viruses: Some Are Just Ornery, Some Are Deadly. Here's How to
Head 'er off at the Pass, COMPUTER WORLD, June 2, 1997 at 88.
403. Electronic Mail Software Provider Reports Virus Contamination, UPI, Feb. 3, 1992, at
1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
404. See Kluth, supra note 391, at 300.
405. Id.
406. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
407. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
408. Johnson, supra note 393, at 764. See also Anne W. Branscomb, Rogue Computer
Programs and Computer Rogues: Tailoring the Punishment to Fit the Crime, 16 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 30-31, 61 (1990). For direct application of such a state statute, see,
People v. Versaggi, 629 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1994).
409. See, e.g., State v. Corcoran, 522 N.W.2d 226 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). States may have
a wide variety of statutes which can be applied to various activities that involve inappropriate
computer use. See, e.g., People v. Krause, 609 N.E.2d 980 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding a police
officer guilty of violating a statute prohibiting official misconduct because he used a computer
system to investigate prostitution customers).
410. See Johnson, supra note 393, at 761.
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caused by viruses or by shutdowns to prevent the spreading of viruses
could result in a breach of contract when continual service is guaran-
teed. However, contract provisions could provide for excuse or deferral
of obligation in the event of disruption of service by a virus.
Similarly, system operators are open to tort suits caused by
negligent virus control.41'
[A SYSOP] might still be found liable on the ground that, in its role
as operator of a computer system or network, it failed to use due
care to prevent foreseeable damage, to warn of potential dangers, or
to take reasonable steps to limit or control the damage once the
dangers were realized.412
The nature of "care" has not been defined by court or by statute. Still,
it is likely that a court would find that a provider is liable for failure
to take precautions against viruses when precautions are likely to be
needed. SYSOPs are also likely to be held liable for not treating files
they know are infected. Taking precautions against viruses would be
likely to reduce the chances or degree of liability.
E. Protection from Hackers
System operators need to worry about damage caused by hackers
as well as damage caused by viruses. While hackers are liable for the
damage they cause, SYSOPs may find themselves on the receiving end
of a tort suit for negligent failure to secure their computer information
system. For a system operator to be found negligent, there must first
be a duty of care to the user who is injured by the hacker. 3 There
must then be a breach of that duty,414 i.e., the SYSOP must display
conduct "which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." '415 Simply
put, the SYSOP must do what is generally expected of someone in his
or her position in order to protect users from problems a normal user
would expect to be protected against. Events that the SYSOP could
not have prevented--or when foreseen and planned for-will not result
in liability.416 A SYSOP's duty "may be defined as a duty to select
and implement security provisions, to monitor their effectiveness, and
411. Id. at 764, 766.
412. Id. at 766.
413. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30(1),
at 164 (5th ed. 1984).
414. Id. § 30(2), at 164.
415. Id. § 31, at 169.
416. Id. § 29, at 162.
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to maintain the provisions in accordance with changing security
needs." '417 SYSOPs should be aware of the type of information
stored in their systems, what kind of security is needed for the services
they provide, and which users are authorized to use what data and
services. System operators also have a duty to explain to each user the
extent of his or her authorization to use the computer information
service.418
The same analysis applies to operator-caused problems. If the
system operator accidentally deletes data belonging to a user or
negligently maintains the computer system, resulting in damage, he or
she would be liable to the user to the same extent as he or she would
be from hacker damage that occurred due to negligence.
VIII. PRIVACY OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Privacy has been a concern of computer information system
providers from the very beginning. With the speed, power, accessibili-
ty, and storage capacity provided by computers comes tremendous
potential to infringe on people's privacy.419 It is imperative that
users of services such as electronic mail understand how these services
work. They must understand how private the users' communications
really are, and who may have access to the users' "personal" e-mail.
The same is true for stored computer files. Similarly, it is important
that system operators be aware of what restrictions and requirements
exist to maintain users' privacy expectations.
A. Pre-Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
One of the most significant cases establishing privacy for
electronic communications is Katz v. United States.41° Katz involved
the use of an electronic listening device (or "bug") mounted on the
outside of a public telephone booth.42' The government (who placed
the bug) assumed that because the bug did not actually penetrate the
walls of the booth, and was not a "wire tap," there was no invasion of
417. Cheryl S. Massingale & A. Faye Borthick, Risk Allocation for Computer System Security
Breaches: Potential Liability for Providers of Computer Services, 12 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 167,
187 (1990).
418. Id. at 188-89.
419. For example, the United States Supreme Court noted that "[p]lainly there is a vast
difference between the public records that might be found after a dilligent search of courthouse
files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized
summary located in a singular clearinghouse of information." United Stated Dept. of Justice v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989).
420. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
421. Id. at 348.
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privacy.422 However, the defendant argued that the bug was an
unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court held:
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. [citations omitted]
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 411
The decision in this case is also understood to say that if a person does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, there is, in fact, no Fourth
Amendment protection. 424
The person must have a subjective expectation of privacy, and to
be reasonable, it must be an expectation that society is willing to
recognize as reasonable.42 For example, most people have a reason-
able expectation that calls made from inside a closed telephone booth
will be private. For computer users, although the system operator can
read the user's e-mail, there may still be an expectation of privacy,"'
especially on a "closed" system such as America Online or Compu-
Serve, as opposed to an Internet transmission. However, this, of
course, does not mean that a user may have a right to expect that the
recipient of a message on an on-line service will keep the contents of
a message secret.427
Statutory protection of the right to privacy was originally provided
by the Federal Wiretap Statute.428 However, this statute affected
only "wire communication," which was limited to "aural [voice]
acquisition. '429  Even if the Act did cover transmission, it still did
not cover stored computer data. 43 ° This does not result in significant
or comprehensive protection of e-mail or stored data.
422. Id. at 351.
423. Id.
424. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
425. See California v. Ciraolo 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
426. United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 576-77 (1995).
427. See, e.g., United States v. Carbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
428. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
429. See United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 156-57 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 922 (1979) (holding that interception of computer transmission is not an "aural acquisition"
and, therefore, the Wiretap Act did not provide protection).
430. Id. at 157 (discussing fact that the statute did not apply to retrieval of information from
computer prior to transmission).
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B. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
Prior to the passage of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, communications between two persons were subject to widely
disparate legal treatment depending on whether the message was
carried by regular mail, electronic mail, an analog phone line, a cellular
phone, or some other form of electronic communication system. This
technology-dependent legal approach turned the Fourth Amendment's
protection on its head. The Supreme Court had said that the
Constitution protects people, not places, but the Wiretap Act did not
adequately protect all personal communications; rather, it extended
legal protection only to communications carried by some technolo-
gies.4 31
The Federal Wiretap Act was updated by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.432 The Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act deals specifically with the interception and
disclosure of interstate electronic communications.433 It works both
to guarantee the privacy of e-mail and also to provide an outlet for
prosecuting anyone who will not respect that privacy. The statute
provides in part that "any person who (a) intentionally intercepts,
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or
endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication" shall
be fined or imprisoned.434 The intentional disclosure or use of the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication that is known
or could reasonably be known to have been intercepted in violation of
the statute is prohibited.43 This largely guarantees the privacy of in-
transit e-mail as well as data transfers over a network or telephone line
going to or from a computer system. In essence, e-mail cannot legally
be read except by the sender or the receiver even if someone else
actually intercepted the message. Further, disclosure or use of the
message contents by any party, other than the message sender and its
intended recipient, is prohibited if the intercepting party knows or has
reason to know that the message was illegally intercepted.
Section 2 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act provides
an exception for system operators and their employees to the extent
necessary to properly manage the computer system:
431. Robert W. Kastenmeier et al., supra note 13, at 720 (citations omitted).
432. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
433. Id. §§ 2510(12), 2511.
434. Id. § 2511.
435. Id. § 2511(1)(c).
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It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a
switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire
or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the
transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose, or use
that communication in the normal course of his employment while
engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition
of his service or to the protection of rights or property of the
provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communica-
tion service to the public shall not utilize service observing or
random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control
checks.436
"Electronic Communication System" is defined as "any wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the
transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities
or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications. '437  Further exceptions are made for system
operators of these systems when the originator or addressee of the
message gives consent;438 when the message is being given to another
service provider to be further forwarded towards its destination; 439
where the message is inadvertently obtained by the SYSOP and
appears to pertain to a crime; 440 when the divulgence is being made
to a law enforcement agency;441 or where the message is configured
so as to be readily accessible to the public.442 It is worth noting that
this section also applies to broadcast communications, as long as they
are in a form not readily accessible to the general public (with some
exceptions). 443 This will probably cover the up-and-coming technol-
ogies of radio-WANS,4" cellular modems, and packet radio. These
technologies are especially likely to be covered by the statute if data is
transmitted using some sort of encryption scheme.445
For law enforcement agencies to intercept electronic communica-
tions, they must first obtain a search warrant by following the
436. Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
437. Id. § 2510(14).
438. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(ii) (1994).
439. Id. § 2511(3)(b)(iii).
440. Id. § 2511(3)(b)(iv).
441. Id. § 2511(3)(b)(iv).
442. Id. § 2511(3)(b)(i).
443. Id. § 2511.
444. Radio-WANS are Wide Area Networks, i.e., computer networks which link computers
by radio transmissions rather than wires.
445. Encryption is in essence a coding of the data so it cannot be understood by anyone
without the equipment or knowledge necessary to decode the transmission.
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procedure laid out in section 2518 of this Act.446  The statute does
not prohibit the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices. 47 The
warrant requirement makes it harder for law enforcement officials to
get at the contents of the communications, but does not substantially
impede efforts to find out who is calling the computer information
system.
C. Access to Stored Communications
Section 2511 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
concerns the interception of computer communications while section
2701 of the Act prohibits unlawful access to communications which are
being stored on a computer. 448 E-mail, voice mail, and even pager
data are stored at some point during the transmission process.449
Section 2701 reads, in part, "whoever--(1) intentionally accesses
without authorization a facility through which an electronic communi-
cation service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization
to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents autho-
rized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage in such system" 4 0 shall be subject to fines and/or
imprisonment. 411 Like section 2511, section 2701 includes provisions
prohibiting the divulgence of stored messages.452 Importantly, while
section 2701 allows law enforcement agencies to gain access to stored
communications, it also specifically allows the government to permit
a system operator to first make backup copies of stored computer data,
subject to a valid search warrant.45 3 Section 2701 enables electronic
communications to be preserved for use outside of any government
investigation." 4
Such a statute is needed because the government often takes the
stored data to sort through during the course of its investigation, as
was the case in Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret
446. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994).
447. Id. § 2511(2)(h)(i). A pen register is a device which records the telephone numbers
called from a specific telephone; a trap and trace device records the phone originating calls to a
specific telephone.
448. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
449. See, Thomas R. Greenberg, Comment, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and
the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 219, 247-48 (1994).
450. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1994).
451. Id. § 2701(b) (1994).
452. Id. § 2702.
453. Id. § 2703.
454. Id. § 2703(a).
11451998]
Seattle University Law Review
Service (Steve Jackson Games).4"' In that case, the Secret Service
raided a publisher and seized its BBS-electronic mail and all. The
court held that the government had to go through the procedures
established by section 2701 et seq., covering stored wire and electronic
communications, in order to discover properly the contents of the
electronic mail on the BBS.456 The court indicated that evidence of
good faith reliance on a search warrant that the Secret Service believed
to be valid was insufficient.4 7  The government knew that the
computer had private electronic communications stored on it and
therefore, the only means they could legally use to gain access to those
communications was compliance with the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, and not by seizing the BBS.458
The Steve Jackson Games, Inc. case is also valuable in that it
demonstrates the interplay between protection against interception of
electronic communication and access to stored communication."'
The district court held, in essence, that taking a whole computer is not
an "interception" as contemplated by section 2510 et seq., especially in
light of the protection of stored communication-provided by section
2701 et seq. The court analogized the situation to the seizure of a tape
recording of a telephone conversation and held that the "aural
acquisition" occurs when the tape is made, not each time the tape is
played back by the police.46° This interpretation was appealed on the
grounds that, because the messages had been sent and not yet received,
they were intercepted, just as if someone had picked up and carried off
a postal service mailbox from the side of the street.461 However, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed Judge Sparks' interpretation of the interplay
between sections 2701 et seq. and 2510 et seq. of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.462
However, not all cases have reached the same conclusion as that
reached in the Steve Jackson Games case as to the legality of seizing a
BBS, stored communications and all. In Davis v. Gracey, the court
held that when officers rely on a valid search warrant and when such
reliance is objectively reasonable, the incidental seizure of the electronic
communications will not result in liability thanks to the "good faith"
455. 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993), aff'd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
456. Id. at 443.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 442-43.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 441-42.
461. Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 457.
462. Id.; Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 386-87 (D. Del. 1997).
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exemption from liability provided by section 2707(e) of the Act so long
as the seizure of the stored electronic communications was incidental
to the execution of the warrant.463
Another important limitation to point out is that section 2701
applies to the divulging of communications to which access is not
authorized.464  If access to the stored communication is autho-
rized-because the party accessing the communication is the owner of
a private communications system---disclosure of the communication
may be allowed.4 61 On the other hand, if the communication service
is being provided to the public, the service provider is limited in its
ability to divulge the contents of stored communication166 unless one
of the permitted exceptions is met.4 67
At this point, it is worth mentioning a case that has drawn
criticism because the opinion did not mention the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act. Smyth v. Pillsbury involved the firing of an at-
will employee for sending e-mail to a superior that was judged to be
"inappropriate and unprofessional." '468 The employer had previously
assured its employees, including the defendant, that all e-mail was
privileged and confidential, and would not be used against its
employees as grounds for termination or reprimand.469 In finding
that the interception of the employee's e-mail did not constitute a
common law tortious invasion of his privacy, the court stated that it
did "not find a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communica-
tions voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over the
company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such
communications would not be intercepted by management. "470
Furthermore, the court held that even if the employee did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the employer's desire to prevent use
of the e-mail system for carrying "inappropriate" comments would
outweigh any privacy interest that employee may have in those
comments. 471
Another important limitation to point out is that section 2701
applies the divulging of communications to which access is not
463. 111 F.3d 1472, 1481 (10th Cir. 1997).
464. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
465. See id.
466. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
467. Id. § 2702(b).
468. 914 F. Supp. 97, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
469. Id.
470. Id. at 101.
471. Id.
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authorized.472 If access to the stored communication is athorized,
because the party accessing the communication is the owner of a
private communications system, disclosure of the communication may
be allowed.473 On the other hand, if the communication service is
being provided to the public, the service provider is limited in its
ability to divulge the contents of stored communications"' unless one
of the permitted exceptions is met.475
D. Privacy Protection Act of 1980
Computer systems also fall under the protection of the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980.476 The Privacy Protection Act immunizes
from law enforcement search and seizure any "work product materials
possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to
disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other
similar form of public communication, in or affecting interstate
commerce." 477  This statute was passed to overturn the decision in
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, a case that held that a newspaper office
could be searched, even when no one working at the paper was
suspected of a crime.4 78 The only exceptions to the law's prohibition
on searches of publishers are the following: probable cause to believe
that the person possessing the materials has committed or is commit-
ting the crime to which the materials relate,4 79 or the immediate
seizure is necessary to prevent the death or serious injury to a human
being." A computer system may fall under this statute when it is
being used in the aid of a print publisher, such as when the service is
used in a publisher's office or to transmit materials to a publisher.48 '
More importantly for the System Operator, electronic publishers
should fall directly under this section based on the list of types of
"publishers" covered by this statute.
The first case that attempted to apply this statute to electronic
publishers was Steve Jackson Games, mentioned earlier. Steve Jackson
472. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1994).
473. See Anderson Consulting LLP v. UOP Inc., 991 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
474. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994).
475. Id. § 2702(b).
476. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1980).
477. Id. § 2000aa(a).
478. 436 U.S. 547, 560 (1978).
479. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
480. Id. § 2000aa(a)(2) (1994).
481. For example, journalists reporting from a war zone can use a laptop computer and a
satellite telephone to transmit an article to an e-mail service, where the article can then be sent
to the publisher. See Electric Word, WIRED, 1.6, Dec. 1993 at 27.
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Games presents a good case study in law enforcement violations of
electronic data privacy. Steve Jackson Games is a small publisher of
fantasy role-playing games in Texas.482 The company also ran a BBS
to gain customer feedback on the company's games.483 The Secret
Service took all of the company's computers-their regular business
computers and the one on which they were running the company's BBS
(private electronic mail, etc.). 484 They also took all of the copies of
their latest game, "Gurps Cyberpunk. '48s  The raid by the Secret
Service caused the company to temporarily shut down. 86 Steve
Jackson Games also had to lay off several -employees.487 The release
of the game was delayed for months, because the Government took all
of the word processing disks as well as all of the printed drafts of the
game.488 The Electronic Frontier Foundation, which provided legal
counsel for Steve Jackson, likened the Secret Service's action to an
indiscriminant seizure of all of a business's filing cabinets and printing
presses.489  Steve Jackson Games was raided because one of its
employees ran a BBS out of his home-one home one out of several
thousand possible homes around the country that distributed the
electronic journal "Phrack," in which a stolen telephone company
document was published. 491 The document contained information
which was publicly available in other forms.4 91 The employee was
also accused of being a part of a fraud scheme-the "fraud" consisting
of an explanation, in a two-line message of "Kermit," which is a
publicly available communications protocol. 492  The employee was
also co-SYSOP of the bulletin board system at Steve Jackson Games.
The court found that at the time of the raid, the Secret Service did not
know that Steve Jackson Games was a publisher (even though they
should have).49a As a result, the Secret Service did not comply with
482. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States, 816 F. Supp. 432, 434 (W.D. Tex. 1993)
affd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
483. Id.
484. Id. at 439.
485. Id. at 439-40.
486. Id. at 438.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Legal Case Summary, May 10, 1990, available on the Internet by anonymous FTP at
FTP.EFF.ORG (Electronic Frontier Foundation) (visited March 29, 1998).
490. Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 816 F. Supp. at 436.
491. See United States v. Riggs, 743 F. Supp. 556, 558 (N.D. I11. 1990).
492. Special Issue: Search Affidavit for Steve Jackson Games, COMPUTER UNDERGROUND
DIG., Nov. 13, 1990, available over INTERNET, by anonymous FTP, at FTP.EFF.ORG
(Electronic Frontier Foundation) (visited March 29, 1998).
493. Id. at 436.
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the provisions of the Privacy Protection Act.494 Judge Sparks said
that the continued refusal to return the publisher's work product, once
the Secret Service had been informed that Steve Jackson Games was a
publisher, amounted to a violation of the Act.49 In the raid, the
Secret Service seized a number of Steve Jackson's computers, and a
number of papers.496 As mentioned, this included the company's
BBS, which contained public comments on newspaper articles
submitted for review, public announcements, and other public and
497private communications.
While the judge found a violation of the Privacy Protection Act,
he did not specify which items led to the violation. The violation
could have been the seizure of the papers, the computers used for word
processing, or the BBS. Thus, the question still remains unanswered
as to whether the seizure of the BBS alone, which was being used to
generate work product for the publisher, would have amounted to a
violation of the Act. Importantly, other users of the BBS who had
posted public comments about Steve Jackson Games were also
plaintiffs in the case.49' They were not allowed recovery based on
the Privacy Protection Act 9.4 " Therefore, either the individual
message posters were not considered to be publishers themselves (only
perhaps authors of works published in electronic form by Steve Jackson
Games' BBS) or their messages were not considered to be work product
subject to protection.
IX. COPYRIGHT ISSUES
A. Basics of Copyrights
Text, pictures, sounds, software-all of these can be distributed
via computer systems-and all can be copyrighted. Section 101 of the
Copyright Act allows protection of "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. "'0
The element of fixation is important in the copyright statute; a
work that is not fixed is not covered by the statute, and any possible
494. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1994).
495. Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 816 F. Supp. at 437.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 439-40.
498. Id. at 439.
499. Id.
500. 17 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1994).
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protection must come from local common law."0' A number of
controversial cases have held that reading copyrighted material into a
computer's Random Access Memory (RAM) constitutes making a copy
(or a fixation)." 2 These cases are controversial because a computer's
RAM retains information only while the computer is turned on, and
requires a constant "refreshing" of the stored information in order to
avoid losing the data. Thus, the information stored in a computer's
RAM is only temporarily fixed, at best. However, a temporary
fixation is all that is required by the Copyright Act for the purposes
of finding that a copy has been made.0 3  These cases are also
controversial because, while the Copyright Act explicitly allows copies
of computer programs to be made in the limited circumstance of
making an archival copy of the program5 4 or a copy necessary to
utilize the software (i.e. a RAM copy),505 this section only covers
computer programs. A computer program is defined in the Copyright
Act as "a set of statements or instruction to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." ' 6
Arguably data in raw form, such as e-mail and sound and picture files,
does not meet the definition of a computer program, and thus may not
even be copied into a computer's RAM as is necessary to utilize the
data without risking a copyright infringement (unless such a copy fits
under one of the exceptions such as the fair use provision).5 7 More
501. Id.
502. MAI Syss. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Advanced
Computer Services of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Syss. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994); Triad
Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1239 (N.D. Ca. 1994), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1145 (1996).
503. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defines a work to be "fixed" in a tangible means of expression
"when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated for a period of more than a transitory duration"). In Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of
Fire Equipment Distributors, 983 F. Supp. 1167, (N.D. I11. 1997), a service provider made an
interesting argument, that the court, unfortunately, seemed to miss. The service provider argued
that it was not liable for copyright infringement because its computers processed the copyrighted
work so quickly that at no point was a complete copy of the protected works in the computer's
RAM at any one time. Id. at 1177. The court stated that there was still a fixation, even if there
was not a complete simultaneous fixation. Id. at 1177-78. The court seemed to miss the point
that the service provider was not challenging whether there was a fixation, but rather was arguing
that the fixation did not exist for more than a transitory duration. Unfortunately, under the
judge's interpretation, any service provider that processes digital communications, such as fiber
optic, satellite, and some cellular communications, all of which require the conversion of the
communication into a computerized form, could be held liable for infringement.
504. 17 U.S.C. § 117(2) (1994).
505. Id. at § 117(1).
506. Id. at § 101.
507. Id. at § 107. Fair Use is discussed in Part IX.C., infra.
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likely, raw data is covered by an implied license which allows the work
to be copied in naturally expected circumstances.
As mentioned, the Copyright Act gives an author the exclusive
rights to make copies of his or her works, as well as create derivative
works which includes copies in computer readable form."'8 Thus,
scanned pictures, digitized sounds, machine readable texts, and
computer programs are all subject to an author's copyright. Any
attempt to turn original material into one of these computer-readable
forms without the author's permission (unless the copy falls under one
of the exceptions in sections 107-120) is a violation of the author's
copyright.
With decreasing costs of data storage, and increasing access to
computer networks, comes an increase in the number of computer
archives, such as FTP (file transfer protocol) sites and world wide web
pages. These computer archives store various types of data which can
be searched by the archive user. The archive site can be searched, and
the information can be copied by anyone with sufficient access to the
archive. The ease with which information can be accessed and
duplicated has some profound copyright implications. I will use as an
example a "lyric server" which is an archive that stores lyrics to songs
by assorted artists.
In the case of a lyric server, if someone is sitting down with an
album jacket and typing the lyrics into the computer for distribution
in the archive, the translation of the lyrics from the album jacket to a
computer text file constitutes a potentially unauthorized copy.509
Similarly, if someone else types in the file and a system operator then
puts the file into the archive for distribution, the SYSOP has violated
the author's right to make copies of his or her work."'0
Once the file is in the archive for distribution, there may be a
copyright violation every time the information is copied. While the
archive user may not be making an infringing copy by just viewing the
file contained in RAM,"' if the archive is publicly accessible,
viewing some types of files may possibly constitute a public perfor-
mance or display.. 2 of the copyrighted work, the rights of which are
508. Id. at § 106.
509. Again this is because the Copyright Act gives the author the right to make copies and
derivative works and this action constitutes making a copy.
510. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
511. But see, discussion of loading data into a computer's RAM constituting a copy, supra
notes 501 to 506 and accompanying text.
512. Public performance and display are defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) as:
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also protected.S3 Display rights, however (as well as performance
rights), are an inelegant fit in this context. When a work is trans-
ferred, it generally must be acted upon to produce a display of the
work. Although some types of distribution may make the immediate
display of a work a seamless process, most distribution technologies do
not produce a display as a necessary incident of accessing the work. To
infringe these display and performance rights, it should be necessary
that the computer system makes the'copyrighted work available in a
manner such that the work is immediately shown, recited, rendered, or
otherwise played directly to the user (as some types of bulletin board
systems operate). To not require this immediate accessibility would be
to confuse the right to distribute copies with the right to display or
perform a work. By allowing the transmission of raw data, the system
operator is making available a public place in which to copy, not
display, the work. Without some activity beyond merely transmitting
the work in a raw data form, to hold a system operator liable for
violating a display right would be analogous to holding a place-such
as a library, a newsstand, or a waiting room, or any other place which
has copyrighted works available to the public-liable for violating the
copyright holder's display or performance rights.
Unfortunately, courts have made just this mistake. For instance,
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, involved a BBS where users could
log on and download pictures scanned from the pages of Playboy
magazine."t 4 The BBS SYSOP claimed that he did not upload the
picture files to his bulletin board system, and that it was the BBS users
who both uploaded and downloaded any copies. The court held Frena
liable for copyright infringement."'S According to the court, Frena
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same or at different times.
513. Id. at § 106.
514. 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993). See also Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National
Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distributors and Northwest Nexus, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1174, n.4 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (stating that a web site operator "appears to be liable" for violating the copyright
holder's display right); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503
(N.D. Ohio 1997). In another case, the plaintiff in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Sanfilippo, No. 97-
0670, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5125 (S.D. Cal., Mar. 25, 1998) alleged that its distribution,
display, and reproduction rights were infringed. The court granted an injunction allowing for all
three rights; however, the court only explicitly found that the defendant had copies the plaintiffs
works. Id. at *10-11, *20.
515. Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
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supplied a product which the court argued contained unauthorized
copies of the plaintiffs protected works, which implicated the
plaintiffs exclusive right to distribute its copyrighted work. 16
Furthermore, the court held that Playboy's exclusive right to display
its works was infringed. 17 Both of these holdings are arguably
wrong.
When a user of Frena's BBS downloads a picture, the user is
likely to see only a line indicating that the file has been transferred
successfully. Viewing the picture generally requires additional steps on
the part of the user."' It is possible that the picture will never be
displayed, and will therefore never infringe the exclusive display right.
This display issue is particularly pronounced with the Web pages.
With a web page, the "images" on a page will only be displayed if the
user is using software that is capable of displaying images, and is using
that feature. 19 Thus, which section of the Copyright Act the web
page provider violates may hinge on factors not under the control of
the provider.
Also at issue in the Frena case is the right to distribute copies.'
The original "copy" is the one on Frena's computer's disk drive. At
the end of the user transaction, this copy has not moved; it is still
connected to Frena's computer. Clearly there has been no "distribu-
tion" of a copy required for an infringement of the copyright holder's
distribution right. Equally clear, however, is that an infringing copy
has been made. At the beginning of the transaction there was a copy
only on Frena's computer. At the end of the transaction, there was
also a copy on the user's computer. However, this implicates
Playboy's exclusive right to make reproductions, 521 not its display or
distribution rights. 22
516. Id. at 1556. The Sanfilippo court cited from the same section of the Frena opinion in
the course of its discussion of "copying." However, this part of the Frena opinion was specifically
addressing the infringement by distribution issue. See Sanfilippo, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5125,
at *7.
517. Id.
518. Modern software packages are making the download, conversion, and display process
more seamless. However, the different stages are still required, even if hidden in the background.
At the time the Frena case was decided, the display process clearly required that multiple steps
be taken by the average BBS user over which the BBS operator had no control and only presumed
knowledge.
519. Not all web browsers are capable of displaying images, and most web browsers have
an option to turn off the display of images in order to load web pages more rapidly.
520. 839 F. Supp. at 1556.
521. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
522. This same confusion over the § 106(3) distribution right was also demonstrated in the
Marobie case. See Marobie-FL, Inc., 983 F. Supp. at 1167.
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The Information Infrastructure Task Force of the Commerce
Department has proposed amending the copyright law to include a new
"transmission right. '5 23  However, such a new right would do
nothing but weaken the distinction between making and transmitting
a copy. "Transmitting" a copy still entails the creation of new copies,
which, as discussed, is already an exclusive right reserved to the
copyright holder.
B. Copyright and Strict Liability
There is no intent or knowledge requirement to find a copyright
violation. Copyright infringement is a strict liability offense-intent
is only a factor in calculating damages.2 4  When a work is copied,
even if the person making the copy does not know or have reason to
know that the work is copyrighted, an infringement may still be
found.12' Even subconscious copying has been held to be an in-
fringement.2 6  However, at least one court has limited the strict
liability concept in the on-line distribution context.
In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications
Service (Netcom), the court was squarely faced with the issue of a
system operator running a machine that was passively reproducing
copies of the plaintiffs work. 27 At issue was the posting of copy-
righted scriptures of the Church of Scientology to a usenet news group
distributed over the Internet."' A user posted the message to a
bulletin board system, which then automatically sent the message out
over a usenet news server, while archiving the message for three days.
The BBS news server passed the message to the news server of
Netcom, 29 the BBS' Internet provider, which then passed the
message on to other news servers. In this manner, passing the message
up the chain and then on to other servers worldwide, the copyrighted
message rapidly reached perhaps as many as half a million news servers
(which then may then make further copies for users local to each
server) within a matter of a day or so. The court held that, even
523. See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (September 1995).
524. Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
525. Id.; see also De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944).
526. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
527. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
528. Id. at 1365-66.
529. The Netcom servers archived the message for an additional eleven days. Id. at 1367-
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though Netcom's servers were making copies of the Plaintiffs
protected materials, the computers were making the copies without
human intervention on the part of Netcom. 3° As a result, the court
held it would be unreasonable to assign liability for direct copyright
infringement to Netcom (or any of the other half million worldwide
news server operators) where the operator could not reasonably prevent
the copying, or even know that such copying was occurring, without
some prior warning of what material was at issue.531 In Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., the court held that
encouraging or facilitating infringement did not amount to direct
copyright infringement-some sort of volitional act on the part of the
system operator is required. 32 In this case, the court found the
volitional act requirement met by the service provider taking uploaded
files, reviewing them, and making them available for users to down-
load. The court rejected the argument that it was too difficult to
determine which uploaded files may contain copyrighted materials that
the system operator did not have the right to distribute. 33 In
another more obvious case, the court in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Sanfilippo held that a service provider could be held liable for
copyright infringement for authorizing others to make infringing copies
of a computer system even though the service provider had not
personally made the copies.534
Although holding the service provider liable in such circumstanc-
es, as those present in the Netcom case, would be unreasonable, and
although some other courts have agreed with the Netcom reasoning,5
35
immunity from liability for the results of the passive functioning of
equipment is not a necessary result under the Copyright Act. Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc. involved a web site operator which,
like Netcom, made Usenet News available.5 36  Unlike Netcom,
however, the service provider made available a smaller subset of usenet
news available-specifically pictures distributed via certain news-
groups-and added an intermediate step in the news distribution
process. Specifically, the service provider had software automatically
sweep the newsgroups for pictures that were posted, extract the
530. Id. at 1368-69.
531. Id. See also Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Sabella, 1996 WL 780560, (N.D. Cal. 1996).
532. 982 F. Supp. 503, 514-15 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
533. Id. at 512-13.
534. No. 97-0670, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *6-*9.
535. See, e.g., Marobie, 983 F. Supp. at 1167.
536. 968 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
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pictures, and place them on a web site for user access. Even though
this process was automated, as were the reproductions in the Netcom
case, the judge in the Webbworld, Inc. case held the service provider
liable for infringing some of Playboy's works which were contained in
some of the pictures. 3 7 Although the court attempted to distinguish
the case in front of it from Netcom by arguing that Netcom is
providing a different service by nature of Netcom also providing initial
Internet access,5 38 the distinction is really without relevance. In fact,
the judge explicitly rejected the service provider's defense that there
should be no liability as a result of the automated processes of its
computers. 539
C. Fair Use On-Line
Whether the unauthorized distribution or archiving of a copy-
righted work constitutes a violation of section 106 of the Copyright Act
is also determined by whether the copying falls under one of the Act's
exceptions. 4 °  The most important exception is the "fair use"
provision."'
[F]air use was traditionally a means of promoting educational and
critical uses. Fair use, then, is an exception to the general rule that
the public's interest in a large body of intellectual products coincides
with the author's interest in exclusive control of his work, and it is
decided in each case as a matter of equity .... "'
The fair use provision contains a list of uses that are presumed to be
acceptable uses of copyrighted works. 4 The list includes use for
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or re-
search. 44 This list may provide some guidance as to what consti-
tutes legal use for the user of a computer information system, but not
for the provider of the archive. The archive user may be safe in
copying song lyrics from the lyric server if he or she is using the lyrics
for the purpose of commentary, for example, but the SYSOP who
provides the service may not have the same defense.
537. Id. at 1177.
538. Id. at 1175.
539. Id. at 1177.
540. The exceptions are codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112 (1994).
541. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
542. Bruce J. McGiverin, Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity: Protecting
Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1736 (1987) (citations
omitted).
543. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
544. Id.
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If a use is not one of those listed in the statute, the determination
as to whether the use is "fair" is made by employing a four-factor test.
The four factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 4 '
Each factor is to be weighed with the others in light of the underlying
purpose of awarding copyrights. 46
Applying these factors to the System Operator's liability for a lyric
server, the character of the use depends on whether access to the lyrics
is available for free, or as a profit making venture and perhaps whether
the archive is advertiser supported. The nature of the work is song
lyrics, likely intended for commercial sale. The amount of the work
used is the entire copyrighted song lyric. 47 A use of the copyrighted
work which makes the original version obsolete will obviously be more
likely to constitute unfair use than a use which brings more notoriety
to the original. 4  And finally, placing copyrighted lyrics on a
publicly accessible computer information system may have a profound
impact on the potential market for the computerized distribution of
lyrics, depending upon the potential number of users of the lyric
server. The impact on a potential market may be substantial. For
example, in a case where Playboy sued a BBS for distributing scanned
images from Playboy's magazine, the BBS was found to be taking in
$3 million a year, which Playboy might be able to make from its own
proposed electronic service.5 49
Once again, one of the most difficult tasks for a system operator
is determine which material might constitute an infringement. This is
especially true since the U.S. Copyright Act no long requires place-
ment of a copyright notice on a protected work.55 ' The Copyright
Act provides an author with the right to have his or her name
545. Id.
546. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
547. While the use of the entire song's lyrics weighs heavily against the use being a fair use,
the Supreme Court has held that use of the entire work can be a fair use. See Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
548. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
549. Electric Word, WIRED, 1.1, Premiere Issue, 1993, at 24.
550. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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associated with his or her own work, as well as the right to have his or
her name disassociated with a mutilation of his or her work, along with
the right to prevent such mutilations in the first place.51
Computer distribution often presents a whole new market for an
author's work, and widespread, unauthorized distribution can destroy
the potential to disseminate the work in the computer market-a right
clearly given to the author of the work. Relying on fair use to defend
archiving of works may not be a very realistic position to take. One
artist found some of his work scanned and available on a BBS only
after he was told of its presence by a friend. The artist's name and
copyright notice had been removed. By the time the artist protested,
240 people had already downloaded his images.112  Such wide
infringement in a potentially new market for the artist is not likely to
be found by a court to constitute "fair" use.
The fair use analysis was first put to the test in Playboy Enterpris-
es, Inc. v. Frena.5 3 In Frena, a BBS made available scanned images
from Playboy magazine. The System Operator claims that he did not
place any of these scanned images on his system.554 The court stated
that copying can be inferred where the defendant had access to the
copyrighted work, where the alleged infringing work (the scanned
pictures) are substantially similar to the copyrighted work, and where
one of the statutory rights guaranteed to the copyright owner is
impaired by the SYSOP's actions."5 ' In the case of scans made
directly from a magazine publishing over 3.4 million copies each
month in the United States, the first two elements of the test were
easily met. 56 Frena argued that any copies of Playboy's pictures
constituted fair use. 57 Employing the four fair use factors, the court
held that:
1. Frena's use was clearly commercial and would likely produce
future harm to Playboy's market;
2. the copyrighted works fell into the category of fiction or fanta-
sy--entertainment rather than factual works;
551. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
552. Liz Horton, Electronic Ethics of Photography; Use of Images in Desktop Publishing,
FOLIO: THE MAG. FOR MAG. MGMT., Jan. 1990, at 71. Of course, with the explosive growth
of on-line services since the time of the events in this example, so too has the scope of
infringement grown.
553. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
554. Id. at 1554.
555. Id. at 1556.
556. Id. See also, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Starware Publ'g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 433,
437 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
557. 839 F. Supp. at 1557.
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3. the pictures copied from each magazine constituted an essential
part of the copyrighted work (the magazine); and
4. the effect of copying the Plaintiffs work would be detrimental
to the potential market of the copyrighted work. 58
D. Contributory and Vicarious Infringement
The language of the Copyright Act does not limit its scope of
application to direct infringements.5 9 There are two types of third
party liability that may be present: one is contributory liability
(summarized as "knowledge and participation" in the infringing
activity),56 and the other is vicarious liability (summarized as
"benefit and control" of the infringing activity.56' These two types
of liability are often hard to distinguish from one another.
The proper circumstances for finding contributory infringement
are those in which the third party has knowledge of and participates in
the direct infringement of a protected work. 62 The oft-cited defini-
tion of a contributory infringer is "[o]ne who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another. 5 s63  Thus, contributory infringement
requires a "know or has reason to know" standard. 64 Even construc-
tive knowledge may be adequate, at least where potentially infringing
activities are encouraged by the service provider who stands to benefit
558. Id. at 1558-59.
559. See Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), where the
court noted:
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994) declares that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner... is an infringer of the copyright." The language of the
statute thus raises the question of when such rights have been 'violated,' a formulation
that by its terms does not limit liability to direct actors.
560. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communication Services, Inc. 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (1995).
561. Religious Technology Center, 907 F. Supp. at 1375, citing Shapiro, Bemstein & Co. v.
H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1963).
562. Singer v. Citibank, N.A., No. 91 Civ. 4453, 1993 WL 177801 (S.D.N.Y. May 21,
1993).
563. See also Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. v. Redd Home Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984); Gershwin Publ'g Corp.
v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); Polygram Int'l
Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1333 (D. Mass. 1994); F.E.L. Publications,
Ltd. v. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 466 F. Supp. 1034, 1040 (N.D. I11. 1978).
564. See, e.g., Casella, 820 F.2d at 365-66. In Casella, a business owner who sold a
restaurant, complete with singing robots, was considered a contributory infringer when he did not
inform the business purchaser that the license to the songs sung by the robots had been revoked.
He knew the new owners would wind up infringing, and did not inform them that their expected
actions were in violation. Therefore, his sale "induced" these violations. Id.
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from the presence of potentially infringing files on its system. 565
This test also requires that the function of the contributor be looked
at in the infringing process, and not just the "quantitative contribu-
tion" of the infringer.166 If the person authorizes the use of a work
without the permission of the copyright holder, and was in a position
to control the use of the copyrighted works by others, then that person
can be held liable as a contributory infringer. 67
Sega v. MAPHIA held that a SYSOP can be liable for copyright
infringement where he played a part in the distribution of copyrighted
software via his BBS.168  At issue in Sega was a members-only
bulletin board system used to distribute copyrighted video games.169
Access was given either in exchange for money, for supplying
copyrighted games, or to the defendant's customers who had bought
devices used to read the software from the original game
cartridges."57 The court held that the defendant knew about and
encouraged the use of his system for the copying of Sega's copyrighted
works.5 7 ' Furthermore, the court held that unauthorized copies of
the videogames were made every time a game was uploaded to or
downloaded from the bulletin board, 72 and that once downloaded,
other copies were then made by the BBS users.5 73 This additional
copying was facilitated and encouraged by the BBS administration.
Thus, the court dismissed the defendant's fair use argument by
pointing out how each of the fair use factors weighed against the
defendant's use being a fair one. 74
Another case that addressed the issue of contributory infringement
was the Netcom case discussed above. In Netcom, the court held that
a finding of contributory infringement was possible if it could be
565. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 514-15 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
566. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162, quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Tele. Inc., 392
U.S. 390, 396-97 (1968).
567. Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods. Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th
Cir. 1990).
568. Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
569. Id. at 927-28.
570. Id. at 928-29. One of the defendants sold "copiers" which are devices used to read
the software from a game cartridge for saving to a floppy disk, or for playing software from a disk
on one of Sega's game consoles.
571. Id. at 932.
572. Id.
573. Id. at 932-33.
574. Id. at 936. In an earlier decision, Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687
(N.D. Cal. 1994), the court found that in order to employ the fair use exception, one must possess
a legal copy in the first place.
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shown at trial that the service provider knew that its service was being
used to infringe the plaintiffs copyrights, and yet the defendant did
not take what steps it could to prevent or otherwise mitigate the
damage caused by the infringement.575 The court held that an
Internet service provider is more than a landlord who merely provides
facilities. 76  Rather, the provider is more akin to the radio stations
that have historically been found liable for rebroadcasting an infringing
broadcast. S77
The second type of third-party liability is vicarious liability.
Vicarious liability attaches when, even in the absence of knowledge of
the infringement, a party has the "right and ability" to supervise the
infringing activity of another, and derives "obvious and direct financial
interest in the exploitation of copyright materials.5 78  Vicarious
liability cases are often analyzed based on two lines of cases: landlord-
tenant cases, which exempt from liability landlords who receive only
a fixed rent and receive no additional financial benefit from any
infringement; 79 and "dance hall" cases, where nightclub owners have
been held vicariously liable for infringing music played by bands
performing in the clubs. 8 ° Courts faced with vicarious liability cases
have had to place the infringing activity somewhere on this spec-
trum. 81
The theory behind vicarious liability is that:
The law of vicarious liability treats the expected losses as simply
another cost of doing business. The enterprise and the person
profiting from it are better able than either the innocent injured
plaintiff or the person whose act caused the loss to distribute the
costs and to shift them to others who have profited from the
enterprise. In addition, placing responsibility for the loss on the
enterprise has the added benefit of creating a greater incentive for
575. Religious Technology Center, 907 F. Supp. at 1374-75.
576. A landlord is not liable for infringements occurring on the premises. See, e.g., Deutsch
v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938).
577. Religious Technology Center, 907 F. Supp. at 1375; see also Select Theatres Corp. v.
Ronzoni Macaroni Corp., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
578. Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963). See
KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74-75 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Gershwin,
443 F.2d at 1162. See also Unicity Music, Inc. v. Omni Communs., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 504, 509
(E.D. Ark. 1994) (radio station manager who also owned the corporation was liable for the
station's infringement); Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908, 913 (D. Conn. 1980)
(manager of radio station liable for station's infringements); Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed
Publishing, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623, (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Singer, 1993 WL 177801, at *1.
579. See, e.g., Deutsch 98 F.2d at 686.
580. See, e.g., Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307; Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1324.
581. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1324.
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the enterprise to police its operations carefully to avoid unnecessary
losses. 582
This is true even where the vicarious infringer does not have actual
knowledge of the infringement. The claim is that the vicarious
infringer should either pay more attention, or should bear the loss
instead of the copyright owner. 83
Even a passive actor who derived benefit from the infringement
can be held "responsible for the policy of neglect which resulted in the
infringement of the Plaintiff's copyright interests."5 4  Even if the
infringing acts were performed by an independent contractor, there is
still vicarious liability for the party who had the right and ability to
supervise the infringer's activities,585 under the theory that the
supervisor should not profit from the infringing behavior of another
whom the supervisor could have controlled. 86  Furthermore, a
corporate officer who either has direct participation or financial interest
in the infringement may be directly liable for the corporation's
infringement. 87
The Netcom court also addressed the vicarious liability issue. In
that case, the court found the plaintiffs claim of vicarious infringement
meritless 88 While there was evidence to suggest that Netcom had
the right and ability to supervise the acts of the infringer by nature of
Netcom's service agreement, indemnity agreement, and its ability to
keyword-screen messages passing through its system, the financial
benefit prong was not met. Because Netcom received a fixed-fee from
its subscribers, it received no additional financial benefit from the
infringement, and, thus, there was no vicarious infringement.589
582. Id. at 1325.
583. Id.
584. Sailor Music v. IML Corp., 867 F. Supp. 565, 569 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
585. Fourth Floor, 572 F. Supp. at 43.
586. Artists Music, Inc. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1626.
587. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Starware Publishing Corp., 900 F. Supp. 438 (S.D. Fla.
1995). See also Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Tx.
1997).
588. Religious Technology Center, 907 F. Supp. at 1377.
589. Id. See also, Marobie, 983 F. Supp. at 1177. But see Webbworld, Inc., where the
defendants were held vicariously liable for running a fixed-fee pay usenet news service where some
of the posts available via the service infringed the plaintiffs copyrights. 968 F. Supp. at 1173.
It is worth pointing out that this author does not place great weight on the financial benefit prong
of the vicarious infringement test. While there is a long line of cases that state that this
requirement must be met, the requirement appears to be based on an old version of the Copyright
Act. In subsequent revisions to the Copyright Act, the provision requiring financial benefit has
been explicitly removed, yet the cases all cite back to earlier cases from before the law change.
Additionally, this financial benefit prong raises questions as to whether a service provider will risk
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E. Liability for Web Links
To examine how the copyright liability applies to a web provid-
er,590 we must first examine how the Web works.
To call up a document on the Web, a user connects to the Web
provider's web server. There, the user is presented with a
"homepage," which is the introductory hypertext document. By
selecting the various hypertext links, "copies" of other documents59'
(or subpages) are "transmitted" to the user. These documents may be
transmitted directly to the user by the Web provider, if the documents
reside on the initially-contacted web provider's computer. However,
it is often the case that these documents reside on a web page on
another computer somewhere else on the computer network (referred
to here as the "secondary computer"). These secondary computers are
potentially anywhere in the world. Thus, the hypertext link serves as
an address, much like a listing in a bibliography, or, more accurately,
like a description of a place on the shelf in someone else's library where
the book is stored.
The user's "web browser" software reads this listing (the
hypertext link), and then uses it to request a copy of the document
from the secondary computer that stores the document at the location
indicated by the hypertext link. If the document is not stored on the
initial web provider's computer, then the initial web provider provides
the address of the linked item on the secondary computer. It is the
user who then transmits a request to the secondary computer, as
recommended by the initial computer, which results in the secondary
computer transmitting a copy of the requested file. If the secondary
computer is not available, or if the remote file is password-protected
or otherwise limited in its access, then the work will not be transmitted
at the user's request, and the user will receive only an error message or
will be prompted for a password. It is as if the bibliography refers the
user to a book that is missing from the shelf of the distant library, or
is in a library for which the user does not have a library card.
greater liability by providing "metered service"-where the cost of users' service is based on the
volume of network bandwidth used by that customer.
590. To avoid additional levels of complexity, the discussion of web providers assumes that
the entity that designs and maintains the web page is also providing the web page on the entity's
own "web server," as opposed to having the web page actually made available by some third
party, such as on a university or commercial service provider's computer. A website saver is a
computer which runs web software and "serves up" the requested files.
591. Which could be text, pictures, motion pictures, sounds, or software files.
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The initial web provider has no control over what is provided at
the secondary site, but the initial provider must program the link to the
secondary site if it is to be accessible from the initial web page in the
first place. In other words, the book may be in the library, but the
Web user would either not know that it exists, or would not be able
to get it as a result of the information provided by the initial web page.
It is also possible that, after the link is made, another "book" could be
put in the same "place on the shelf." In essence, a web page provider
could link to Document A at a distant site, and at some point later, the
distant site could replace Document A with Document B. The only
way for the initial web provider to know of the switch in documents
would be to follow the link and see that Document B has been
substituted in place of Document A, the document originally linked on
the homepage.
Another way of examining the situation is as follows: accessing
a link which calls up a document distributed from a web server to
which you are directly connected is the equivalent to sending a request
to that web page's computer saying, "transmit to me the file stored on
your machine at the location specified in this link." At this point, if
the user has the appropriate permission, 92 the indicated work is sent.
If the file is not stored on the machine running the web page the user
is accessing, then accessing a link is the equivalent to saying to the
initial web provider's computer, "you are indicating to me that I can
access a copy of Document A at this distant location, and I would like
to access Document A." At this point, a request for a transmission of
the document stored at the link's destination is sent by the user to the
secondary computer recommended by the initial computer. If the user
has the appropriate permission, a "copy" of the document is then"sent" to the user's computer.
If the document accessed on the web page is stored locally, then
the copyright analysis is fairly straight forward. The document is read
from the web provider's disk drive and into the RAM of the web
provider's computer, creating a copy. 93 The work is then transmit-
ted through the computer network and "fixed" in the RAM of the
user's computer. The work has now been reproduced, implicating
592. In other words, if the document is "world readable" or if the user has any passwords
necessary to access the document, the user has appropriate permission.
593. MAI System Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993);
Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363
(E.D. Va. 1994); Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 31 U.S.P.Q2d 1239, 1242
(N.D. Ca. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1145 (1996).
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rights 94 of the copyright holder (who, of course, may be the web
provider). Any of these copies may be infringing copies."' 5 In many
cases the work will be put up on the web page by or under the
authority of the copyright holder, in which case the copies would be
ones that are either explicitly permitted, or presumably subject to an
implied license by nature of their being made available on a web page
that requires such reproductions to be made in order to view the
work. 596
If the document accessed is not located on the web provider's
computer, and is "linked" only on the provider's web page while
residing on another computer, the situation becomes a bit more
complicated. In this situation, the web provider is not delivering the
document directly, and no copy ever comes into contact with the
initially-accessed web provider's computer. The initial web provider
does not transmit anything to the user other than the location of the
work on the secondary provider's computer. Because of this, there can
be no direct liability if the transferral of the work constitutes an
infringement. It then becomes necessary to determine whether the
initial provider is either contributorily or vicariously liable for the
infringement.
As stated earlier, "one who, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infring-
er." '597 In order for a web operator to be liable to an "infringing site"
for placing a link on its web page,"' the web operator does not have
to actually know or have reason to know of the infringements that are
likely to occur as a result of the user accessing the infringing site.599
Actual knowledge that the link will result in infringements is not
required; reason to know on the part of the web operator will
suffice.600 Moreover, it is not important that the user is doing the
594. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
595. A&M Records, Inc. v. An Internet Site Known as Fresh Kutz, No. 97 CV 1099H
(JFS) (S.D. Cal. June 10, 1997).
596. Cf., Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990); Oddo v. Ries,
743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984).
597. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
598. For these purposes, an "infringing site" is defined as a web page which will transmit
copyrighted material when accessed as a result of a user following the link provided on the initial
web page, or a page which is linked for the purpose of accessing infringing material contained
thereon, even if the infringing material is not immediately transmitted as a result of the initial
link.
599. See, e.g., Casella, 820 F.2d at 364-65.
600. Cf. Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
846 (holding defendants violated copyright law by creating and distributing pirate computer chips
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actual infringing, as long as the user is doing the infringing through the
initial web provider's web page. 61 Even though all that is being
provided by the initial web page is a form of advertising for the
infringing site, in other contexts, cases have held that contributory
liability could be found if an advertiser knew that the product being
promoted was an infringing one.60 2 In such a case, not only is the
infringing site being "advertised" by the initial site, but the initial site
is also giving the user a head start on any infringement. While the
user may be able to gain knowledge of the infringing site without the
help of the initial page, the assistance provided by the initial site is
possibly material enough to constitute contributory infringement.
When there is no contributory liability, the web provider may still
be vicariously liable for linking to an infringing site. This would apply
to situations where a link is put on the initial page to a secondary site
that is making infringing works available, unbeknownst to the initial
page provider. In some ways, if a web operator links to a site
containing copyright violations, the situation is analogous to the bars
in the "dance hall cases" who invite in "guests" (web page users) to
enjoy the "performances" (links) that the proprietor is making
available, even if the performers (sites linked) are "independent
contractors. ' 60 3 In other words, the web page provider is more like
a landlord. The web provider provides the link, but is not in a
position to supervise or control the conduct of the infringing site.60 4
The most control that the web provider (the "landlord") could have
over the secondary provider (the "tenant"), is by removing the link
from the initial web page (in essence, by "eviction").
Case law in the vicarious liability area is unclear and inconsistent.
The majority of the parent/subsidiary vicarious infringement cases
have held that a parent corporation is not liable for the infringing
activities of its subsidiary, unless some actual involvement can be
which enabled display of programs intended for paying subscribers). See also Singer v. Citibank,
N.A., No. 91 Civ. 4453, 1993 WL 177801 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 1993).
601. Cf. M. Whitmark & Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787, 789
(D. Mass. 1960) (holding performance of copyrighted music by orchestra which played on
weekends was a "public playing for profit" and rendered the club liable for infringement). See
also Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929).
602. See Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 160; Screen
Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399,404-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
603. See, e.g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n,
Inc., 554 F.2d 1213, 1214 (1st Cir. 1977); Dreamland Ball Room, 36 F.2d at 355; KECA Music,
Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74-5 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
604. Cf., Deutch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 687-88 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that a handwriting
analysis chart made by a person having access to the copyrighted handwriting chart infringed on
the copyrighted chart).
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shown, 611 though a minority have been more willing to make the
stretch necessary to find liability.66
In the end, vicarious liability poses a tough question, and the
likelihood of finding an infringement will hinge on whether the merits
of the case warrant such a finding, and then only if direct or contribu-
tory liability cannot be found.
F Copyright Infringement as Wire Fraud
In addition to using traditional theories of copyright infringement
to challenge infringers, some prosecutors have tried employing some
creative alternatives. A controversial case worth mentioning is one in
which prosecutors tried to convict a BBS operator of conspiring to
commit wire fraud. In United States v. LaMacchia, the court held
though that the wire fraud statute could not be applied to LaMacchia's
conduct, due to the fact that his bulletin board system was used to
distribute copyrighted software without charge. 607  The LaMacchia
court based its decision on the precedent set by the U.S. Supreme
Court case Dowling v. United States.6 °8
At issue in Dowling was the transport through the mail of bootleg
Elvis records. The government had accused Dowling of violating the
mail fraud statute, after which the wire fraud statute is modeled. The
government claimed that the bootleg records constituted property"stolen, converted, or taken by fraud" as covered by the Interstate
Transportation of Stolen Property Act. In his opinion, Justice
Blackmun reasoned that copyrighted works were not tangible property
of the sort normally covered by the Stolen Property Act.6 9 Because
no transfer of the copyright had taken place, there had been no theft
of the copyright, only an infringement of it. 610  However, such
infringements are addressed by the Copyright Act.61 ' Therefore, the
government was incorrect in trying to apply a "gap filler" statute, such
as the Stolen Property Act, to cover the interstate sale of record albums
605. See Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See also
HowardJohnson Co., Inc. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1990); Frank Music Corp.
v. Metro- Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989); Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed
Publishing, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q2d 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
606. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., No. 88C 2856, 1989 WL 121290
(N.D. I11. Oct. 5, 1989).
607. 871 F. Supp. 535, 545 (D. Mass. 1994).
608. 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
609. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 228.
610. Id. at 218-19.
611. Id.
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that, while not stolen, contained unlawful recordings. 612 Rather, the
Stolen Property Act was meant to protect the owner of an item from
being deprived of that item's possession; not as a result of the creation
and sale of the Elvis records.613
Justice Blackmun pointed out that the Copyright Act applies the
term of art "infringement" for such actions, instead of using the more
common terms "theft", "conversion", or "fraud. '614 Justice Black-
mun reasoned that, because the Copyright Act clearly applied to
Dowling's conduct and provided appropriate penalties for that conduct,
it would be inappropriate to stretch another statute to cover actions
clearly under the disposition of the Copyright Act, merely because
interstate transportation was involved.61S However, the recordings
that were transported, while not amounting to theft, were subject to
mandatory licensing fees, which Dowling did not pay.616
In the LaMacchia case, unlike in Dowling, no underlying fraud
was found.617 This was because the computer software in LaMac-
chia, unlike in Dowling, was protected by the copyright law but was
not subject to a licensing fee. 61' There was no concealment of
unpaid royalties, nor wire fraud. The felony copyright infringement
statute could not be applied to LaMacchia to find criminal infringe-
ment, because the statute requires that the defendant must have
infringed the copyright "willfully and for purpose of commercial
advantage or private financial gain. "619 While LaMacchia was willful
in setting up and running his pirate bulletin boards, he did not intend
to profit by his actions. Thus, while he may have been a software
pirate, he was not a criminally-infringing one. 620
In cases such as LaMacchia, the copyright Act does provide a
remedy for aggrieved copyright holders. Therefore, creative attempts
at prosecution such as attempted in LaMacchia, and reactionary
legislative regulation, such as the "No Electronic Theft Act," passed
to close the "LaMacchia loophole," are unnecessary and risk causing
612. Id. at 226-27.
613. Id. at 228.
614. Id. at 217.
615. Id. at 218.
616. Id.
617. La Macchia, 871 F. Supp. at 542-43.
618. Id.
619. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1994).
620. Since this case was decided, the "No Electronic Theft Act" (Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111
Stat. 2678, Dec. 16, 1997) (not currently codified) was signed into law to specifically address the
holding of this case and to extend the criminal copyright infringement penalties to cover certain
acts of not-for-profit copying.
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more harm than good to the balance of rights established by the
Copyright Act.
X. TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION ISSUES
A. Confusion
Along with copyright issues, trademark and unfair competition
issues are growing concerns in the on-line world. Two of the
copyright cases mentioned earlier held that distribution of copyrighted
material amounted to violation of the copyright holder's trademark, as
well as unfair competition. 621
Federal trademark law provides that:
(a) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is
or is likely to be damaged by such act.6 22
Section 1125 serves to prevent an infringer from using another's
trademark in competition with the rightful trademark holder.6 23  It
prohibits attempts or actions likely to result in an infringer's "passing
off" its products or services for the products of another.6 24  Merely
using another's trademark on-line does not necessarily constitute
trademark infringement.6 21
The MAPHIA court applied section 1125 in the copyrighted
software context, and found that the distribution of copyrighted video
621. Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 688-89 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1560, 1562 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
622. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1998). This is also known as Section 43 of the Lanham Act.
623. See, e.g., 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 1052 (1985).
624. See, e.g., Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996).
625. Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. C 96-2703 1997 WL
811770 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997).
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game software amounted not only to a violation of Sega Enterprise's
(Sega) copyright, but such distribution was also a violation of Sega's
trademark rights and amounted to unfair competition under the federal
trademark law.626 The court stated that every time a game was
downloaded and subsequently played, Sega's trademarks were
used. 27 Sega's trademarks were also used in the file descriptors of
the games stored on the BBS.628 Downloaded games enter the stream
of commerce, potentially causing confusion as to their origin. This
practice deprived Sega of revenue, made available confidential
prerelease versions of some of its games, and made games available
without proper packaging and instructions.629 All of these practices
potentially caused damage to Sega's business and reputation in
violation of the Trademark Act. Thus, knowing distribution of
trademarked software resulted in liability for the BBS operators.630
Similarly, the BBS operator in the Frena case was held liable for
trademark infringement and unfair competition because he distributed
trademarked pictures on his bulletin board system.631  As the
MAPHIA court held in the software context, the Frena court held that
the System Operator's use of the Plaintiff s trademarked works violated
Playboy's trademark rights and constituted unfair competition.632
While both of these cases involved U.S. plaintiffs and U.S.
defendants, it would be a further violation of the Lanham Act to
import infringing goods into the United States.6 33 Accessing a non-
U.S. computer information service, by modem or computer network,
which contains trademarked materials, and then downloading these
materials into the United States may constitute an importation, as the
statute is not limited to specific modes of transporting the imported
materials.
However, it is possible that computer information system
operators may be given a small measure of protection under the
Lanham Act for unknowingly transmitting trademark infringements
626. 857 F. Supp. at 688-89.
627. Id. at 684.
628. Id.
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1560-1562.
632. Id. at 1561-62.
633. The Statute reads, in part:
(b) Any goods marked or labeled in contravention of the provisions of this section shall
not be imported into the United States or admitted to entry at any customhouse of the
United States ...15 U.S.C. § 1125(b).
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effectuated by the system's users if the SYSOPs are deemed to be
"innocent infringers" who are "engaged solely in the business of
printing the mark or violating matter for others. 6 34
B. Dilution
Trademark dilution in the computer-communication context is
becoming an increasingly important issue. Nearly half of the U.S.
states have a trademark "dilution" or "anti-dilution" statute that
protects trademarks even where there is no likelihood of confusion
between two uses of a mark.635  Because this produced patchwork
protection of what is often a national concern, the Federal Dilution Act
was passed, which adds subsection (c) to Section 43 of the Lanham
Act636 to provide protection against dilution for "famous" marks.6 37
The Act provides:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reason-
able, to an injunction against another person's commercial use in
commere of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark
has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of
the mark.63
The Dilution Act also explicitly allows for "fair use" of a famous mark
for purposes such as news reporting, parody and certain other sorts of
noncommercial uses.639
634. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2) (1986).
635. Summary of Testimony of the International Trademark Association on H.R. 1295 and
1270 available in 1995 WL 435750 (July 19, 1995).
636. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 Cong. Rec.
H14317 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 1996)).
637. To be considered a famous mark, section 1125 (c) provides that courts are to consider
the following list of factors:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services
with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used
by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered ...
638. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1).
639. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). See also Summary of Testimony of the International Trademark
Association on H.R. 1295 and 1270, supra note 635. Failure to consider these free speech
implications caused an earlier attempt to pass such a dilution statute to fail. See David S.
Villwock, The Federal Dilution Act of 1995, 6 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 213, 221 (1996).
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Traditionally, trademark dilution comes in one of two forms:
tarnishment or blurring. Dilution by tarnishment occurs when a
famous mark is linked to poor quality or unwholesome products, or
otherwise displayed in a derogatory manner.640 If the use of the
mark does not result in negative associations for the senior trademark
user, then there is no dilution by tarnishment.64" '
Dilution by blurring involves a "whittling away" of the value and
selling power of a mark by its unauthorized use.642 The Dilution Act
is intended to prevent only cases where actual blurring may occur. 643
For instance, blurring occurs where one uses another's mark in the
same specialized industry, or when both uses occur on products
intended for the general public, but not necessarily where a use is in
a specialized industry and the other use is in another, unrelated
specialized industry.644
Unlike traditional trademark infringement, it is not necessary that
the goods or services compete, or that there is a likelihood of confusion
between the competing uses of a mark. To find blurring under the
Dilution Act, one court has identified five relevant factors: "1)
similarity of the trademarks and trade dress; 2) similarity of the
products; 3) sophistication of consumers; 4) renown of the senior mark
and trade dress; and 5) renown of the junior mark and trade
dress. ' 645  While the first three factors are similar to the likelihood
of confusion test, what is important to remember is that any use which
increases the possibility of a mark losing its distinctiveness may
constitute dilution by blurring.646
C. The Law Applied
The majority of the trademark cases involving computer networks
have been Internet domain name cases. A domain name is a form of
address647 that indicates the location of a computer connected to the
640. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
641. See, e.g., Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
642. Panavision Int'l, L.P., 945 F. Supp. at 1304.
643. Summary of Testimony of the International Trademark Association on H.R. 1295 and
1270, supra note 635. See also Megan E. Gray, Defending Against a Dilution Claim: A
Practitioner's Guide, 4 TEx. INTELL. PROP L.J. 205, 210-11 (1996).
644. Id.
645. Clinique Lab., Inc., 945 F. Supp. at 562. See also Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc. 35 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1994).
646. Id. (citing Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).
647. The basic Internet address is in numerical form (the "IP" address, or "Internet
Protocol" address). The domain name address is an alphanumeric address which exists to make
Internet addresses easier to remember. See, e.g., MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202,
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Internet and the type of organization or the country to which the
address belongs.64
These addresses are valuable assets to companies seeking to
establish a corporate presence on the Internet because of the network's
commercial potential.649  As companies and individuals become
increasingly aware of the value of these addresses, which are assigned
primarily on a first-come/first-served basis, 650 companies have either
had to fight to regain domain names that match the names of their
companies and have been registered by others, or fight to prevent the
use of domain names that are likely to confuse consumers into
believing that the services offered at that location on the Internet are
associated with their company when the services are really being
provided by another entity.6"'
A clear example of the confusion over domain names is the
conflict between competing test preparation companies Princeton
Review and Stanley Kaplan Review. The Princeton review registered
the domain names "princeton.com" and "review.com," but they also
registered "kaplan.com" in order to "mock and annoy" its competi-
tor.652 The Princeton Review used the site to provide people, who
were looking for Kaplan Review's materials, with electronic materials
critical of the quality of Kaplan's services and explaining why they
believed the Princeton Review was better. Kaplan sued to recover"its" address (after refusing the Princeton Review's offer to turn over
the address in exchange for a case of beer). The case was resolved,
after it was removed to binding arbitration, in favor Kaplan. 53
Another early conflict over domain names included author Joshua
Quittner's registration of the domain name "mcdonalds.com" in the
course of writing an article on businesses that fail to register their
corporate names as Internet sites.654 The first conflict to produce a
204 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (involving summary judgment motions on fraud and breach of contract
claims, and did not address the trademark issues or the merits of the unfair competition claim).
648. Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law of
Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 24 (Apr. 10, 1995).
649. Curry, 867 F. Supp. at 207.
650. Id. at 204.
651. For a good account of many of these conflicts see Burk, supra note 648.
652. Id. at paragraph 19.
653. Id. Apparently no beer was exchanged in settlement and the president of Princeton
review accused his rival of having "no sense of humor, no vision, and no beer" and he vowed to
register the domain name "kraplan.com" in order to distribute electronic materials disparaging of
his competitor. Id. at paragraph 20.
654. Id. at paragraph 21. This conflict was settled in exchange for McDonald's donating
$3,500 worth of computer equipment to a grade school for connecting the school to the Internet.
Id. at paragraph 21.
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court decision involved Adam Curry's use of the domain "mtv.com,"
and MTV's attempt to acquire that address.655 The case settled out
of court, and MTV now owns the "mtv.com" domain, while Curry has
moved his information system to the "metaverse.com" address." 6
Taking advantage of the Dilution Act, Hasbro became the first
company to enjoin the use of an Internet domain name. In Hasbro,
Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group Ltd., the use of the address"candyland.com" by an adult-entertainment provider was enjoined
because it diluted Hasbro's trademark.65 7  This case also presented
a good example of tarnishment because the mark for a children's board
game was used to label an adult entertainment site.
Shortly after the Hasbro, Inc. case was decided, the case of Comp
Examiner Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc. produced an injunction based on
a likelihood of confusion over the use of a domain name.658  This
case involved the defendant using a web page to advertise products
aimed at the same target market as that of the plaintiffs products.
The court held that the plaintiff was likely to succeed in showing that
there was a likelihood of confusion between the two uses of the "juris"
mark, and therefore the defendant was enjoined from using the
"juris.com" domain name.65 9
Another more straightforward case was Digital Equipment Corp.
v. Altavista Technology, Inc.66 °  The case involved a preliminary
injunction granted following a dispute over the use of the name
"AltaVista" on the Internet. When the Plaintiff created the "Alta-
Vista" search engine, it bought the trademark rights to use the name
from AltaVista Technology, Inc. (ATI) and licensed back to ATI
certain rights in the name."' One of the rights ATI retained was the
right to use the <http://www.altavista.com/> web page address. As
Digital's search engine, located under the Digital domain name at
<http://www.altavista.digital.com/>, became more popular, large
numbers of people accidentally looked for the engine at ATI's web
address, a natural error to make. ATI placed a link on its web page
655. Curry, 867 F. Supp. at 207. Curry was formerly employed at MTV as a "VJ" (Video
Jockey), and was an MTV employee when he established the domain name.
656. See Burk, supra note 648 at paragraph 17.
657. No. C 96-130, 1996 WL 84858 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 22, 1996).
658. Comp Examiner Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc., No. 96-0213 1996 WL 376600 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 26, 1996).
659. Id. Another similar case involved use of the domain name "cardservice.com" to
promote credit and debit card processing services. Cardservice International, Inc. v. WRM &
Assoc., 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997).
660. 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
661. Id. at 458.
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to the real address of Digital's search engine. As the traffic increased,
however, ATI redesigned its web page to look more and more like that
of the Digital search engine, and then began selling advertising to
companies that thought they were buying ad space at the search engine
site. The court found that ATI had exceeded its rights under the
license agreement with Digital, and that its actions constituted unfair
competition and an infringement of Digital's trademark rights in
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).662  When looking at the factors
leading to a likelihood of confusion, the court noted that the two
AltaVista marks are similar, that both companies, for relevant
purposes, were supplying the same service, that both companies were
competing and advertising in some of the same markets, that there was
some actual confusion on the part of third parties, that ATI's use of
the AltaVista mark was intended to capitalize on Digital's mark, and
that the AltaVista mark is a strong suggestive mark entitled to strong
protection. 663
The number of domain name conflicts have been rising sharply
as more businesses move on-line. Some have involved companies in
different lines of business that have coveted the same domain
name.664  Others have involved companies that are related to another
rightful user of a domain name but that do not have appropriate
permission to use a particular mark as a domain name.665 Still others
involve organizations that are trying to trade off of another's mark,666
662. Id. at 478.
663. Id. at 477-78.
664. See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Or.
1997) (finding that a web page promoting a theater group was not likely to confuse people looking
for a web site for circuit analysis); Juno Online Services, L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp.
684 (N.D. I11. 1997) (finding no trademark misuse or state law deceptive business practices);
Teletech Customer Care Management (California), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Company, Inc., 977 F.
Supp. at 1407, (C.D. Cal. 1997) (engineering and installation contractor's use of "customer care"
company's trademark as a domain name is likely to produce confusion, especially since
contractor's name is available as a domain name, but is not being used by contractor). Cf.
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting
that mere registration of a domain name which matches another's trademark is not sufficient to
find infringement of the mark).
665. Travel Impressions Ltd. v. Kaufman. No. 96 CV 4503 (JG), (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 1997)
(finding franchisee registered franchiser's mark as a domain name in excess of franchisee's
authority provided in franchise agreement).
666. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us v. Akkaoui, No. C 96-3381, 1996 WL 772709, (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 29, 1996), (finding "adultsrus.com" domain name is likely to dilute Toys "R" Us family of
trademarks).
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or are otherwise trying to divert attempts at finding the mark-holder's
Internet address.667
Some of the more interesting trademark cases have involved
"domain name squatting," where someone registers the domain name
that matches a company's trademark in the hope of selling the name
to the company at a profit. Many of these cases have involved Dennis
Toeppen, who runs an Internet service provider business in Illinois.
Although many of the domain names for which he has registered are
for his legitimate service provider clients, he has registered some
because he "felt it would be interesting to see how the world respond-
ed. '668 The "world" responded by filing several lawsuits.669
One suit was a result of Toeppen's registering the domain"intermatic.com," which he used to put up a web page with an aerial
map of Urbana, Illinois.670 Another suit resulted from his registering"panavision.com" (and then later "panaflex.com").671 After register-
ing the "panavision.com" domain name, Mr. Toeppen set up a web
page at the domain to display aerial photographs of Pana, Illinois. He
did not use any of the Panavision domains to sell any goods or
672services.
The Intermatic, Inc. (Intermatic) court applied the Seventh
Circuit's likelihood of confusion test and found that there was enough
of a question as to likelihood of confusion to survive a motion for
summary judgment.673 In contrast, the Panavision International, L.P.
(Panavision) court held that Toeppen's use of the mark constituted
dilution (and therefore did not determine if there was any likelihood of
confusion). 674  Additionally, the Intermatic court found that Toep-
pen's registration prevented Intermatic from using its mark as its
667. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313,
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (holding defendant's registration of "plannedparenthood.com" domain
name to divert people seeking plaintiffs web site and to peddle antiabortion books infringes
plaintiffs trademark).
668. Dennis Toeppen, Usenet News Post to the group chi.internet, message ID dennis-
2611960911580001@victorville-34.net66.com, Nov. 6, 1996.
669. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Intermatic,
Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); American Standard Inc. v. Toeppen, No.
96-2147, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14451 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1996).
670. Intermatic, Inc., 947 F. Supp. at 1232-33. Eventually this map was moved, and the
only thing appearing at the www.intermatic.com address was a notice that the Champaign-Urbana
map page had moved to a new address. Id.
671. Panavision Int'l, L.P., 945 F. Supp at 1298.
672. Id. When Panavision came asking for the domain name, Toeppen offered to transfer
it to the company in exchange for $13,000. Panavision sued instead.
673. 947 F. Supp. at 1236.
674. 945 F. Supp at 1304.
11771998]
Seattle University Law Review
domain name, but the court at least acknowledged that Intermatic
could still possibly use its mark in its domain name.67 This finding
was unlike that in Panavision where the court (erroneously) argued that
because Toeppen reserved the Panavision name, he foreclosed
Panavision's ability to identify its goods on the Internet, and thus
diluted Panavision's mark.676
Both courts held that this prevention of the rightful owner's using
the mark as a domain name constituted dilution.677 This conclusion
is arguably incorrect; merely registering a name is not a use of the
name in the trademark sense.678 It does not make it any less likely
that a consumer will think that a Panavision or Intermatic product
came from Panavision or Intermatic. In essence, there is no dilu-
tion. Interestingly, Judge Pregerson, who decided the Panavision
case, has attempted to clarify this point in Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Network Solutions, Inc. by holding that merely registering a domain
name is not necessarily an infringement of a matching trademark.6"'
To the court's credit, Toeppen did more than just register the
domain names. He also set up web pages at all of the domains. When
Toeppen set up the web page, even to display the map of Pana or
Urbana, he provided something which could be attributed to the mark
holder. However, the Dilution Act requires not just a use of the mark,
but a "commercial use in commerce" of the mark.681 The courts
found this requirement met not because of the web page, but because
of Toeppen's efforts to sell the domain name. 6 2 For instance, Judge
Pregerson in Panavision stated:
675. Internatic, Inc., 947 F. Supp. at 1232-34.
676. Panavision, Int'l, L.P., 945 F. Supp. at 1304.
677. Intermatic, Inc. 947 F. Supp. at 1240; Panavision, Int'l, 945 F. Supp. at 1304.
678. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957 (C.D.
Cal. 1997). Cf. La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265,
1273 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting "warehousing" of name by token use was not sufficient use in
commerce to reserve rights in name); Marvel Comics, Ltd. v. Defiant, a Division of Enlightened
Entertainment, Ltd., 837 F. Supp. 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting certain preregistration use
were adequate uses in commerce for trademark purposes); Societe De Developments Et
D'Innovations Des Marches Agricoles Et Alimentares-Sodima-Union De Cooperatives Agricoles
v. Int'l Yogurt Co., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 839, 852 (D. Or. 1987) (stating token use of a product for
purpose of reserving name is not an adequate use for trademark purposes).
679. This holding conflicts with the result in Actmedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int'l, Inc., No.
96C 3448, 1996 WL 466527 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 1996), where the court held that merely reserving
a domain name violates 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (West Supp. 1998) and Illinois Common Law.
680. 985 F. Supp. 949, 957 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
681. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
682. Panavision Int'l, L.P., 945 F. Supp. at 1303; Intermatic, Inc., 947 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
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In the case before the Court, however, Toeppen has made commer-
cial use of the Panavision marks. Toeppen's "business" is to
register trademarks as domain names and then to sell the domain
names to the trademarks' owners. Toeppen's business is evident
from his conduct with regard to Panavision and his conduct in
registering the domain names of many other companies. His
"business" is premised on the desire of the companies to use their
trademarks as domain names and the calculation that it will be
cheaper to pay him than to sue him.6"3
Despite the courts' assertions, even registering a domain name and
offering it for sale does not match the definition of a use in commerce
as defined in the Lanham Act.6"4 The Act defines a use in com-
merce as follows:
The term "use in Commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in
the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right
in the mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed
to be in use in commerce-
(1) on goods when-
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers
or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels
affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the
goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising
of services and the services are rendered in more than one State...
and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in
connection with the services.6 5
Courts have held that merely registering a name in order to
reserve a right to the name is not sufficient use in commerce. The
mark must be applied to an identifiable product with an intent to
683. Id. See also Intermatic, Inc., 947 F. Supp. at 1239-40 (stating "Toeppen's intention
to arbitrage the 'intermatic.com' domain name constitutes a commercial use ... Toeppen's desire
to resell the domain name is sufficient to meet the 'commercial use' requirements of the Lanham
Act.").
684. Panavision Int'l, L.P., 945 F. Supp. at 1304. "In addition, the Dilution Act itself
excepts certain uses and thereby protects parties who 'innocently' register a famous trademark as
a domain name (e.g., a citizen of Pana, Illinois who registers 'panavision.com' in order to provide
a community political forum would come under the exemption for non-commercial use)." Id.
685. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (West Supp. 1996).
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distribute that product.686 Toeppen's attempt to get money from
Panavision and Intermatic by selling them the like-named domains he
had registered was not a public use of those names to identify the
source of goods or services. 87 If anything, the domain names were
Toeppen's goods, rather than merely a label he was using as a source
identifier for his trademark-speculating services. The level of
confusion injected into trademark law is illustrated clearly in the
Lockheed-Martin v. Network Solutions, Inc. case. This case addressed
the issue of the registrar's liability for allowing third parties to register
domain names which may be confusingly similar to another's trade-
mark. Judge Pregerson stated that he found the defendant liable in the
Panavision case because he not only registered a domain name, but he
also offered to sell it to the plaintiff because it had value to Panavision
because the domain name matched its trademark.688  In Lockheed-
Martin, the court held that the defendant was not liable for trademark
infringement even though it is in the business of registering domain
names and even though it particularly hopes to realize the value of
selling domain names that match trademarks to trademark owners.689
The distinction Judge Pregersonnn draws is that Network Solutions,
Inc. is only involved with the "technical function" of a domain
name-matching a name to its underlying address. In other words,
Network Solutions, Inc. is not liable because it does not use the
domain names as trademarks, it merely registers them and sells them
to trademark holders. However, Judge Pregerson summarized his
holding in Panavision by stating that "[t]his decision merely holds that
registering a famous mark as a domain name for the purpose of trading
on the value of the mark by selling the domain name to the trademark
owner violates the federal and state dilution statutes."69  In both
cases, the courts reached the "just" conclusion. It seems clear,
686. See, e.g., International Yogurt Co., Inc., 662 F. Supp. at 852; Lockheed Martin Corp.,
985 F. Supp. at 957.
687. Marvel Comics, Ltd., 837 F. Supp. at 548. "As for sufficient 'use in commerce,' the
'talismanic test' is whether or not the use was 'sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the
marked goods in an appropriate segment of the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark."
Id. See also Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d at 1274.
Trademark rights are not created by sporadic, casual, and nominal shipment of goods
bearing a mark. There must be a trade in the goods sold under the mark or at least an
active and public attempt to establish such a trade .. .Registerable rights manifestly
cannot flow from these activities and the old adage 'no trade-no trademark' is
applicable here.
Id.
688. 985 F. Supp. at 957.
689. Id.
690. Panavision Int'l, L.P., 945 F. Supp. at 1300.
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however, that they are contradictory, and therefore one of the opinions
must be incorrect.
Another creative analysis was applied to the domain name issue
in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci.6 91 In that
case, Judge Wood held that because of the interstate nature of the
Internet in general, which requires the use of long distance phone lines
to access a remote web page, and because of the fact that the activities
of a multistate business were blocked by the defendant's use of a
plaintiffs mark as a domain name, the "in commerce" requirements of
the Lanham Act were met.69 2 This is arguably false for the same
reason it is false in the Panavision and Intermatic cases. Judge Wood
seems to be breaking a phrase defined by the statute into two parts
("commercial use" and "in commerce") and analyzing the sections
separately, rather than as the term of art defined in the statute.
However, more interestingly, Judge Wood points out that Section
32 of the Lanham Act does not contain an "in commerce" require-
ment.693 This section of the Act prohibits the use of a mark, without
permission, "in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive. 69 4 Judge Wood held that "informational services" can fall
under this definition, and if the information provided is likely to lead
"[p]rospective users of plaintiffs services who mistakenly access
defendant's web site [to] fail to continue to search for plaintiffs own
home page, due to anger, frustration, or the belief that the plaintiffs
home page does not exist" there may be a remedy under Section
3 2 .69' Notably, Judge Wood held that the defendant's acts in the
Planned Parenthood case constituted a commercial use of the mark.
The defendant had set up an antiabortion web page at"plannedparenthood.com" in order to intercept people intending to find
the plaintiffs family planning site. Judge Wood stated:
[D]efendant's use is commercial because of its effect on plaintiffs
activities. First, defendant has appropriated plaintiffs mark in order
to reach an audience of Internet users who want to reach plaintiffs
services and viewpoint, intercepting them and misleading them in
an attempt to offer his own political message. Second, defendant's
appropriation not only provides Internet users with competing and
691. No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 VL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997).
692. Id. at *3.
693. Planned Parenthood Education of America, 1997 WL 133313 at *4.
694. Id.
695. Id.
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directly opposing information, but also prevents those users from
reaching plaintiff and its services and message. In that way,
defendant's use is classically competitive: he has taken plaintiffs
mark as his own in order to purvey his Internet services-his web
site-to an audience intending to access plaintiffs services.696
One case has applied a trademark analysis to Internet addressing
in a nondomain name context. The court in Patmont Motor Werks,
Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., held that using a trademark in a web site
address following the domain name-in this case using the GO PED
trademark in the address <http://www.idosync.com/goped>--could
not constitute an infringement.697 Additionally, the court stated that
while use of a trademark in a domain name may allow for confusion as
to sponsorship, use after the domain name could not produce confusion
as to sponsorship.698
As a blanket statement, this holding is clearly erroneous. It is not
uncommon for a trademark owner to set up a web site on a service
provider's machine without obtaining a separate domain name (as was
the situation in the Patmont case). Also, a merchant who sets up shop
in an on-line shopping mall may have an address such as
<http://www.shoppingmall.com/trademark>. Clearly such a use
could involve an indication of sponsorship, and thus clearly such a use,
with the right set of facts, could constitute a trademark infringement.
New methods of taking advantage of the goodwill developed by
others are continually being developed. For example, Playboy
Enterprises has obtained an injunction against a Web site trying to
capitalize on the Playboy mark.699 A preliminary injunction was
entered prohibiting the defendant from using its playboyxxx.com or
playmatelive.com domain names.7"' Importantly, however, the court
also enjoined the use of Playboy's trademarks in the "meta-tags" of the
defendant's Web pages. "Meta-tags" are elements of computer code
normally hidden from the view of people looking at Web pages.
Search engines,' however, read the key words a web site designer
puts in this hidden code for rating how closely a web page's content
696. Id. at *6.
697. No. 96-2703 1997 WL 811770, at *3 and *4.
698. Id. at *4.
699. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
700. Id. at 1225.
701. Search engines are databases available via the Web which indexes the content of other
web sites thus allowing users to search for web pages which (might) contain material of interest
to them.
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matches the search request of a search engine user looking for specific
content. Thus by manipulating the content of the meta-tags, a web
site designer can affect what searches will provide a reference to the
web page and the prominence the page will receive in a search
report.7"2 In this case, the defendants had embedded Playboy's
trademarks in the meta-tags of their playboyxxx.com and
platmatelive.com sites so that Internet users searching for the plaintiff's
web site as well (or instead). Playboy has also obtained a victory
against AsiaFocus International claiming the defendant's use of
Playboy trademarks in the meta-tags constitute trademark dilution.7"3
Playboy Enterprises is not the only party seeking relief due to
others' inappropriate use of trademark in meta-tags. Insituform
Technologies, Inc. received a consent judgment against National
Envirotech Group prohibiting the defendant from using the plaintiffs
marks in the defendant's web page, but also requiring the defendants
send letters to some of the major search engines asking them to ensure
that a new version of the defendant's web site-which no longer
contains the confusing meta-tags-is listed in their databases instead
of the original pages.70 4
Not all meta-tag cases have been resolved immediately in the
plaintiffs favor. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Wells, the court held
that a former Playmate of the Year, Terri Wells, was entitled to use
certain trademarks belonging to Playboy Enterprises."S The court
denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because Ms. Wells
had been a Playboy Playmate and had been Playmate of the Year and
had been specifically allowed to refer to herself as having won these
titles from Playboy Enterprises. Thus, the court stated, her use of the
marks was fair in the same way and Academy Award winner could
state that he or she had won an Oscar or a Heisman Trophy winner
could refer to having won the award.70 6 The court allowed this "fair
use" argument to extend to the use of Playboy marks in the meta-tags
on Ms. Wells' web site, in part perhaps because of the otherwise
noninfringing nature of the web site.
702. A term often used for such manipulation of search engine results, often by reporting
key words multiple times in a web page's meta-tags or otherwise hiding such text, is"spamdexing."
703. See C/Netnews.com, discussing Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus International,
visited June 10, 1998 <http://www.news.com/News/item/0,4,21370.html>.
704. Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. National Envirotech Group, L.L.C., No. 97-2064
(E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1997) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
705. No. 98-CV-0413 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 1998) (on file with the Seattle University Law
Review).
706. Id.
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XI. CONCLUSION
Now that the current regulatory environment of computer
information systems has been discussed, we are left wondering how
well the regulations function to control Cyberspace. Many people fear
that the current law does not effectively protect the rights of voyagers
through Cyberspace. This has given rise to groups such as Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility7. 7 and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation.7 8 Groups such as these work to increase access to
technology for the general masses; to help legislatures understand what
it is they are regulating; to help aid in the passing of responsible,
workable, laws; and, where necessary, to help defend people whose
rights are being violated because of legislation which does not properly
cover computer information systems.
Constitutional law professor Laurence Tribe has even proposed a
new amendment to the U.S. Constitution to protect individuals from
such violations of their rights. His proposed amendment reads:
This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech, press,
petition, and assembly, and its protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, shall be construed as fully applicable
without regard to the technological method or medium through
which information content is generated, stored, altered, transmitted,
or controlled.7"9
This amendment would serve to ensure that the speech and privacy
rights that we currently enjoy in other media would be applied to
electronic communications as well. An amendment such as this would
hopefully avoid incidents like the raid on Steve Jackson Games. This
amendment would serve to guarantee that a computer bulletin board
publishing the contemporary editor's message would enjoy the same
constitutional protection as the print publisher's printing press. This
is particularly important as electronic publishing and electronic
document delivery become the norm, rather than the exception.710
707. Katy Ring, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Seeks to Change Lay
Preconceptions, COMPUGRAM INT'L, Oct. 9, 1990.
708. John P. Barlow, Crime and Puzzlement: In Advance of the Law on the Electronic
Frontier; Cyberspace, WHOLE EARTH REV.,'Sept. 22, 1990, at 44.
709. Laurence Tribe Proposed Constitutional Amendment, available over INTERNET, by
anonymous FTP, at FTP.EFG.ORG (Electronic Frontier Foundation) (visited March 29, 1998).
710. See generally John Browning, Libraries Without Walls for Books Without Pages,
WIRED, 1.1, Premiere Issue, 1993, at 65 (discussing the Bibliotheque de France's digital
scanning of "100,000 great works of the 20th century as chosen by a committee of notable French
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What is necessary to regulate computer information system
content and system operator liability is, first and foremost, an
understanding of the technology. The law is a slow-evolving,
tradition-bound beast. Computers are an upstart technology pioneered
by people who do things like create viruses to let loose on their friends
in order to hone their programming skills." If judges, juries,
lawyers, and legislators do not understand current technology, the
technology will change before the law catches up to it.
Many of our current laws will work well if adapted to computer
information systems. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986712 works well to regulate electronic mail because it is modeled
after the statute that governs the U.S. mail.713 For many people,
these new communications fora are direct replacements for old means
of communications; therefore they should be regulated like the ones
they represent. This may entail using several different regulatory
schemes, but this should not be too difficult to employ by people who
understand the technology at issue. Simply regulate e-mail like U.S.
mail, regulate networks like common carriers, etc. It would not be
difficult to employ the correct legal analogy if the computer informa-
tion service at issue is looked at from the user's point of view. At
some point, totally new models of regulation may be appropriate.
Where novel legislation is needed is in defining terms to be used
in the developing law and in filling any gaps. One illustration is
trespassing. If someone hacks into a computer system, is he or she
breaking and entering? Or, is the situation more analogous to someone
making a prank telephone call? Another example is the copying of
electronic documents. Should merely reading an electronic text into
RAM constitute a potentially infringing copy? How does a library
lend an electronic document without making a copy?
Tribe's proposed constitutional amendment is rooted in logic
similar to underlying logic of a natural law concept. Because constitu-
tional protection already exists, it should be assumed that the
Constitution covers all technologies equally, including Cyberspace. In
theory an amendment to the Constitution is not necessary. However,
a new amendment would leave no doubts and would make for
streamlined judicial decisions. As computer systems grow in their use,
older media will pass away. The growth of computer networks and
citizens").
711. See Branscomb, supra note 408, at 7-11.
712. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994).
713. 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1994).
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on-line services in the past few years has been explosive. New laws
will have to be added, and old laws will have to evolve to conform with
the specific demands of the new media.
A growing imperative will also be international coordination of
laws. "The point is that pretty soon you'll have no more idea of what
computer you are using than you have of where your electricity is
generated when you turn on the light." '714 For a networked comput-
er, access can be had from anywhere there is a network connection.
Often, there is little or no easy way to determine in which state or
country the computer you are using is located. In our interconnected
society, there may not even be a clear way to establish which sover-
eign's laws will apply. International cooperation will become essential
in resolving matters such as conflicts of laws if the legal environment
is to be truly clear and understandable to guide the behavior of system
operators. In cases where the law will not provide clarity, some
network users will resort to "self help" remedies to perceived ills-
hacking the hackers until a sort of "justice" is achieved.
714. Danny Hillis, Kay + Hillis, WIRED, 2.01, Jan. 1994, at 103.
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